

TOKIEDA'S LANGUAGE PROCESS THEORY

BY

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ABSTRACT

The Language Process Theory (*Gengo Kateisetsu*) was introduced in the 1930s by the Japanese linguist, Tokieda Motoki (1900-1967). The theory presents language as a human process, not as a structure that exists within the speaker or outside of a human community. Language, Tokieda tells us, is a process by which a culture's meanings are expressed and understood. Tokieda constructs this view of language on the basis of his study of the concepts of language that had been established by traditional Japanese linguists prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, the thought of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945), his critical reading of Ferdinand de Saussure, and the concepts of Buddhist philosophy.

During the 1940s and 50s, Tokieda played a significant role in the advancement of theoretical linguistics and its treatment of the Japanese language, with his theory having an important influence on other Japanese linguists – more frequently indirectly than directly. His theory has not, however, always been clearly understood. Indeed, it has only been recently that the scholarly community has begun to appreciate more fully his view of language.

To help bring a better understanding of his theory to the scholarly community of Japan and the world, this essay examines Tokieda's work, together with the writings of his precursors, contemporaries, students and critics, from new and varied points of view and assesses both its theoretical value and its usefulness in the classroom.

After considering Tokieda's theory from the point of view of its philosophical foundations, this thesis proceeds, to examine in detail the following topics; textual analysis, his theory of the polite-honorific language (*keigo*), and the role of reading

in the teaching of language and literature – all of which are discussed with their application to illustrative texts, many of which are passages from the Japanese classics.

Through the examination of the theory behind these topics, we find that his major ideas such as the concept of “situation” (*bamen*) and the relation between “objective expressions” (*shi*) and “subjective expressions” (*ji*) are useful not only to those studying Japanese, but also to those whose interest in language is theoretical and to those whose concerns are pedagogical. Both can benefit substantially from Tokieda’s insights and through them obtain a broader understanding not only of modern linguistic theory but also how the extra-structural aspects of language can better be taught.

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To R. L. Spear, who gave me strong support and useful advice at the various stages until the completion of the dissertation.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to explicate the Language Process Theory (*Gengo Kateisetsu*) of Tokieda Motoki (1900-1967) and consider it from a new point of view, one that relates it more intimately with contemporary linguistics, both theoretically and practically. To accomplish this we will begin by placing Tokieda and his scholarship in their traditional setting, tracing the influences of Western linguistics on his scholarship, and then discussing the relevance of his scholarship to subsequent theory. With this as a foundation, Tokieda's theory will be applied to the process of analyzing Japanese texts, the function of the respect language in Japanese, and the role of literature in the process of learning a language. Each of these aspects of language will further be related to the question of how best to associate theory to pedagogical practice.

It was in the period from 1943 to 1961, when a professor at Tokyo University, that Tokieda was a major influence on Japan's linguistics. It is the scholarly activity of this period that we will focus our attention in Chapter 2 beginning with the scholarship that influenced his writings, then turning to those works that are of comparative value in understanding his contribution to the field, and in the third section, his influence on later scholarship will be discussed.

His process theory of language, which integrates both theory and practice, treats language as the process by which meanings are expressed and understood. As we will observe in our examination of his theory in Chapter 3, Tokieda's theory has ties not only to Western linguistics, as seen in his criticism of the writings of Ferdinand de Saussure but also to those European philosophical concepts that were introduced

into Japan by Nishida Kitarō, arguably the most important philosopher to be produced by Japan.

During the 1940s and 50s, Tokieda played a significant role in the advancement of theoretical linguistics and its treatment of the Japanese language, with his theory having an important influence on other Japanese linguists – more frequently indirectly than directly. His theory has not, however, always been clearly understood. Indeed, it has only been recently that the scholarly community has begun to appreciate more fully his view of language, a view that interprets language not as a phenomenon that can be explicated by means of formulae that account for objective or subjective facts, but rather as a process best understood holistically. It is hoped that this presentation of Tokieda's scholarship and its applications will convince others that contemporary linguistics would be advanced by the closer study of the Language Process Theory and its focus on language as human interaction.

In recent years Tokieda's theory has begun to draw greater attention from the scholarly community both at home and abroad. Not unexpectedly those scholars who are exploring phenomenological linguistics, pragmatics, and literary criticism are in the vanguard of this resurgence. Any of these scholars find the Language Process Theory a valuable tool for their research because it gives priority to parole over langue and views language not as a stable system but rather as an unending process of becoming. It will be the task of Chapter 2 to bring these concerns into focus, so that they can be examined more closely in Chapter 3 and applied to pedagogically relevant concerns in the following three chapters.

Tokieda's Language Process Theory encompasses a wide range of topics and therefore presents many aspects requiring study. In Chapter 3 we shall consider the

philosophical aspects of his theory, beginning with an overview of Nishida Kitarō's logic of locus, and its influence on Tokieda's major linguistic concepts of *bamen* (situation). We will then discuss his concepts of *shi* (objective expressions) and *ji* (subjective expressions) as they function within a theory that takes language as an unending process of becoming. And here, to better understand the concept of becoming we will look at the influence of Buddhist philosophy on Tokieda's theory.

The next three chapters will take up topics of practical significance; (1) the interpretation of texts as a demonstration of the insight that the Process Theory can bring to linguistic analysis, (2) the examination of the Japanese respect language as it represents the intimate interaction of language and culture, and (3) the role of literature in language learning. All of these topics, we might add, are among those that many scholars, East and West, are currently examining from the various points of view.

More specifically, in Chapter 4, Tokieda's theory will be applied to the task of practical text analysis, focusing on the usefulness of employing his concepts of *shi* and *ji*. For this purpose, two texts have been selected; "*Kumo no ito* (The spider's thread)" 1918, by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke, a children's story often used as a text in Japanese schools; and several English translations of the preface to the Late Middle Japanese work *Tsurezuregusa* (Idle jottings) c.1330, by Kamo no Chōmei, a classical text whose interpretation demonstrates the flexibility of the Process Theory.

Tokieda's study of discourse was the first in Japan to open up the potentialities of the process approach to textual analysis, and it has been only recently that efforts have been made to advance his seminal insights. It is for this reason that this thesis attempts to re-assess the utility of Tokieda's theory, not only for Japanese linguists

but for all scholars, teachers, and learners of language.

Since this thesis has as one of its major concerns the relationship between theory and practice, Chapter 5 deals with the application Tokieda's of his theory of respect language (*keigo*). This has been done not only because it is a significant concern of his Language Process Theory, but also because it reflects quite clearly how a more process oriented theory – one that offers a critical challenge to the convenient division between semantics and pragmatics – can be of significant help in any pedagogy that wishes to relate linguistic forms to cultural use. Politeness in Japanese speech is an aspect of the language that is not only profoundly important in social settings, but also extremely difficult for foreign students to master in their efforts to assimilate the mental processes necessary for the effective use the language. Today, concerning the usage of honorific expressions, both native speakers and foreign learners of Japanese alike are, as Tokieda anticipated, struggling under disconcerting conditions. Both in the English and Japanese speaking communities, the rules that determine social interaction are being relaxed. And for this reason a reexamination of the use of the honorific language, as an essential feature of Japanese language and speech, is important if we are to gain a clearer understanding of how social relationships are expressed in a language. In this respect, Tokieda's theory of *keigo* is as relevant now as it was more than sixty years ago. And so it will be argued in this thesis that by absorbing his insights on *keigo*, integrating them into contemporary scholarship, and making better use of them in the classroom, we can contribute significantly to the development of the study not only of polite language but also of the impingement of social systems generally on linguistic forms as they are employed throughout the world.

The role of reading, and more specifically the reading of literature, in the pedagogical application of theory has, for a number of historical reasons, been given less attention by linguists than it deserves. It will be the aim of Chapter 6 to argue that greater attention should be given to this aspect of language and that Tokieda, whose concern is not in the mental functions required to perform the act of reading, but in the way literature functions within the community, presents a number of valuable insights into the area of language. For descriptivists working with native speaker informants, and for structuralists dedicated to the construction of a model to explain the structures innately present in the mind, the linguistic significance of such works of art as Lewis Carroll's Alice books has little or no concern. Tokieda takes the position that culture is not so easily divided between what we hear and say, on the one hand, and what we read and write, on the other, and for this reason he attempts to unify what others would divide. If the relation between language and literature is more closely examined from the point of view of Tokieda's theory, there is the potential to develop a theory of communication on the basis of which the studies of these two fields can be more effectively integrated. We shall also discuss in this chapter Tokieda's Language Process Theory as an early and insightful precursor to the theory of speech acts, and argue that, in contrast to other speech act theories, Tokieda's not only deals with the overall process by which speakers function in their linguistic community but also with how readers can attain a better understanding of their reading acts.

A careful study of these three topics; textual analysis, the linguistic treatment of the respect language, and the role of literature in language learning, is not only highly important for those who have interest in Tokieda's Language Process Theory

and its usefulness in language pedagogy, but also more widely for those whose interest is in language as a human means of communication and a cultural phenomenon.

With this as an introduction, we will now proceed to the theoretical portion of this essay, an undertaking that will attempt to present Tokieda's Process Theory in such a way that can be applied to the fields of linguistics and literature, as well as several sub-disciplines of the former. Though this might be considered too broad a topic to be dealt with in so short a thesis, I have decided to undertake the task for two reasons. First, there is currently a strong interest in textual analysis, pragmatics, and the role of reading literary works as an adjunct to language learning, making Tokieda's theory highly relevant. And further, as I will attempt to demonstrate, if only in an introductory manner, that Tokieda's Process Theory has the capacity to contribute in profoundly important ways to the development of a more effective theory of linguistics, a theory that Tokieda would argue ought not compartmentalise the various aspects of human communication, but rather strive to integrate them into a process that will broaden the horizon of our understanding of language and its relationship to culture.

CHAPTER 2 TOKIEDA'S PLACE IN LINGUISTICS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the scholarly milieu of Tokieda's Language Process Theory. First we will look at Tokieda's career and his bibliography in detail. The discussion in Section 2.2 will first focus on the classical Japanese grammarians that were an early influence on his thinking and then on the work of Saussure, which Tokieda criticizes as failing to characterize properly the genius of language. In Section 2.3 a discussion of the influence that Tokieda's work has had upon the subsequent scholarship will be presented. While further reference will be made to this scholarship in subsequent chapters, it is hoped that the overview offered here will serve as a foundation for the theoretical concerns of Chapter 3, as well as the practical applications that will be dealt with in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. We will approach these influences from the vantage point of how they came to be significant in the construction of Tokieda's theory.

2.1. TOKIEDA'S CAREER

Let us begin with a brief sketch of Tokieda's life. He was born in December 6, 1900 in Tokyo as the eldest son of Tokieda Motoyuki and Kiku. His father, Motoyuki, was a bank employee for twenty years working intermittently at overseas branches in such places as India and The United States. Motoyuki had great influence on Tokieda's childhood, inspiring in him an interest in Japanese language.¹

Motoyuki was a great reader and had a strong interest in the Japanese language, particularly in the matter of how it should be reformed. In 1913 he wrote an essay on

how the Japanese language might be changed in order to get the Japanese language spoken and understood more widely in the world. His main idea was to replace the *kango* (Japanese words of Chinese origin) of Japanese with English words. In this way, he believed, those who spoke Japanese would be able to communicate more effectively in the world community, and the Japanese language would be more readily understandable to foreigners. Here is an example of his proposed creolized language:

*Wazuka twenty years ago, Constitutional Government no moto, first Diet ga hirakareta toki, Prince Itō ga kare no "Commentaries on Constitution" ni Ministers wa directly niwa Emperor ni mata indirectly niwa people ni "responsible de aru"; mata "Ministers no responsibility o decide suru power wa Diet kara withheld sarete aru" to iishi koto wa generally ni acknowledge sareta.*²

Only twenty years ago, when the first Diet was held under the Constitutional Government, Prince Ito in his "Commentaries on Constitution" said that the Ministers were responsible directly to the Emperor, indirectly to the people, and that the power of the Ministers to decide their responsibility was withhold by the Diet. This has been generally acknowledged.

Motoyuki also had innovative ideas on how to divide Japanese words. They should, he believed, be divided into two groups; one the physical elements, the other the psychological. The latter had a relation to the basic structure of the grammar, and therefore should not be changed; on the other hand, the former could be freely changed. Those elements that could be replaced by English words belonged to the former. Concerning Motoyuki's ideas of the reform of Japanese, Tokieda says,

I was influenced unconsciously by my father's ideas of reforming Japanese, which had been based on his breathing the air of the

civilization and enlightenment in the Meiji period, and his indulging in the rationalism, convenience, materialism of the United States, while living abroad. Sometimes I practiced eagerly on the typewriter by myself and made the sentences that were written only in Romanization, sometimes I was scolded by my teacher of the national language in the junior high school for presenting compositions that were written only in Japanese syllabary.³

While we can be certain that Tokieda's thinking about language and its problems began under the influence of his father's, as he grew up, he began to disagree with Motoyuki's extravagant ideas about reform, especially after the young student became familiar with views of Ueda Kazutoshi and his concern with the protection of the national language.⁴

Ueda Kazutoshi (1867-1937), who was a professor of Japanese language at Tokyo Imperial University, greatly influenced Tokieda in his childhood. When Tokieda was a student at Gyosei Junior High School, he read Ueda's view of Japanese language in his textbook on the Japanese language, a textbook that taught that the national language should be respected and protected. Ueda called constantly for the development of Japanese language studies as a science, with his studies becoming models for later works on the Japanese language. Tokieda was so impressed by what he read of Ueda's ideas that he was not able to think about his future without its being concerned with the Japanese language.⁵

Despite his own interest in Japanese language, Motoyuki was against his son's wish to be a scholar of Japanese language. Motoyuki advised his son to study it as his hobby, not as a career. But Tokieda did not change his goal. Following graduation from Dairoku (the Sixth) High School, in 1922, Tokieda entered the Department of Japanese Literature, Tokyo Imperial University. This was at the time when Ueda

Kazutoshi was a professor and Hashimoto Shinkichi (1882-1945) an assistant in the department. Their influence on Tokieda will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.

After doing exceptionally well in his undergraduate studies, Tokieda wrote his graduation paper in 1924 on the history of the study of Japanese language before the Meiji period. The title was “Nihon ni okeru gengo kannen no hattatsu oyobi gengo kenkyū no mokuteki to sono hōhō (Meiji izen), (The development of the conception of language and the purpose and method of language study, prior to the Meiji period in Japan).”⁶ This was the point of departure for the later formulation of his views on language, and the basis of those linguistic ideas that were to be developed into his Language Process Theory. This will be the main topic of Chapter Three.

In 1925, after being graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, Tokieda, now twenty-five, became a teacher of Japanese at the Tokyo Daini Shiritsu Chūgakkō (The Second Municipal Junior High School). According to Tokieda, the teaching of Japanese language to junior high school students was exceedingly valuable. The experience was both stimulating and rewarding, with Japanese serving as a vital means of communication between teacher and students. During this period, he dedicated himself to the concerns of the classroom rather than trying to integrate his linguistic research with teaching. At Daini Chūgakkō he did, however, met Nishio Minoru (1889-1979), a senior colleague who had a significant influence on his latter scholarship.⁷

In April 1927, recommended by Hashimoto, Tokieda became an associate professor of Japanese language at Keijo Imperial University, in the present day national university in Seoul, Korea.⁸ It had been founded in 1926 as the first imperial university in a Japanese colony. Before arriving in Keijo, Tokieda published

his first paper “Suzuki Akira no kokugogakushijō ni okeru ichi ni tsuite (The place of Suzuki Akira in the history of Japanese language studies)” in January 1927. It was a reworking of a portion of his graduation paper.⁹ In December of his first year at Keijo, Tokieda was granted a leave of absence to visit England, Germany, France, and the United States to study the Western methods of linguistics. After returning from abroad in August, 1929, he married Takafuji Keiko in October, with whom he had two daughters.

He was invited to present his impressions of his travel abroad at a meeting of the Japanese Language Study Group of Tokyo Imperial University on the 26th of September 1929. He spoke about the history of Japanese language and how it differed from that of Western languages and the need to make the nature of the national language clear in order to establish a firm foundation for Japanese linguistics. In his talk he stressed the importance of the study of the role of characters in the Japanese language.¹⁰

In 1933, Tokieda became a professor at Keijo Imperial University, teaching Japanese language and linguistics there for sixteen years. After his first book *Kokugogakushi* (The history of Japanese language studies)¹¹ in 1932, during his stay in Korea, Tokieda almost every year wrote a major paper on Japanese language, papers that were collected in his *Kokugogaku Genron* (The principles of the Japanese language study), in 1941. They included:

Bun no kaishakujō yori mita joshi jodōshi (The classification of post-positional particles and auxiliary verbs from the viewpoint of sentence interpretation), 1937.

Shinteki katei to shitenno gengo honshitsukan (A view of language as a mental

process), 1937.

Gengo ni okeru bamen no seiyaku ni tsuite (On the restrictions of *bamen* in language)¹², 1938.

Bamen to keijihō to no kinōteki kankei ni tsuite (On the functional relation between *bamen* and honorific expressions), 1938.

Keigohō oyobi keijihō no kenkyū (A study on the nature and structure of honorific expressions), 1939.

Gengo no sonzai jōken (The conditions for the existence of language), 1941.

In May of the same year, Tokieda's father, Motoyuki died. During this period, 1932-1935, Tokieda and his family experienced a number of misfortunes, his father's death, his wife Keiko becoming ill, and his own depression. Tokieda suffered from a nervous breakdown and cancelled his lectures and published no papers for the next two years. In an effort to improve his health, Tokieda returned to *kendō*, a martial art that had been one of his childhood interests.¹³ In 1938, Tokieda planned to resign from Keijo and leave Korea in protest to the administrative policy of the colonial government. This was caused by the government's requiring an oath of loyalty to the Emperor (*Kōkoku Shinmin no Seishi*) to be taken by Koreans and the demand that a tower (*Hōnōtō*) at Keijo Imperial University be dedicated to the Emperor in October 1938, matters that Tokieda considered an infringement of the university's autonomy. His resignation was not accepted.¹⁴

It was not until May of 1943, following the retirement of Hashimoto, that Tokieda returned to Tokyo, now as the professor of Japanese language at Tokyo Imperial University. In June of that year he obtained his doctorate with *Kokugogaku*

Genron (The principles of the Japanese language study).

In the following year, Tokieda, with Hashimoto, prepared to establish the Society for Japanese Language Studies. The preparations went slowly as a consequence of the large number of students who had left the university to fight in the war.

In April 1946, Tokieda became a member of *Kokugo shingikai* (The Japanese Language Council, an advisory committee of the Minister of Education). During this period, Tokieda's works on the problems in the Japanese language study and on Japanese language education increased. They were:

Kokugo no kōtsū seiri (Controlling the traffic in Japanese language), 1946.

Kokugo mondai ni taisuru kokugogaku no tachiba (The position of Japanese linguistics towards the problems of Japanese language), 1947.

Kokugo Kenkyūhō (A method to the study of Japanese language), 1947.

Kokugo kyōiku ni okeru koten kyōzai no igi ni tsuite (On the meaning of the classic materials in the Japanese language education), 1948.

Kokugo Mondai to Kokugo Kyōiku (The Japanese language problems and Japanese language education), 1949.

Kokugo ni okeru gokai to kyokkai (The misunderstanding and perversion in Japanese language), 1951.

Kokugo Kyōiku no Arikata (How Japanese should be taught), 1951.

Kokugo Kyōiku no Hōhō (The method of the Japanese language education), 1954.

In 1954 he also published *Nihonbunpō Bungohen* (The literary Japanese grammar),

which is, with his earlier work *Nihonbunpō Kōgohen* (The colloquial Japanese grammar) in 1950, one of his major works on Japanese grammar.

In 1955, Tokieda completed *Kokugogaku Genron Zokuhen* (A sequel to “The principles of the Japanese language study”). Then, in 1960, he became the head of *Monbushō Shidō Yōryō Inkaï* (The Ministry of Education Committee for the guidance of teaching). He continued writing on the Japanese language education: *Kokugo kyōiku no kisoteki na shomondai* (The basic problems in Japanese language education) in 1960, *Kokugo Mondai to Kokugo Kyōiku, Zōteiban* (The Japanese language problems and Japanese language education, revised edition) in 1961, and *Kokugo Mondai no tameni* (For the sake of the problems of Japanese language) in 1962. In these and other works, Tokieda strove to connect the study of Japanese language education to the study of Japanese linguistics within the frame of the Language Process Theory. Hamamoto Jun’itsu, referring to the situation at the time when the problems of Japanese language education had been little discussed in the field of Japanese linguistics, states that Tokieda contributed greatly to the field of Japanese language education through his Language Process Theory, and that the study of Japanese language education might have been significantly less deeply and broadly understood were it not for Tokieda’s contributions to the field.¹⁵

The year of 1960 was also important for his study of discourse. In September Tokieda published *Bunshō Kenkyū Josetsu* (An introduction to the study of discourse). In this work he tried to deal with discourse as an integral whole, not as a text to be analyzed into words or phrases. He proposed that discourse be dealt with on the basis of the Language Process Theory.¹⁶ Tokieda retired from Tokyo University in March 1961, and became a professor at Waseda University. During his

period he worked on his study of the linguistic life of Japan, which he wanted to include in the final formulation of his Language Process Theory. At the same time, he strove to have the theory understood more fully, and to get criticism of his theory from other scholars.¹⁷

In 1966, he was awarded *Shiju Hōshō* (the Purple Ribbon Medal), but before he was able to complete all of his projects, Tokieda died of stomach cancer on the 27th of October 1967. He posthumously received the *Kun Nitō Zuihō Shō* (the Second-Class Order of the Sacred Treasure).

2.2. INFLUENCES UPON TOKIEDA'S PROCESS THEORY

As was mentioned in the previous section, “Nihon ni okeru gengo kannen no hattatsu oyobi gengo kenkyū no mokuteki to sono hōhō (Meiji izen), (The development of the conception of language and the purpose and method of language study, prior to the Meiji period in Japan),” the paper that Tokieda wrote in 1924 as his graduation thesis at Tokyo Imperial University, was the starting point for the construction of his Language Process Theory. For this reason it would be well to consider the academic environment of his studies at Tokyo Imperial University and the influence it had on his thesis.

When Tokieda began his study Japanese linguistics in 1922 at Tokyo Imperial University, the general method was to begin by studying the methods of modern Western philology and grammar. Therefore, Tokieda like other students studied such works as W. Chambers, *Chamber's Encyclopaedia*, A.H. Sayce, *Principles of Comparative Philology*, W.D. Whitney, *Life and Growth of Language*, H.A. Strong,

Introduction to the Study of the History of Language, Henry Sweet, *History of Language* and O. Jespersen, *Progress in Language with Special References to English*, and *Language, its Nature, Development and Origin*.¹⁸ Reading those books, Tokieda was confronted by a perennial problem: what is the nature of language. In search of an answer, he studied not only linguistics but also, philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and religion.

At Tokyo Imperial University, Tokieda had the opportunity to attend Professor Ueda Kazutoshi's lectures and to hear directly the famous scholar's views on the Japanese language. Ueda, who was born in Tokyo in 1867, studied linguistics at Tokyo Imperial University under two famous foreign teachers, Basil Hall Chamberlain and Karl Adolf Florenz. Chamberlain (1850-1935) had come to Japan in 1873 at the age of twenty three, and taught Japanese and philology at Tokyo Imperial University from 1886 to 1889. He made a profound contribution to the establishment of modern study of Japanese linguistics with works such as *A Simplified Grammar of the Japanese Language* in 1872, *A Handbook of Colloquial Japanese* in 1888, and *Nihonshōbunten* in 1889. Florenz (1865-1939) taught philology at Tokyo Imperial University from 1893 to 1914. Following Chamberlain, he contributed greatly to the establishment of the study of linguistics at the university. He wrote an important essay on Japanese writing in the Roman alphabet for the first issue of Tokyo Imperial University's *Gengogaku Zasshi* (The journal of linguistics) in 1900. While teaching at the university, he studied Japanese literature and became the first foreigner to gain a doctoral degree at a university in Japan. His *Geschichte der Japanischen Literatur* written in 1909 was translated into Japanese by S. Tsuchikata and T. Shinoda as *Nihonbungakushi* in 1936. Ueda's lectures on this

scholarship stimulated Tokieda's study of Japanese linguistics.¹⁹

Ueda, after returning from Europe, where he had studied linguistics, and comparative studies at Berlin and Leipzig University from 1890 to 1894, introduced European linguistics to Japan and contributed to the establishment of modern Japanese linguistics as a professor of linguistics at Tokyo Imperial University.²⁰ However, under the influence of the then prevalent nationalistic relevance of language and its study in Europe, Ueda had become better known as a politically active scholar with strong views concerning the National Language (*kokugo*) than as a cloistered academician. He gave many lectures outside the university on how language is important for the people, one of the most famous of which was *Kokugo to Kokka to* (National Language and Nation), given at Tetsugakukan in October 1894, shortly after his return from abroad.²¹ Ueda's enthusiasm for the study of Japanese linguistics, his modern academic style, and his close association of a nation's culture with its language were to influence greatly Tokieda as he immersed himself in the study of Japanese linguistics.

Then too there was Hashimoto Shinkichi (1882-1945), an assistant in the Department of Japanese Literature at the time, who gave Tokieda invaluable guidance. Tokieda wrote his graduation paper under his supervision. Hashimoto, who had been greatly impressed by Hermann Paul's *Principien der Sprachgeschichte* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1880) as a student, had already in 1916 written, with his mentor Ueda, "Kohon Setsuyōshū no kenkyū (A study of the old texts of *Setsuyōshū*)" for a university publication.²²

Hashimoto later became one of the most distinguished scholars in the field of Japanese language studies. His concept of *bunsetsu* as a minimal syntactical unit,

first presented in *Kokugohō Yōsetsu* (The essentials of Japanese grammar), in 1934, became one of the most important contributions to Japanese linguistic studies during the Shōwa period (1926-1989). Indeed Tokieda made use of the term to describe any combination of the two units, though after he had written his graduation paper, Tokieda came to refer to such combinations as *ku* (phrases).

And here we should take into account the influence of a natural disaster that occurred in 1923. In September of that year, the great earthquake struck the Tokyo area. As just a small portion of what was lost in the fire that followed the earthquake were many of the most valuable books and documents in the library of the University of Tokyo.²³ As Tokieda himself relates, this catastrophe influenced the direction of his study. The ruined city, the confusion, and then the reconstruction, created an atmosphere in which Tokieda, now in a world without resources, could do little else than to focus his mind on fundamental, theoretical problems. And to resolve these problems, he set himself to the task of understanding what older Japanese scholars had thought about the nature of language.²⁴

We might conclude this section by noting that after the death of Hashimoto in 1945, Tokieda was appointed head of the committee that in the following year published his collected writings. In this book, Tokieda comments on Hashimoto's work, and describes him as a truly dedicated and intense scholar, one less politically involved Ueda, a generalist.²⁵ And so it was that Tokieda in his formative years fell under the influence of two different academic styles, the meticulous and the dynamic, styles that he united in his own career.

2.2.1. The Influence of Suzuki Akira

Tokieda's graduation paper was a very long thesis by any standards, consisting of seven chapters and having three hundred and seventy six sheets of three hundred-character manuscript paper, with one illustration and three diagrams. The topic of this paper was the history of the studies of Japanese language during the Edo Period (1600-1867). Its aim, however, was less to introduce the scholars and their works than to establish his own linguistic thought by clarifying the scholarship of his predecessors. His chief sources for this historical investigation were; *Kokugogaku Shōshi* (The short history of the Japanese language study) by Hoshina Kōichi, 1899, and *Nihongogakushi* (The history of the Japanese language study) by Naga Tsuregaki, 1908.

One of the results of his research was that Tokieda discovered a manuscript copy of *Katsugo Kiretsuzuki no Fu* (A table of forms of inflectional words) completed about 1803 by Suzuki Akira (1764-1837), now regarded as the original or close to the original formulation of his grammatical thought. By examining this manuscript, Tokieda found that it was Suzuki who unified the studies of Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) and Fujitani Nariakira (1738-1779), integrated both schools, and thereby advanced the early modern study of the conjugational system.

This was a significant event in the study of the history of Japanese linguistics because before the manuscript had been found and examined by Tokieda, it had been believed that it was *Kotoba no Yachimata* (A study of verb forms), written in 1806 by Motoori Haruniwa (1763-1828), that had unified the earlier studies, and so it can be seen that Tokieda at the beginning of his career was able to modify the orthodox

genealogy of the Japanese linguistic studies and put Suzuki's scholarship, which had been long neglected, in its proper place.

Although Tokieda's paper focuses on the linguistic concepts and their development by the chief scholars of the Edo Period, Tokieda was able to contribute to the study of *tenioha* - *tenioha* being a traditional grammatical term applied not only to the Japanese postpositional particles but also to the suffixes of verbs and adjectives, and even certain adverbs. While during nineteenth century, *tenioha* referred to the postpositional particles and verbal suffixes, by the end of nineteenth century it referred only to the postpositional particles. The term itself is not used in modern Japanese linguistics.

Unlike Chinese, Japanese is characterized by these kinds of agglutinative elements. Nevertheless, because of the tradition of marking Chinese texts to be read in Japanese with a mark for the *te* placed in the upper right and corner of a character and a mark for the *ni*, *o*, and *ha*, placed clockwise in the others, the term that was appropriate for the marking texts came to be applied to the grammatical elements of Japanese and have a significant influence on Japanese grammatical studies, and subsequently on the Language Process Theory of Tokieda.

From the fourteenth century, the study of these morphological elements was carried on almost exclusively for the explication of Japanese poems, *waka*. Tokieda may well have thought that because the study of *tenioha* had developed within the confines of Japanese culture with little foreign influence, clarifying their use historically might help in gaining a better understanding of how the Japanese people conceived of language and how Japanese scholars might best describe the grammar of the language.

By dedicating two thirds of his paper to a description of the grammatical elements related to *tenioha*, Tokieda paid considerable attention to Suzuki Akira's *Gengyo Shishuron* (The four categories of words) of 1824. This work divides Japanese words roughly into four types; *tai no shi*, *arikata no shi*, *shiwaza no shi* and *tenioha*. *Tai no shi* is the general equivalent to the noun in the modern parts of speech, *arikata no shi* the adjective, and *shiwaza no shi* the verb. The *tenioha* for Suzuki includes not only postpositional particles, verbal suffixes, and interjections, but also adverbs and the conjunctive and inflectional elements of verbs and adjectives. According to Suzuki, the first three types of words point at something, while the last, the *tenioha*, have nothing to point at. Suzuki also states that the *tenioha* are the "voice of the mind" applied to the *shi*, which points at something. If a *shi* is a bead (*tama*), the *tenioha* are the cord (*o*) that connects one bead to other, making an ornament to be worn; and using another metaphor he describes the *shi* is a container and the *tenioha* as the human hands that move to make use of it. The former metaphor follows Motoori's explanation, and Suzuki explains more effectively the function of *tenioha* by adding the latter. Both beads and containers have no way to be useful without cords and hands. Yet, cords and hands have no object to work upon without the beads and containers.

Suzuki's definitions were made on the basis of those studies of *tenioha* written to explicate the *waka* of the Middle Ages. One of the most important of these was *Teniha Taigaishō* (The outline of *teniha*) completed at the beginning of the fourteenth century by Fujiwara no Teika (1162-1241).²⁶ Tokieda, however, regarded Suzuki's definitions not only as the successor to the traditional studies but something that suggested a functional difference between *shi* and *tenioha*. Although in his

graduation paper Tokieda did not extend his own linguistic thought beyond the analysis of Suzuki's ideas, this was certainly the starting point from which he began to consider *shi* as the objective elements and *tenioha* as the subjective elements of Japanese.

In contrast to Yamada Yoshio, the great classical scholar who did not regard *Gengyo Shishuron* as important,²⁷ Tokieda thought that Suzuki presented a highly useful categorization of words, and used it in the establishment of his theory of *shi* and *ji*. The approach that Tokieda took when writing a graduation paper of re-examining the concepts used in the Edo studies led to their re-evaluation and subsequently to his finding a broader use for the linguistic studies.

2.2.2 The Influence of Ferdinand de Saussure

Between the submission of Tokieda's thesis in 1924 and his return from his tour of Europe in 1929, an event took place that had a profound influence upon the course of Japanese linguistic scholarship. This was Kobayashi Hideo's 1928 translation into Japanese of Ferdinand de Saussure's *Cours de linguistique générale*. Its availability to the Japanese scholarly community not only stimulated greater interest in linguistic science, but also served as a stimulus to a more precise formulation of what was to become Tokieda's Language Process Theory.

Kobayashi came to Keijo Imperial University in the spring of 1929, and there he and Tokieda met again, now as colleagues, when Tokieda returned from Europe in the autumn of that year. They were already well acquainted, since both had attended

the class on the Ainu language at Tokyo Imperial University.²⁸ According to Kobayashi, Tokieda was at Keijo eager to study Saussure. Since their offices were close, Tokieda visited Kobayashi, often once or twice a week, and they frequently discussed the *Cours*. In his 1978 article in *Gengo*, Kobayashi does not criticise Tokieda's popular theory of language process, but emphasizes that Tokieda was, like himself, under the influence of Saussure even though their conclusions were at variance.²⁹

With Kobayashi's translation of Saussure's *Cours*, Saussurean structuralism came to have as profound an influence on the study of language in Japan as it had had on Western theory. Indeed, as a consequence of Kobayashi's translation, there was a strong tendency to take modern linguistics to be equal to structuralism. Kobayashi's choice of the title contributed to this tendency. He had first entitled his translation *Gengogaku Genron* (Principles of linguistics) and in 1972 renamed it *Ippan Gengogaku Kōgi* (General linguistics), titles which give the impression that it was a general overview of the discipline and not the teaching of a single scholar.

Tokieda's criticism of Saussure was mainly focused on the concept of *langue* and its relationship to *parole*. He says:

According to Saussure, *langue* is the association of *image acoustique* and concept. However, what we experience from our actual linguistic practice is not the mutual association of image acoustique and concept, but the association of image acoustique with concept. To establish the existence of something formed by the association of image acoustique and concept from the fact that the two are associated would be a leap of logic.³⁰

The starting point of the study of language for Saussure is not to make an outline of our concrete linguistic experiences but to establish the

fundamental units in language. Saussure's approach to *langue* is similar to that of the natural sciences, although he considers it to be *psychique*. The concept of *langue* exists apart from the person who uses language and therefore neglects the function of the speaker.³¹

Tokieda argues that the concept of *langue* has a natural science bias; that is, it analyzes the structure of language by means of the concept of *unit* as it is employed in the natural sciences. Tokieda's view is that the function of the person who uses language (*gengo shutai*) should be carefully clarified before one attempts to distinguish the linguistics of *parole* from that of *langue*. Since Tokieda considers language as the process by which speakers express and hearers understand thought, it is natural for Tokieda to deny the abstract concept of *langue* as basic, and consequently its relationship with its empirical aspect of *parole*. It is the linguistic act — expression and understanding through language — that Tokieda takes to be the most important object of language study. This is *langage* in Saussure, where it is excluded from linguistic study because of its mixed quality. A process, for Tokieda, includes both what is said and the rules by which it is conceptualised. To separate the two is to remove the container from that hands that are employing it.

The year *Kokugogaku Genron* was published saw the beginning of the Pacific War. This delayed reaction to the work. Indeed, the first response to Tokieda's criticism of Saussure came in 1949 with *Gengo Kateisetsu ni tsuite no gimon* (Questions about the Language Process Theory) by Satō Kiyoji. Although he admits that Tokieda's definition of the nature of language was further developed than that of Saussure in grasping more concretely the shape of language, Satō claimed that the concept of *gengo shutai* (the language user) in the Language Process Theory did not pay sufficient attention to the social aspects of language. He writes:

Language is indeed embodied in individual acts. They are, however, not independent individual acts. There must be something social and objective in order to make individual linguistic acts occur. It is not possible for the sound and meaning to be combined arbitrarily by the individual. The function of certain patterns is needed to combine the sound and meaning. The pattern is neither individual nor subjective.³²

Tokieda answered that when he says *gengo shutai* (the language user) it does not exclude the social aspect of language since every act by human beings including language is governed by historical and social restrictions.³³

There were arguments from both sides of this issue. Kazama (1951)³⁴, Ōkubo (1951)³⁵, Kuroiwa (1952)³⁶, and Monzen (1956)³⁷ took the side of Saussure. The basic position of these papers is to criticise Tokieda for his denial of the concept of *langue* and consequently what they call his subjective mentalism.

On the other hand, apart from Tokieda himself, Miura (1948, 1951)³⁸, together with Sugiyama (1964)³⁹ supported the Language Process Theory. Their similarity is to be found in their recognising the importance of the language user (*gengo shutai*), while criticizing Saussure for his idealistic rationalism.

Among the critics of Tokieda, Hattori (1957)⁴⁰ was especially severe. Hattori Shirō, a Bloomfieldian descriptivist focusing on phonology, criticized Tokieda for misunderstanding Saussure. He pointed to the conventional aspect of *langage* and argued that our verbal behaviour is not random or haphazard but repeatable. He also claimed that what could be experienced directly was *langage*, while *langue* was a hypothetical feature that we establish by observing and analyzing examples of speech. Hattori tried to resolve the conflict between Saussure's theory and *Gengo Kateisetsu* on the basis of his understanding of the relevant concepts. Tokieda, however, argued

that Hattori's view of *langue* was not the same as Saussure's and maintained that even though there were some misunderstandings in his own view of Saussure, this did not significantly affect the arguments presented in support of *Gengo Kateisetsu*.⁴¹ The main point of the argument between the two was their differences in understanding the concepts, a matter on which they never reached agreement.⁴²

Sixteen years later, the matter was reviewed by the linguist Ōhashi Yasuo (1973)⁴³. In his critique, although he agreed that there were problems in Tokieda's understanding of Saussure, he came out against Hattori. Ōhashi's position was that this was not a problem caused by the misunderstanding of Saussure's concepts, but one to be more effectively discussed by placing Tokieda in clear opposition to Saussure, and that it therefore could not be settled by compromise. He argued that what is significant in the comparison of Tokieda and Saussure is that *Gengo Kateisetsu* is a theory whose purpose is to show systematically the linguistic significance of *parole*, and that this had been specifically excluded from the linguistics by Saussure.

In the early eighties another detailed review of the matter was made by Miwa Nobuharu, who is a linguist of the English language. Miwa (1981, 1982)⁴⁴ examines in detail Tokieda's criticism of Saussure:

As a person who studies linguistics, I have been interested how significantly the theory of Saussure has influenced modern linguistic scholarship. I have also been attracted to the criticism of Saussure by Tokieda and how it has influenced the field of Japanese linguistics. I therefore began reading *Kokugogaku Genron*. And once I began, I was quite surprised. The linguistic theory of Saussure and what Tokieda criticizes as Saussure's theory have nothing in common. Tokieda's criticism of Saussure is entirely based on misunderstandings. In

particular, Tokieda misunderstood the concept of *langue*. He took it not as “system (*taikei*)” but as “sign (*kigō*).” This was the fundamental misunderstanding found through out his criticism of Saussure.⁴⁵

Miwa then analyzes how Tokieda misunderstood the concept of *langue*, and continues: “*Langue* in the theory of Saussure is the system of language and the structure of language. Tokieda, however, did not understand this and took it as being a linguistic sign.”⁴⁶ And then he introduces three quotations from Tokieda’s works to show this misunderstanding of the concept of *langue*:

(1) According to Saussure, the true target of linguistics is only *langue*, which is purely a psychic substance (*jun shinriteki jittai*). He says that linguistics is the study of the organization and system that combinations concept and acoustic image.⁴⁷

(2) Saussure considers the combination of the concept and acoustic image as *signe*, and tries to establish language in a general sign.⁴⁸

(3) Saussure himself has said the following about *langue*; Therefore, the linguistic sign is the psychic substance which has two aspects. These two aspects are associated firmly with each other and are in concord with each other.⁴⁹

Miwa says that these references made by Tokieda concerning Saussure’s ideas obviously show that Tokieda interpreted the concept of *langue* as referring to a sign. In particular, the last reference is how Saussure actually defines *signe* not *langue*. Miwa further looks at how Tokieda’s misunderstanding happened. Miwa conjectures that Tokieda studied Saussure almost entirely from the Japanese translation of Kobayashi and through discussions with Kobayashi at Keijo Imperial University, and that the translator Kobayashi himself might not have understood *langue* correctly. Miwa continues:

Let us guess at how Kobayashi answered when he was asked by Tokieda about the difference between Saussure's *langue* and the popular idea in Western linguistics that the linguistic sign is the combination of sound and concept. I imagine that Kobayashi likely answered that *langue* is not the sign of the sound that has meaning physically but is the sign of a substance that is supposedly mental.⁵⁰

Here Miwa takes the position that if we assume this to be Kobayashi's answer, the following interpretation by Tokieda's would be justifiable, "Once people thought that meaningful sounds were transmitted from A to B. Now that understanding has been replaced by *langue*."⁵¹

Thus Miwa arrives at the idea that Kobayashi, who was the translator of the *Cours* and in all likelihood understood Saussure better at the time than any other Japanese scholar, must have understood *langue* to be the combination of a concept and an acoustic image (*chōkaku eizō to gainen to no ketsugōtai*) and was a purely psychic substance (*jun shinriteki jitsuzai*) since it is not the combination of a physical sound and concept (*butsuriteki na onsei to gainen to no ketsugō*). And therefore, because Tokieda absorbed Saussure almost totally through Kobayashi's translation and his discussions with him, Tokieda's misunderstanding was inevitable.

Miwa further argues that Kobayashi not only failed to understand correctly the concept of *langue*, also to grasp the point of Tokieda's criticism of Saussure.⁵² Furthermore, Miwa says that another problem concerning Tokieda's misunderstanding of *langue* is that Hattori, who strongly opposed Tokieda's theory, did not point out that *langue* is the system not the sign as Tokieda had taken it to be. And finally, Miwa emphasizes that Tokieda's misunderstanding of *langue*, which was inevitable given the circumstances under which it was acquired, were the main

causes of the controversy.⁵³

The debate over Tokieda's criticism of Saussure is not yet over. Ōno Susumu discussed Saussure and his place in the field of Japanese linguistics when in 1992 "The International Symposium on Ferdinand de Saussure and Today's Linguistic Theory" took place at Waseda University in Tokyo. He said:

As I have already mentioned, Tokieda discussed Saussure depending entirely on Kobayashi's Japanese version. In fact, there has been much controversy over Tokieda's understanding of the *Cours*. I cannot reasonably judge whether his view is accurate or not, and I don't propose to do so. Rather, I'm greatly interested in the fact that Tokieda viewed language as a human act of expression just as dancing and drawing and that he therefore placed special emphasis on the acting subject.⁵⁴

Then too, at a two-day conference on "The Sensibilities of Transformation, The Linguistic Turn and Contemporary Japanese Literary Criticism" held at UCLA in 2002, John Whitman of Cornell University, whose paper we will return to in the final section of this chapter, also referred to the debate over Tokieda's interpretation of Saussure from another point of view in his paper entitled "Kokugogaku vs. Gengogaku: Language Process Theory and Tokieda's Construction of Saussure, 60 Years Later." He finds a relative lack of connection between this debate, arising as it does in the field of literary theory, and the earlier (but still ongoing) debate over *kokugogaku* and *gengogaku*. He also discusses in detail the misinterpretation made by Tokieda of Saussure's concept of *langage*, noting that it was in large part the consequence of his having used Kobayashi's translation as his source.⁵⁵ He further suggests, however, that this might also have been the result of Otto Jespersen's influence on Tokieda. It is not so much a problem of terminology or even

methodology that separates Tokieda and Saussure as it is an essential difference of thought with respect to the nature of language.

To better understand this issue a re-examination of the relation between the structuralism of Saussure and *Gengo Kateisetsu* should be made. And so we will here end this brief introduction to Saussure's *Cours* as an influence on Tokieda and take up his theory in the next chapter when we discuss the philosophical position of Tokieda as it came under the philosophical influence of Nishida Kitarō.

2.3. THE RELEVANCE OF TOKIEDA'S LINGUISTIC THEORY

2.3.1. The Reception and Criticism of Tokieda's Work

We have already discussed, in the section 2.2.2, the responses to and arguments over Tokieda's criticism of Saussure. Here, from a somewhat different point of view, let us look at the reception of Tokieda's treatment of the grammatical elements of language. As we have seen, it was on the basis of Suzuki Akira's categorization of words that Tokieda divided Japanese words into two groups of *shi* (objective expressions) and *ji* (subjective expressions). *Shi* comprise the type that come to be expressed through the process of conception in the speaker's mind and *ji* the type that are expressed without this process. Viewed from the standpoint of the traditional parts of speech of Japanese, the former includes nouns, pronouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs; the latter postpositional particles, auxiliary verbs, conjunctions, and interjections. *Ji* come at the end in Japanese grammatical units and synthesize the structure in such a way that *ji* wrap *shi*, or, to use Tokieda's earlier metaphor, serve as the hands that

grasp the container. Tokieda says that the difference between *shi* and *ji* is essential and that the definition should be strictly divided.⁵⁶ The problem created by this strict definition is that we are obliged to deal with the sentences end with verbs or adjectives, both of which are *shi*. For example:

(1) *Furu*.

It rains.

(2) *Samui*.

It is cold.

Those sentences have no words of *ji* at the end. Therefore, we cannot find any element that synthesizes *shi* to construct the sentence as a whole, which is the function of *ji* according to the analysis of Tokieda. Tokieda says that we can posit the existence of *ji* even though it is not appeared in the sentence. He calls that *zero-kigō no ji* (zero-sign *ji*), and represents it in this way: ⁵⁷

(3) *Furu* □

(4) *Samui* □

In this way he divides *shi* and *ji* into two categories of words and at the same time, explains the structure of Japanese syntax where *ji* function to unite a sentence by the manner in which *ji* wrap *shi*. He nowhere attempts to formulate an analysis that divides what in more general terms might be called the stem for the ending in such final forms.

Japanese linguists such as Ōno Susumu, Sakakura Atsuyoshi and Kindaichi Haruhiko, opposed the idea of drawing so a clear line between *shi* and *ji*. Ōno says that there should be another category of words between *shi* and *ji*. He claims that Japanese words such as verbs and adjectives, which have inflectional endings and

can be used as predicates, in the inflected forms embody the function of uniting a sentence, which he calls *chinjutsu*.⁵⁸ Therefore, although Ōno agreed with Tokieda's idea that *ji* wrap *shi* at the end of the sentence, he did not accept the idea of zero-sign as shown in the examples above.⁵⁹ According to Ōno, verbs and adjectives show the function of *ji* by their capacity to change forms. "Furu" which is the dictionary form of the verb "furu" and "samui" which is the dictionary form of the adjective "samui" have the function of *ji* as well as that of *shi*, and therefore, these words should be put in the middle category between *shi* and *ji* as the category that has both functions.

Sakakura, like Ōno, criticised Tokieda for making so clear a division between *shi* and *ji*. Further, he claims that auxiliary verbs themselves also have two different features; objective and subjective.⁶⁰

Kindaichi opposed Tokieda's division of *shi* and *ji* from the point of view of the auxiliary verbs. He says that certain auxiliary verbs such as "u", "yō", and "mai" which only have the dictionary forms and do not have other inflected forms, are surely *ji* because they express the speaker's will or conjecture. On the other hand, there are other auxiliary verbs which are used to express objective expressions, and therefore, they should not be regarded as *ji* but *shi*. For example, a sentence with an auxiliary verb of negation "*nai*,"

(5) *Hana wa saka nai.*

flowers-*topic* bloom not

The flowers do not bloom.

The auxiliary verb "*nai*" refers to a certain observable situation with respect the flower, and therefore, it should be treated as *shi* (an objective expression).⁶¹

Such claims were, however, objected by Tokieda.⁶² He argued that Kindaichi

misunderstood the difference between *shi* and *ji*, and that he interpreted the difference on the basis of the content of the expression not the process of the expression. Here we should note that Kindaichi uses the term “*kyakkanteki hyōgen*” and “*shukanteki hyōgen*” which refers to *shi* and *ji* respectively in his arguments. On the other hand, Tokieda has never used such terms in this context. He uses the term “*kyakutaiteki hyōgen*” to *shi* and “*shutaiteki hyōgen*” to *ji*. Tokieda means by “*kyakutaiteki hyōgen*” expressions made through the process of the conceptualization by the speaker, which are *shi*, and by “*shutaiteki hyōgen*” expressions made without that process, which are *ji*. Tokieda pointed out that Kindaichi did not consider carefully enough the terminology. These terms, then, are not used by Tokieda on the basis of the content of the expression but on the basis of the process by which the speaker grasps things and expresses them in his speech.

Nagano Masaru, who was a student of Tokieda at Tokyo University, discussed the treatment of adjectives in the definition of *shi* and *ji*.⁶³ He says that an adjective should be divided into two parts of the root of the adjective and the declension, and that the former is *shi* and the latter *ji*. For example, “*aoi* (is blue)” should be analyzed as “*ao-i*” and “*ao*” is *shi* and “*i*” is *ji*. Nagano’s idea was based on Tokieda’s treatment of the *keiyō dōshi* (adjectival verbs) of Japanese, such as “*shizuka da* (being quiet)” and “*yūmei da* (being popular).” According to Tokieda’s theory, those words should be divided as

Shizuka + *da*

substantive + auxiliary verb

shi + *ji*

and therefore, the independent category for those words is not needed. Nagano on the

basis of this treatment proposed an idea that analyzes adjectives should be as follows:

ao - i

root - ending

shi - ji

According to Nagano, in the sentence

(6) *Oo*, *samu* i

Oh (interjection) cold

Oh, it is cold.

The *ji* is shown by “i,” which is the latter ending part of the adjective “samui.” This can be taken as a major improvement in Tokieda’s formulation in so far as it removes the need for the positing of a zero element.

Suzuki Kazuhiko, who was the assistant of Tokieda in his later years at Tokyo University, proposed a decade after Tokieda’s death that *shi* should be called *sozaigo* (words of material) and *ji* called *shikōgo* (words of intention).⁶⁴ According to Suzuki, using these terms instead of *shi* and *ji* could show first that they are both are equally words and secondly that *shi* indicate something related directly to the material or matter while *ji* indicate something related to the speaker’s mind in the process of the speech act.

As mentioned earlier, Tokieda did not change his definition of *shi* and *ji*, taking them as fundamental. After the debate over the division of *shi* and *ji* – a debate that led to a better understanding of the strengths and weakness is of the Language Process Theory – had clarified the differences between the two, the attention of scholars of Japanese linguistics turned to the function of *ji* in the Japanese syntax.

Although Haga (1954)⁶⁵, Ōkubo (1968)⁶⁶, and Miyaji (1971)⁶⁷ all focused on

this issue, perhaps most important among Tokieda's critics is Watanabe (1971), who wrote extensively on syntax⁶⁸. He considers grammar from three points of view. Those are *keitai* (form), *igi* (meaning), and *shokunō* (function). His approach to language is functional, as seen in his assertion that, "a sentence is externally an independent form, internally a fulfillment of meaning, and syntactically a functional unit."⁶⁹ He takes grammar to be the study of *kōbunteki shokunō* (syntactic function). Like Tokieda, Watanabe takes the position that the *genko shutai* (the linguistic subject within a locus) is an essential concern when considering the relationship between speakers and language. And he goes on to explain that a sentence is constructed by means of the unification of *jojutsu-naiyō* and *chinjutsu* – the former concept being the content which is described by the speaker, and the latter the propositional relation between the content and the speaker, which is, as in Tokieda, determined by the speaker.

Here, we recognize the concepts *jojutsu-naiyō* and *chinjutsu* to be closely akin to the concepts of *proposition* and *modality* in English.⁷⁰ Indeed, Kitahara (1981)⁷¹ attempts to apply these concepts of *proposition* and *modality* to the study of Japanese auxiliary verbs. Watanabe, however, argues that the relation between the two is externally continuous, in that a *jojutsu-naiyō*, which in Japanese is most frequently shown in the predicate in a sentence, is followed by a *chinjutsu*, which is generally shown by the sentence-ending particles. The work of Watanabe prompted other Japanese scholars to study in greater detail both these structures.⁷²

The arguments over *chinjutsu* were followed by the study of modality in Japan in the seventies such as Nakau (1979)⁷³ and Nitta (1979)⁷⁴. Nakau applies the concept of modality to Japanese sentences, and Nitta classifies Japanese sentences

from the point of view of expression types.

Unlike many Anglo-American linguists who strive to keep grammar, semantics and pragmatics separate, Tokieda, in his work of 1950 argues that it is necessary for the study of discourse to be considered as an aspect of grammar as well as the study of words, and sentences.⁷⁵ This view was new, even heretical at the time it was introduced by Tokieda.⁷⁶ Later, in 1960, Tokieda developed his ideas further and argued that the study of discourse should be established as an aspect of language parallel to grammar and placed within a newly conceived field of Japanese language studies that would include the study of literature.⁷⁷

With respect to these linguistic issues such scholars as Ichikawa Takashi, Hayashi Shirō, and Nagano Masaru deserve mention. Ichikawa Takashi, whose study of the structure of discourse follows Tokieda;⁷⁸ Hayashi Shirō, who has studied the basic types of sentences and worked in the area of discourse analysis;⁷⁹ and Nagano Masaru, whose idea of analyzing adjectives has been referred to earlier in this section and who has also studied discourse, all have made use of Tokieda's theory in the advancements they have made to the discipline,⁸⁰ with some remaining within the framework of grammar and some attempting to expand the traditional boundaries of grammar to encompass a more holistic understanding of language.⁸¹

It should be further noted that there was an influence of Tokieda's concept of *bamen* in the early studies of language life in the fifties and the sixties. Uno (1951)⁸², Nagano (1957)⁸³, and Tsukahara (1963)⁸⁴ are the representative works. Uno argues that the concept of *bamen* is needed to explain the changes (or similarities) of the linguistic acts. He expands Tokieda's concept of *bamen* and proposed to divide the concept into the four categories, which are the situation of the speaker (*shutaiteki*

bamen), the subjective material of the situation (*sozaiteki bamen*), the situation of the hearer (*taishateki bamen*), and the physical material of the situation (*butsuriteki bamen*). Nagano also offers his definition of the factors for articulating *bamen* in the concrete speech. He finds five factors contributing to the actualization of a *bamen* in speech. Those factors are oneself (*jibun*), addressee (*aite*), material (*wazai*), mood (*fun'iki*), and context (*myakuraku*). Tsukahara also proposes that further studies with respect to *bamen* should be done in such areas as, the speaker's (writer's) situation, the hearer's (reader's) situation, the material, the relationship between the speaker (writer) and the hearer (reader), the relationship between the speaker (writer) and the material, the relationship between the hearer (reader) and the material, and the means of communication. All these scholars have established their study of language life within the framework of Tokieda's concepts such as the speaker, hearer and *bamen* in speech acts.⁸⁵

2.3.2. Tokieda and the National Language during the Japanese Occupation of Korea

Perhaps here is as good a place as any to discuss the shadow that has been cast over the career and consequently the acceptance of the scholarship of Tokieda. Tokieda's Process Theory has directly influenced a significant number of scholars in Japan, but to this day there are political issues raised over his position on the language policy of the Japanese government in Korea during the war. This section will attempt to put this issue into proper perspective.

As we have seen, while in Korea, where he was teaching Japanese linguistics at

Keijo Imperial University, Tokieda wrote a several essays on language policy. In 1940 he wrote “Kokugogaku to kokugo kyōiku (Japanese linguistics and language education)” and in 1942 “Chōsen ni okeru kokugo seisaku oyobi kokugo kyōiku no shōrai (The future of the language policy and the language education in Korea).” In these essays Tokieda discusses such issues as the concept of a national language and its relationship to Japanese and Korean. In the latter article, which appeared in the journal *Nihongo*, he wrote,

I have reached the conclusion that a national language is of special value to a nation state, and from this point of view Japanese is a language that does not have such a status and should, like other languages, including Korean, be studied as one of the targets of linguistics. A national language and Japanese as it is spoken throughout the country are not entirely the same. Every dialect is valuable in the study of linguistics as is the standard language; sometimes the study of dialects is even more important than that of the standard language. People feel their dialect to be their mother tongue. From the point of view of the nation, however, the abolition of dialects should be encouraged. Here, we can see the primacy of the national language or standard language in education. Our national language is the standard language of Japan and Japanese people. The relationship between the national language and Japanese dialects is the same as the relationship between our national language and Korean, and it should hold a superior position to Korean as well as to the various Japanese dialects on the basis of the modern concept of the national Polity.⁸⁶

Here, Tokieda distinguishes Japanese from the national language and the concept of nation and supports the idea that even in Korea the national language should have priority over Korean. The important concept here is that of the “nation,” the *oku* of *kokugo*, which is usually translated as the “national language.” Had Tokieda coined another word, such as *teikokugo* the “imperial language”, his aim would perhaps

have been better understood. His aim was the establishment of a sort of lingua franca, based upon Japanese, which could be used by all peoples of what would come to be known as the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The position he ultimately articulated has led some critics to accuse Tokieda of being an imperialist in the service of the Japanese government in one of its colonies. Kawamura (1993) makes such a criticism:

Tokieda recognised Japanese as the national language from the beginning, and he excluded any discussion of the possibility that another language such as Korean could be chosen as a national language having any value. He accepted the language policy of the Japanese government at the time without criticising it. The superior position to which Tokieda elevated Japanese only reflects the superiority of Japan's military and political position in Eastern Asia at the time, and had nothing to do with linguistics.⁸⁷

Shi (1993) also criticises Tokieda:

Tokieda in his arguments concerning the relationship between the Japanese language and the Korean language failed to assess correctly the value that dialects or mother languages can have. And as a result, he did not oppose the government's policy that forced the people in its colonies to use the Japanese language. He did not fight against the policy that neglected the culture of people in the region and imposed controls over the use of language. On the contrary, he attempted to establish the superiority of the language of Japan over the languages of other nations.⁸⁸

While it is true that Tokieda did not oppose the policies of the Japanese government, it is necessary to consider the situation in Korea in 1930s and 40s. According to Morita (1987), the policies effecting language in Korea began with the 1911 promulgation by the Japanese government in the first order on education.⁸⁹ The

purpose was to make the people of Korea loyal to Japan. The order required the use of Japanese in all of elementary school classes except for those designated for the teaching Korean. Year by year, the government augmented the policy by requiring students in Korea to use Japanese more extensively. The third order of the education in Korea in 1938 changed the curriculum significantly, allowed Korean to be studied only as an elective, not a required subject. The order of 1941 excluded the Korean language from the curriculum completely and required Korean students to study the same courses as students in Japan.

It was under these circumstances that Tokieda wrote the essay on the national language that appeared for the journal *Nihongo* in 1942. When we consider the situation in Korea at the time, Tokieda's position as a professor of Japanese at Keijo Imperial University, and his desire for a culturally unified empire, it is perhaps not surprising that he spoke in such general terms of the need for a strongly centralised language policy.

Yasuda (1997) also criticises Tokieda for his support of imperialism. Yasuda states, on the basis of a newly uncovered essay, that Tokieda supported the policy of the government that forced people in Korea to use only Japanese as their language.⁹⁰ The essay was written by Tokieda in 1943 with the title of “Chōsen ni okeru kokugo — jissen oyobi kenkyū no shosō (The national language in Korea — the various aspects of its practice and study),” and appeared in *Kokuminbungaku* Vol. 3-1, a journal published in Keijo.

In a passage cited by Yasuda, Tokieda states:

I think that people in Korea should use Japanese. They should make every effort to use Japanese as their language in daily life. The current

linguistic situation for the people in Korea is divided and confusing, and therefore, their linguistic life is hardly happy. The way to resolve the current confusion is to unite the people's life in Korea with the use of Japanese. That would free them from a life lived with a double-language and give them a simpler more united linguistic life.⁹¹

Yasuda criticises Tokieda for supporting the policy that forced the people of Korea to abandon Korean and use Japanese as their language. And indeed he did so. But it is still an open question as to whether he was a supporter of the military dictatorship of the time or, as a consequence of his admittedly naïve idealism, a supporter of The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere as a promising alternative to the European colonization of Asia

To counterbalance the assertions that Tokieda was an ardent supporter of the totalitarian regime in power, there is evidence to show that Tokieda had been intimidated into supporting the over-zealous language policy of the period. Suzuki (1985) tells us of an incident in 1938, one which he heard from Tokieda's wife.

Tokieda opposed the forcible interference by the government in the administration of university. According to his wife, the head of the office of school affairs at the university visited his house every day wearing a sabre and long boots and for hours waited for Tokieda's return. She said that she could never forget the fear she felt at the time, and as a consequence she developed a gastric ulcer.⁹²

Hamamoto (1985) also tells us a similar incident. Reporting on a conversation held in March of 1985, he writes that Tokieda wept when others commented on the hard times he had in Korea. Hamamoto was told that military policemen kept Tokieda's house under surveillance causing him to fear for his life and that he asked his teacher Hashimoto Shinkichi in Tokyo to help him, saying that he would do anything if he

could leave Keijo.⁹³

In 1943, Tokieda returned to Tokyo to become a professor at Tokyo Imperial University succeeding Hashimoto Shinkichi. Shortly after, Tokieda wrote the essay (1944)⁹⁴. In this essay he criticized severely the language policy of the Japanese government in Korea. He wrote,

Since the Meiji Period the problems of the national language in Japan have not been approached on the basis of the fundamental considerations due the issue. The approach came from the tendency and tide of the time. In particular, the language policies in Japan were discussed on the basis of the trend of thought prevalent since the beginning of the war between Japan and China in 1931. The problems of the national language have been at the mercy of conflicts over principles and doctrines. The approaches to the problems such as making surveys of the national language, considering the outcome of the survey, and recognizing the nature of the problems were definitely lacking. In short, the problems of the national language were not an issue broadly discussed, but merely the tool by which certain people satisfied their desire for battle.

The point that should be noted here is that in this essay, written before the end of the war, Tokieda had already began to criticise the policies of the government. It seems that he was relieved to be back to Tokyo and grateful for the opportunity to express himself more openly.

Karatani (1995) also finds grounds to claim that Tokieda was not an imperialist, but that he publicly denounced the sort of “national language strategy” that sought to enforce the use of Japanese as a standard language in Korea down to the pronunciation of family and given names. Furthermore, Tokieda rejected the notion of deriving Japanese culture and philosophy from the Japanese language.⁹⁵

While this issue has no direct bearing on Tokieda's Language Process Theory, it is a significant aspect of his career and remains a matter of concern to scholars. The relationship between scholars and their political milieu is one that deserves the most serious reflection.

2.3.3. Works on Tokieda and the Language Process Theory

With respect to the general studies produced on Tokieda, one important work is Suzuki Kazuhiko's biography in 1985.⁹⁶ Suzuki, who was a Tokieda's student at Tokyo University, had also produced an earlier detailed bibliography in 1968.⁹⁷ There are two other studies of Tokieda, ones by Negoro Tsukasa, who wrote a general introduction to Tokieda's major works on Japanese grammar in *Tokieda Motoki Kenkyū, Gengo Kateisetsu* (The study on Tokieda Motoki, the Language Process Theory) in 1985, and an introduction to Tokieda's works on the Japanese language education in *Tokieda Motoki Kenkyū, Kokugo Kyōiku* (The study on Tokieda Motoki, the Japanese language education) in 1988. However, as Negoro himself mentions, it was not his aim to analyze Tokieda's theory from a grammatical point of view.⁹⁸ He, rather, tried to compare Tokieda's study to those of two other scholars; Ikeda Kikan (1896-1956), who was a professor at Tokyo University specializing in the literature of the Heian Period (794-1192), and Yoshikawa Kōjirō (1904-1980), a professor of Chinese literature at Kyoto University specializing in Chinese classic literature, in particular the poet Du Fu. Although the reason why Negoro referred to those scholars is not clear, their having no direct link to Tokieda's Language Process Theory, the stance taken by Negoro has made his work unique.

Negoro's views on Tokieda's scholarship are quite clear. He considers Tokieda to have established his theory with little influence from foreign scholars. For example, with respect to the relationship between the Language Process Theory and phenomenology, Negoro says that Yamanouchi Tokuryū (1890-1982), who was one of the first Japanese philosophers to introduce phenomenology to Japan in the thirties and forties, refers in his *Imi no Keijijōgaku* (The metaphysics of meaning)⁹⁹ to the Japanese traditional study of language, the difference between *shi* and *tenioha*, and that this reflects the influence that Tokieda had on Yamanouchi.¹⁰⁰ Negoro goes on to say that Tokieda attempted to connect the Japanese traditional language theory with the phenomenological view, but that the relationship between his theory and phenomenology is much weaker than that between his theory and the Japanese traditional linguistic thought. "I do not think," he goes on to say, "that Tokieda's linguistic theory is any stronger for his taking the phenomenological view into his theory. I think that there is little relationship between Tokieda's linguistic theory and phenomenology."¹⁰¹ Negoro claims at the end of his work that greater attention should be paid to Tokieda's scholarship, saying:

When a new theory appears, we Japanese tend to doubt its originality and suspect that it was borrowed from a scholar of a foreign country. We not only make no effort to establish a new theory but also believe that we are not able to pioneer new theories. Through my examination of the relationship between the Language Process Theory and Yamanouchi's study of phenomenology, I find the theory to owe its establishment to Tokieda himself. Although Tokieda's study has not held a leading position in Japanese linguistics, I think, that his theory, in which he defines the nature of language is a mental process, shows Tokieda's humanistic view of

language, and that the theory of *shi* and *ji* suits well the structure of Japanese.¹⁰²

Negoro's work also includes a valuable bibliography.¹⁰³

Concerning Tokieda's works on Japanese language education there are two books to be mentioned. One is *Tokieda Motoki Kokugo Kyōiku Ronshū* (A collection of essays on Japanese language education by Tokieda Motoki), edited by Ishii Shōji, in two volumes and published in 1984. The other is *Tokieda Motoki*, edited by Hamamoto Jun'itsu in 1989. Both the editors make assessments on his scholarship, and both agree that Tokieda's study of the Japanese language education has made a great contribution to the field, especially immediately after the war, at a time when many teachers were paying little attention to the problems of language education. They also voice the opinion that closer attention should be paid to Tokieda's scholarship in order to advance the study of language education through the application of his Language Process Theory.¹⁰⁴

In the nineties a study of another aspect of Tokieda's work was published. This is Yasuda Toshiaki, *Shokuminchi no naka no Kokugogaku: Tokieda Motoki to Keijo Teikoku Daigaku o megutte* (Japanese linguistics in the colony: On Tokieda Motoki and Keijo Imperial University), published in 1997. Yasuda discusses matters related to Tokieda's position on the language policy of the Japanese government in Korea during the war and joins the majority of critics by claiming that Tokieda by his writings on the national language had supported the militaristic government in its efforts to spread the use of Japanese as the national language over its colonies.¹⁰⁵

Now let us look at the works on Tokieda in the western community of the study of linguistics. As far as I can determine, the earliest introduction of Tokieda's work is

Joseph K. Yamagiwa's University of Michigan dissertation entitled "The Older Inflected Forms Surviving in the Modern Japanese Written Language," which was submitted in 1942. In his dissertation Yamagiwa introduced Tokieda's *Kokugogakushi* (The history of Japanese language studies), but made only passing reference to his Language Process Theory. Yamagiwa, however, continued to introduce Tokieda's work to the West. He edited and compiled *Readings in Japanese Language and Linguistics* in 1965, which included three of Tokieda's writings among its twenty two selections. The first is "*Kokugogaku* (Japanese language studies)," which Tokieda wrote for *Kokugogaku Jiten* (Dictionary of Japanese language studies) in 1955.¹⁰⁶ The second is "Gengo no sonzai jōken to site no shutai, bamen oyobi sozai (Participant, situation, and subject matter as conditions for the existence of language),"¹⁰⁷ which was originally published as a paper in January in 1941 and included in *Kokugogaku Genron* as part of the first chapter in December of the same year. It deals with the concept of *bamen* as one of the main concepts of Language Process Theory. The third work included in Yamagiwa's anthology is "*Kokugo mondai ni taisuru kokugogaku no tachiba* (The place of Japanese language studies with respect to problems of the Japanese language)," which was published in *Kokugo to Kokubungaku* (Japanese language and literature) in 1947.¹⁰⁸ Yamagiwa's selection of those three works by Tokieda, which were the most for any one scholar, indicates that he considered Tokieda's works important in various ways.

Similar introductions to Tokieda's work were published with German translations in 1974. These are found in *Japanische Sprachwissenschaft*, edited by Claus Fischer, Shoko Kishitani, and Bruno Lewin. The work includes Tokieda's "Dentatsu no shujusō— seikai, gokai, kyokkai — (Verschiedene Erscheinungsformen

der kommunikation: verstehen, mißverstehen, verdrehen),” which was taken from Tokieda’s *Kokugogaku Genron Zokuhen* (A sequel to “The principles of the Japanese language study”) in 1955.¹⁰⁹ It also includes “Shi to ji (Sachwörter und hilfswörter),” which was written by Watanabe Minoru in *Zoku Nihon Bunpō Kōza I* (The second series of the Japanese grammar I), *Bunpō Kakuronhen* (The details of grammar), in 1959.¹¹⁰ Watanabe in the paper discusses the difference in the ways that the concepts of *shi* and *ji* are used by Hashimoto and Tokieda. Another brief introduction to the life and works of Tokieda is found in S. Kaiser, “Tokieda Motoki (1900-1967)” in 1994.¹¹¹

There are also a number of works on Tokieda’s criticism of Saussure. Catherine Garnier’s “Tokieda contre Saussure, pour une théorie du langage comme processus” in 1982,¹¹² and John Whitman’s “*Kokugogaku* vs. *Gengogaku*: Language Process Theory and Tokieda’s construction of Saussure, 60 years later”, in 2004.¹¹³ Whitman in particular discusses in detail the relatively weak connection between the current debate, carried on by literary theorists, and the earlier and still continuing debate between *kokugogakusha* and *gengogakusha* that arose as a consequence not only of Tokieda’s presentation of his Language Process Theory but more particularly his 1941 critique of Saussure. Whitman attributes the most recent debate to what he refers to as “a kind of territorial polemic” initiated by Hattori Shirō in his attack on Tokieda’s reading of Saussure. Tokieda’s work, it seems, produced arguments from both the *kokugogakusha* and *gengogakusha*. This paper is of value in that it introduces to those outside the field of Japanese linguistics the innovative ideas of Tokieda and how they are relevant to many of the theoretical issues being discussed today.¹¹⁴

Another important contribution made by Whitman's is his summary of Miura Tsutomu's critique of the Language Process theory. Miura takes the position that Tokieda's theory had the impact on linguistics comparable to the advent of Copernicus' theory in astronomy. He goes on, however, to present a quite balanced view of the theory citing both its strength and weaknesses. Whitman outlines the main points.

The strong points are: (1) the treatment of language in a process driven structure, (2) the making of a distinction between objective expressions (*shi*) and subjective expressions (*ji*) as a basic classification of words, and (3) the raising of the issue of there being two distinct stances toward language; the subjective stance and the objective stance. He also identifies the defects of the theory: (1) taking the essence of language to be "the conceptual operation by the subject," (2) assuming "meaning" in language to be "the subject's way of grasping", that is to say, a semantic operation directed toward the object, (3) failing to recognize the social conventions that accompany linguistic expressions and the intermediary processes dependent on them, and (4) the failure to take up the distinction between expressions dealing with perceived reality and expressions dealing with imagination, and the mutual relation between them. This critique, Whitman notes, has a Saussurean flavor.

Perhaps the most important contribution of Whitman's paper is his careful examination of Tokieda's position with regard to the distinct between *nihongo* and *kokugo*, and, as we have seen, how this is related to his misinterpretation of Saussure's concept of *langage*. After a careful examination of Tokieda's position with respect to the difference between *nihongo* and *kokugo*, which was so important to Tokieda's stand on what language should be spoken in Korean, Whitman

continues by referring to a useful analogy with which Tokieda strove to differentiate the two. Tokieda draws a distinction analogous to the difference between the natural and the human sciences, and argues that:

... we must discard the constructional view of language (*kōseitekigengokan*) and adopt a processual view of language (*kateitekigengokan*). So long as we view a word to be a constructional entity (*kōseitai*) formed from ideas and acoustic images, it will be difficult to produce criteria for distinguishing it as a word of Japanese (*nihongo*) from another *langue*. We must seek Japanese-like special characteristics (*nihongotokitokusei*) in the psycho-physiological processes where they are actually expressed.

In the concluding portion of his paper, Whitman looks closely at a less discussed, though equally important, aspect of Tokieda's theory, that of the concept *chinjutsu*. This term, usually translated as "proposition", might best, Whitman suggests, be rendered as "mood" or "propositional attitude". It is derived, as are so many of Tokieda's terms for the grammatical terminology of the Edo Period and is also used by Yamada Yoshio. Tokieda's *chinjutsu*, however, differs from Yamada's concept in two important ways: it is realized in the morphology of all clauses, and has the special function of clause-final functional morpheme. Three examples are given:

Yama wa yuki	ka
Soto wa ame	rashii
Inu hashiru	□

For the last item, as we have seen, Tokieda posits a "zero *chinjutsu*" in order to maintain the generalization that a clause-final *chinjutsu* is present in all sentences of Japanese. Whitman quite rightly raises the question of how universal this aspect of Tokieda's grammar is, but leaves us with the distinct feeling that the Language

Process Theory deserves closer attention. It is to this end that the present thesis is committed.

There are other works to be noted, though they do not mention Tokieda in their titles. Patric Heinrich in his 2002 paper “*Gengo seikatsu*, the study of language life in Japan, 1945-1995,” refers to Tokieda’s theoretical approaches to the study of the social use of the Japanese language in the second half of the twentieth century. He says that “the language life of the seventies did not develop out of theoretical considerations as sociolinguistic studies had in the West, even though it could have done so by following Tokieda’s theoretical reflections.”¹¹⁵ Barbara Pizziconi in her paper “Japanese politeness in the work of Fujio Minami” in 2004, refers to Tokieda’s study of *keigo* saying that the legacy of Tokieda to the study of politeness cannot be stressed enough.¹¹⁶

Finally there are two works in English written by Japanese that have been often quoted by those English references with respect to the concepts of *shi* and *ji*. One is Sakai Naoki, *Voices of the Past: the Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Discourse*, published in 1991¹¹⁷, and the other is Karatani Kōjin, *Nationalism and Écriture*, in 1995.¹¹⁸ Concerning their discussion of the concepts of *shi* and *ji*, I will take them up in the section of Tokieda’s objective and subjective expressions (*shi* and *ji*) in Chapter 3.

Those references in Western languages show that interest in the works on Tokieda and his theory has been increasing and that there are many aspects in Tokieda’s scholarship that deserve more serious attention. In the Chapter that follows, we will take up the manner in which Tokieda treats these issues, and in the final three chapters, which deal with practical concerns, we will turn our attention to the ways in

which Tokieda's Process Theory can be brought to bare on such aspects of language as textual analysis, the language of respect, and the relationship between linguistics and literature.

CHAPTER 2 NOTES

- ¹ Tokieda, *Kokugo Kenkyūhō* (A method to the study of Japanese language), Sanseidō, 1947, pp.13-15.
- ² Ibid., p.16. According to Tokieda's note, this article appeared in "New York Shinpō" in January 1913.
- ³ Ibid., pp.14-15.
- ⁴ Ibid., p.18.
- ⁵ Ibid., p.20. Ueda's essays and papers are included in *Kokugo no tame* (For the sake of the Japanese language), Vol.1, 1895 and Vol.2, 1903, Fuzanbō.
- ⁶ This graduation paper was fortunately not burned in the war and published in 1976.
- ⁷ Tokieda, 1947, p.43.
- ⁸ Concerning the situation of the appointment of Tokieda as associate professor at Keijo Imperial University, see Negoro Tsukasa, *Tokieda Motoki Kenkyū, Gengo Kateisetsu* (The study on Tokieda Motoki, The Language Process Theory), 1985, pp.215-216.
- ⁹ *Kokugo to Kokubungaku* (Japanese language and literature), Vol.4 No.1, 1927.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., pp.53-62.
- ¹¹ Tokieda, *Kokugogakushi, Iwanamikōza Nihonbungaku*, Vol.2 No.12, Iwanami Shoten, 1932. This work was rewritten later and published in 1940 with the same title *Kokugogakushi*.
- ¹² With respect to the concept of *bamen*, see the section 3.1.2, where the relation between the concept of *bamen* and phenomenology has been discussed.
- ¹³ Suzuki Kazuhiko, *Tokieda Motoki den* (The life of Tokieda Motoki), *Nihongogaku*, September 1985, p.125.
- ¹⁴ Suzuki Kazuhiko, *Tokieda Motoki den* (The life of Tokieda Motoki), *Nihongogaku*, October 1985, pp.87-88.
- ¹⁵ Hamamoto Jun'itsu, *Tokieda Motoki*, Meiji Tosho, 1989, pp.28-29.
- ¹⁶ Tokieda, *Bunshō Kenkyū Josetsu* (An introduction to the study of discourse), Yamada Shoin, 1960, pp.3-4.
- ¹⁷ Suzuki Kazuhiko, *Tokieda Motoki den* (The life of Tokieda Motoki), *Nihongogaku*, April 1986, pp.83-84.
- ¹⁸ Except for *Language, its Nature, Development and Origin*, which was not translated until 1927 by M. Ichikawa and K. Jinbō, there had been Japanese translations made of these books. See Tokieda, *Kokugogakushi* (The history of Japanese language studies), 1940, pp.238-240.

¹⁹ Tokieda, *Kokugogaku e no Michi* (The road to Japanese language studies), 1957, pp.21-22.

²⁰ *Tokyo Daigaku Hyakunenshi* (The history of hundred years of Tokyo University), Daiichi Hōki Shuppan, 1985.

²¹ It is included in *Kokugo no tame* (For the sake of Japanese language), Vol.1, 1895.

²² In *Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku Bunka Daigaku Kiyō* (The bulletin of the Literary College, Tokyo Imperial University), No.2.

²³ It might be noted here that Hashimoto, in the wake of this disaster, reconstructed the entire card catalogue for the language collection, from memory. It seems he brought to his study of language a photographic memory.

²⁴ Related in *Kokugogakushi* (The history of Japanese language studies), 1940, preface, pp.1-2.

²⁵ *Hashimoto Shinkichi Hakase Chosakushū* (A collection of the writings of Dr. Hashimoto Shinkichi) 1, Iwanami Shoten, 1946, pp.365-366.

²⁶ Although the title is *teniha*, the meaning is the same as *tenioha*. There is an opinion that Fujiwara no Teika is not the author. See Negoro Tsukasa, *Tenioha Kenkyūshi* (The history of the study of *Tenioha*), Meiji Shoin, 1980. Tokieda's views of the *Teniha Taigaishō* are often seen in his works. For example, "*Taigaishō* explains *tenioha* comparing it to *shi* (other words) and says that *shi* is like a temple (*jisha*) and *teniha* like solemnity (*shōgon*)," in *Kokugogakushi*, 1940, p.69, and "*Teniha Taigaishō* is the basis of my theory of *shi* and *ji*," *Bunshō Kenkyū Josetsu*, 1960, p.205.

²⁷ See Yamada Yoshio. *Nihonbunpōron* (Japanese grammar), 1908.

²⁸ Kobayashi Hideo, *Nihon ni okeru Saussure no eikyō* (The influences of Saussure in Japan), *Gengo* (Language), No.3, Taishūkan, 1978, p.48.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.48.

³⁰ Tokieda, *Kokugogaku Genron* (Principles of the Japanese language study), 1941, p.64.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.66.

³² Satō Kiyoji, *Gengo Kateisetsu ni tsuite no gimon* (Questions about the Language Process Theory), *Kokugogaku*, No.2, 1949, p.180.

³³ Tokieda, Satō Kiyoji shi no "Gengo Kateisetsu ni tsuite no gimon" ni kotaete (To Mr Kiyoji Satō's questions on *Gengo Kateisetsu*), *Kokugogaku*, No.4, 1950. Tokieda also referred to the relationship between the arbitrary and the social in the concept of *shutai* in "Gengo no shakaisei ni tsuite (On the social aspect of language)," *Bungaku*,

Vol.19 No.9, 1951.

³⁴ Kazama Rikizō, Gengo kenkyū no taishō (The goal of linguistic study), *Kokugo Kokubun*, Vol.20 No.6, 1951.

³⁵ Ōkubo Tadatoshi, Tokieda Motokishi no Saussure hihan o saikentō suru (Re-examining Tokieda Motoki's criticism of Saussure), *Bungaku*, Vol.19 No.6, 1951.

³⁶ Kuroiwa Komao, Gengo no kateisei to kigō keiyakusei (The process in language and semiotic agreement), *Kurumedaigaku Ronsō*, Vol.3 No.1, 1952.

³⁷ Monzen Shinichi, Gengo Kateisetsu to langue, parole (The Language Process Theory and langue and parole), *Tenri Daigaku Gakuhō*, Vol.8 No.2, 1956.

³⁸ Miura Tsutomu, Benshōhō wa gengo no nazo o toku (The dialectic solves the mystery of language), *Shisō no Kagaku*, Vol.5, 1948, and Naze hyōgenron wa kakuritsu shinaika (Why the theory of expression cannot be established), *Bungaku*, Vol.19 No.2, 1951.

³⁹ Sugiyama Yasuhiko, Gengo to bungaku (Language and literature), *Bungaku*, Vol.32 No.8, 1964.

⁴⁰ Hattori Shirō, Gengo Kateisetsu ni tsuite (On the Language Process Theory), *Kokugo Kokubun*, Vol.26 No.1, 1957.

⁴¹ Tokieda, Hattori Shirō kyōju no "Gengo Kateisetsu ni tsuite" o yomu (To Professor Hattori's comments on *Gengo Kateisetsu*), *Kokugo Kokubun*, Vol.26 No.4, 1957.

⁴² After Tokieda's death, a few papers that refer to Tokieda's view of Saussure have been published. Nomura Hideo, Saussure no kaishaku ni tsuite (On the interpretation of Saussure), *Bungaku*, Vol.36 No.2, 1968. Maruyama Shizuka, Gengo riron ni tsuite (On the theory of language), in *Hajimari no Ishiki* (The consciousness of beginning), Serika Shobō, 1971.

⁴³ Ōhashi Yasuo, Saussure to Nihon, Hattori-Tokieda Gengo Kateisetsu ronsō no saikentō (Saussure and Japan, a re-examination of the controversy between Hattori and Tokieda over *Gengo Kateisetsu*), *Misuzu*, Vol.15 No.8-9, 1973.

⁴⁴ Miwa Nobuharu, Saussure fuzai no Saussure rōnsō — Gengo Kateisetsu rōnsō ni okeru Saussure (The arguments on Saussure without Saussure — Saussure in the arguments on the Language Process Theory). This paper was published in *Kagoshima Daigaku Jinbun Gakka Ronshū*, No.16-17, 1981-1982. It is also included in Miwa's *Eigoshi eno Kokoromi* (A try at a history of English), 1987, Tokyo: Kobian Shobō.

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- ⁴⁵ Miwa Nobuharu, *Saussure fuzai no Saussure rōnsō — Gengo Kateisetsu rōnsō ni okeru Saussure* (The arguments on Saussure without Saussure — Saussure in the arguments on the Language Process Theory), in *Eigoshi eno Kokoromi* (A try at a history of English), 1987, pp.229-230.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.233-234.
- ⁴⁷ Tokieda, *Gendai no Kokugogaku* (The modern studies of Japanese), 1956, p.24.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.177.
- ⁴⁹ Tokieda, *Kokugogaku Genron*, pp.64-65.
- ⁵⁰ Miwa, 1987, p.241.
- ⁵¹ Tokieda, *Kokugogaku Genron*, p.77.
- ⁵² Miwa shows the sentences below by Kobayashi, as the evidence of his failure. “I cannot understand what Tokieda means when he defines Saussure as a constructional viewer (*kōseishugisha*).” Kobayashi. 1978. p.49
- ⁵³ Miwa also says that not only Japanese scholars but also Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, who were both the editors of the *Cours*, seemed to have misunderstood *langue* as sign or something similar to sign. See Miwa. 1987, p.270.
- ⁵⁴ Ōno Susumu, Saussure and Motoki Tokieda, in *Saussure and Linguistics Today*, edited by Tullio De Mauro and Shigeaki Sugeta, 1995, Bulzoni Editore, pp.257-258.
- ⁵⁵ John Whitman, *Kokugogaku vs. Gengogaku: Language Process Theory and Tokieda’s construction of Saussure, 60 years later*, Manuscript, University of Cornell, 2004.
- ⁵⁶ Tokieda Motoki, *Kokugogaku Genron* (The principles of the Japanese language study), p.242.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.243-244.
- ⁵⁸ The term *chinjutsu* is most frequently translated as “proposition” in the sense of something that brings together both form and function. However, the concept of *chinjutsu* is rather close to “modality” in Japanese linguistics. See Yamaoka M., *Jūzokusetsu no modality* (Modality in subordinate clauses), *Fukubun no Kenkyū* (Studies of complex sentences), Nitta Y. (ed.), Kuroshio, 1995.
- ⁵⁹ Ōno Susumu, *Gengo kateisetsu ni okeru shi ji no bunrui ni tsuite* (On the division of *shi* and *ji* in the Language Process Theory), *Kokugo to Kokubungaku*, Vol.16 No.1, 1950.
- ⁶⁰ Sakakura Atsuyoshi, *Bunsetsu no kōzō ni tsuite* (On the structure of phrases), *Nihonbunpō no Hanashi*, 1952.
- ⁶¹ Kindaichi Haruhiko, *Fuhenka jodōshi no honshitsu* (The nature of the unchanged

auxiliary verbs), *Kokugo Kokubun*, Vol.22 No.2-3, 1953.

⁶² Tokieda Motoki, Kindaichi Haruhiko shi no “Fuhenka jodōshi no honshitsu”o yonde (On “The nature of the unchanged auxiliary verbs” by Mr.Haruhiko Kindaichi), *Kokugo Kokubun*, Vol.22 No.5, 1953.

⁶³ Nagano Masaru, Gengo kateisetsu ni okeru keiyōshi no toriatsukai ni tsuite (On the treatment of adjectives in the Language Process Theory), *Kokugogaku*, No. 6, 1951.

⁶⁴ Suzuki Kazuhiko, *Nihonbunpō Honshitsuron* (The study of the nature of Japanese grammar), Meiji Shoin, 1976, pp.59, 247, 248.

⁶⁵ Haga Yasushi, Chinjutsu towa nanimono (What is *chinjutsu*?), *Kokugo Kokubun*, Vol.23 No.4, 1954.

⁶⁶ Ōkubo Tadatoshi, *Nihonbunpō Chinjutsuron* (The study of *chinjutsu* in Japanese grammar), Meiji Shoin, 1968

⁶⁷ Miyaji Yutaka, *Bunron* (On syntax), Meiji Shoin, 1971.

⁶⁸ Watanabe Minoru, *Kokugo Kōbunron* (Japanese syntax), Hanawa Shobō, 1971.

⁶⁹ Watanabe, 1971, p.16.

⁷⁰ Watanabe connects the structure of *jojutsu-naiyō* and *chinjutsu* in a sentence to the structure of *Proposition + Modality* in the case theory of Filmore. See Watanabe Minoru, *Bunpō* (Grammar), *Kokugogaku no Gojūnen* (Fifty years of the Japanese linguistics), Musashino Shoin, 1995, p.101.

⁷¹ Kitahara Yasuo, *Nihongo Jodōshi no Kenkyū* (The study of Japanese auxiliary verbs), Taishūkan Shoten, 1981.

⁷² Concerning the summary of the arguments over *chinjutsu* in the fifties and sixties, see Onoe Keisuke, *Bunpōron — Chinjutsuronsō no tanjō to shūen —* (The theory of grammar — the beginning and the end of the arguments over *chinjutsu*—), *Kokugo to Kokubungaku*, Vol.67 No.5, 1990.

⁷³ Nakau Minoru, Modality to mēdai (Modality and proposition), *Hayashi Eiichi Kyōju Kanreki Kinen Ronbunshū, Eigo to Nihongo to* (The commemorative issue for professor Eiich Hayashi sixty years old, English and Japanese), Kuroshio Shuppan, 1979.

⁷⁴ Nitta Yoshio, *Nihongobun no hyōgen ruikai* (The types of expression in Japanese sentences), *Hayashi Eiichi Kyōju Kanreki Kinen Ronbunshū, Eigo to Nihongo to* (The commemorative issue for professor Eiich Hayashi sixty years old, English and Japanese), Kuroshio Shuppan, 1979.

⁷⁵ Tokieda, *Nihonbunpō Kōgohen* (The colloquial Japanese grammar), Iwanami

Shoten, 1950.

⁷⁶ Nishida Naotoshi, *Bunshō, buntai* (Discourse, style), *Kokugogaku no Gojūnen* (Fifty years of the Japanese linguistics), Musashino Shoin, 1995, pp.266-268.

⁷⁷ Tokieda, *Bunshō Kenkyū Josetsu* (An introduction to the study of discourse), Yamada Shoin, 1960.

⁷⁸ Ichikawa Takashi, *Bunshō no kōzō* (The structures of discourse), *Kōza Gendai Kokugogaku II, Kotoba no Taikei*, Chikuma Shobō, 1957.

⁷⁹ Hayashi Shirō, *Kihonbunkei no Kenkyū* (A study of the basic types of sentences), Meiji Tosho, 1960, and *Bunshō ni okeru bun no shihatsu, shōzen, tenkansei ni tsuite* (On beginning, joining, changing in discourse), *Keiryō Kokugogaku*, No.39, 41-45, 1967-1968.

⁸⁰ Nagano Masaru, *Bunshōron Shōsetsu* (A detailed explanation of discourse), Asakura Shoten, 1972, and *Bunshōron Sōsetsu* (A general introduction of discourse), Asakura Shoten, 1986.

⁸¹ Minami Fujio, *Bunshō-buntai* (Discourse-style), *Kokugogaku no Gojūnen* (Fifty years of the Japanese linguistics), Musashino Shoin, 1995, p.226.

⁸² Uno Yoshikata, *Kokugo no bamen* (*Bamen* in Japanese), *Kokugogaku*, No.7, August, 1951, pp.82-94.

⁸³ Nagano Masaru, *Bamen to kotoba* (*Bamen* and language), *Kōza Gendai Kokugogaku I, Kotoba no Hataraki*, Chikuma Shabō, 1957, pp.123-148.

⁸⁴ Tsukahara Tetsuo, *Bamen to kotoba* (*Bamen* and language), *Kōza Gendaigo I, Gendaigo no Gaisetsu*, 1963, Meiji Shoin, pp.228-250.

⁸⁵ See Minami Fujio, *Bamenron no mondaiten* (The problems in the theories of *bamen*), *Gengo no Dynamics, Gengo Shakaigaku Series 6*, Bunka Hyōron Shuppan, 1984.

⁸⁶ Tokieda Motoki, *Chōsen ni okeru kokugo seisaku oyobi kokugo kyōiku no shōrai* (The future of the language policy and the language education in Korea), *Nihongo*, Vol.2 No.8, 1942.

⁸⁷ Kawamura Minato, *Nihongo no jidai* (The age of the Japanese language), *Hiyō Kūkan*, Vol.11, 1993.

⁸⁸ Shi Gang, *Shokuminchi Shihai to Nihongo* (The rule of colonies and Japanese language), Sangensha, 1993, p.141.

⁸⁹ Morita Yoshio, *Kankoku ni okeru Kokugo Kokushi Kyōiku* (The education of the national language and national history in Korea), Hara Shobō, 1987.

⁹⁰ Yasuda Toshiaki, *Shokuminchi no naka no Kokugogaku: Tokieda Motoki to Keijo*

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⁹¹ Yasuda, 1997, p.133.

⁹² Suzuki Kazuhiko, Tokieda Motoki den (The life of Tokieda Motoki), *Nihongogaku*, October 1985, p.87.

⁹³ Hamamoto Jun'itsu, Tokieda Motoki no namida (The tears of Tokieda Motoki) *Nihonbungaku*, Vol.34, 1985.

⁹⁴ Tokieda, Saikin ni okeru kokugo mondai no dōkō to kokugogaku (The recent developments of the problems of the national language and Japanese linguistics), *Nihongo*, Vol.4 No.2, 1944.

⁹⁵ Karatani Kōjin, Nationalism and Ecriture, *SURFACES* 5 (201.1), 1995, 1-19.

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⁹⁶ Suzuki Kazuhiko, Tokieda Motoki den, 1-10 (The life of Tokieda Motoki, 1-10). *Nihongogaku*, January, July-December 1985, February-April 1986.

⁹⁷ Suzuki Kazuhiko, Tokieda Motoki hakase nenpu (A biographical sketch of Dr Tokieda Motoki), *Kokugogaku*, No.72, 1968.

⁹⁸ Negoro Tsukasa, *Tokieda Motoki Kenkyū, Kokugo Kyōiku* (The study on Tokieda Motoki, the Japanese language education), Meiji Shoin, 1988, p.437.

⁹⁹ Yamanouchi Tokuryū, *Imi no Keijijōgaku* (The metaphysics of meaning), Iwanami Shoten, 1967.

¹⁰⁰ Negoro Tsukasa, *Tokieda Motoki Kenkyū, Gengo Kateisetsu* (The Study of Tokieda Motoki, the Language Process Theory), Meiji Shoin, 1985, p.381.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.385.

¹⁰² Negoro Tsukasa, 1988, p.438.

¹⁰³ Negoro Tsukasa, 1985, pp.431-445.

¹⁰⁴ See *Tokieda Motoki Kokugo Kyōiku Ronshū 2* (The collection of essays of Japanese language education by Tokieda Motoki, Vol.2), edited by Ishii Shōji, Meiji Tosho Shuppan, 1984, pp.397-398, and *Tokieda Motoki*, edited by Hamamoto Jun'itsu, Meiji Tosho Shuppan, 1989, pp.28-30.

¹⁰⁵ *Shokuminchi no naka no Kokugogaku: Tokieda Motoki to Keijo Teikoku Daigaku o megutte* (Japanese linguistics in the colony: On Tokieda Motoki and Keijo Imperial University), 1997, Sangensha, pp.222 and 348.

¹⁰⁶ *Readings in Japanese Language and Linguistics, Part I. Selections*, edited and compiled by Joseph K. Yamagiwa, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965, pp. 1-4.

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- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp.114-137.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp.428-441.
- ¹⁰⁹ Japanische Sprachwissenschaft, Bearbeitet von Claus Fischer, Shoko Kishitani, Bruno Lewin, Tokyo: Sansyusya Publishing Co., Ltd., 1974, pp.186-193.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp.154-163.
- ¹¹¹ Asher, R. A. (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, Oxford, New York, Seoul, Tokyo: Pergamon Press, Vol.9, pp.4623-4624.
- ¹¹² *Langages* 68, pp.71-84.
- ¹¹³ 2004 Manuscript, University of Cornell.
- ¹¹⁴ This is based on the paper he delivered in “The Two-day Conference on Sensibilities of Transformation, The Linguistic Turn and Contemporary Japanese Literary Criticism” held at UCLA in 2002.
- ¹¹⁵ *Historiographia Linguistica* XXIX: 1/2, pp.95-119.
- ¹¹⁶ Pizziconi, Japanese politeness in the work of Fujio Minami, *SOAS Working Papers in Linguistics and Phonetics* 13, 2004, pp.269-280.
- ¹¹⁷ Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. The book was translated into Japanese as *Kako no Koe: Jūhasseiki Nihon no Gensetsu ni okeru Gengo no Chii* in 2002, Tokyo: Ibunsha. In the book Sakai says that he changed the subtitle from *Voices of the Past: Discourse on Language in Eighteenth-Century Japan*, which was used in his dissertation at Chicago University in 1983, to *The Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Discourse* when publishing as a book.
- ¹¹⁸ *SURFACES* 5 (201.1), 1995, 1-19.

CHAPTER 3 THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE PROCESS THEORY

Perhaps the most important feature of Tokieda's theory for this study is that it takes language to be a communicative activity carried out by human beings. Tokieda is opposed to the idea of language as an abstract structure composed of items and the rules that are manipulated to give them meaning. Rather, he argues that language should be perceived as a process by which utterances are expressed and given meaning within human context. Language, just as art and music, is an act of human expression. It is unique in virtue of its being communicated through acts of speech or acts of writing, and given meaning through acts of hearing or acts of reading.

As we shall discuss in Section 3.1, there are for Tokieda three conditions necessary for the language process to come into existence. These are *shutai* (the speaker), *bamen* (the locus, the hearer and other factors that influence the speaker), and *sozai* (the material context). Every concrete linguistic experience happens under these three conditions. Our attention will be focused on the concept of *bamen*, or locus, which is a concept that should not be taken in its literal, material sense.

According to the Language Process Theory, there are two positions to be taken towards language. One is that of the user who performs linguistic acts, and the other the position of the observer who studies them. The study of language is to observe and describe the activity that takes place when linguistic acts are performed. A significant aspect of this theory is that the linguist too is part of the process.

On the basis of this view of language, Tokieda establishes certain features for the Japanese language that can be applied to the exposition of its grammar. Since language is an act of expression by the speaker, words are divided into two types

according to the way the speaker employs them. One type is *shi* (objective words), which express of objectively perceived reality, and the other is *ji* (subjective words), which express speaker's perception in relation to the *bamen*, such as his or her feelings, guesses, wishes, and judgements. The division between these two groups is essential to Tokieda's Process Theory and will be treated in detail in Section 3.2. The chapter will conclude with an attempt to bring all these concepts within the overarching concept of *katei* (process).

3.1. THE CONCEPT OF *LOCUS* (*BAMEN*) IN TOKIEDA'S THEORY

The concept of locus, or *bamen*, in the Process Theory does not simply mean the material context that surrounds the speaker. It includes not only the hearer but also any circumstances that influence the speaker, even the speaker's feelings towards the situation in which the speech event takes place. As we shall see, Tokieda also emphasises the interactive relation between the speaker and the *bamen*. The speaker influences the *bamen* by performing speech acts and at the same time is influenced by the *bamen* when he or she performs a linguistic act.

The significance of locus in Japanese finds its roots in the Shintō tradition, where the location of certain natural object is in itself considered sacred. To this day, a large office building in Tokyo will be constructed to accommodate the site of a sacred, and therefore unrelatable object. This aboriginal tradition has come to influence Japanese Buddhism and has thus become so important an aspect of the

culture that it has influenced the way in which Japanese philosophers and scholars of language have come to understand the human condition.

There are three Japanese words for locus that will be used throughout this thesis, each in specific contexts; (1) *ba*, the ordinary combining form of the idea of *tokoro* “place,” as in *furoba* “bathroom” (a place where, at hot springs for example, nudity was traditionally considered appropriate even in front of strangers of the opposite sex), (2) *basho*, Nishida’s more technical term for “situation” or “locus,” which we will discuss in the next sub-section, and (3) *bamen*, which is the term Tokieda employs as a grounding for his theory and the subject of this section.

With this brief introduction, let us examine how the concept of locus has been both a major feature of Tokieda’s Process Theory and a significant contribution to linguistic theory.

3.1.1. Nishida’s Logic of *Locus (Basho)* and Tokieda’s Language Process Theory

Tokieda’s Process Theory is perhaps best approached by considering the concept of *locus (basho)* as it was formulated by Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) in his *Zen no Kenkyū* (A study of good) of 1911. This work is generally taken to be the first and most successful work to bring modern Japanese philosophy to world attention. The concepts we will encounter in our discussion of his theory, for example, “pure experience,” “spirit,” “self,” or “behaviour,” should not, however, be understood solely on the basis of Japanese thought. As Nishida states in the introduction to *Zen no Kenkyū*, “The reason for the title is that I have come to consider the problem of

man to be both the centre and the end of philosophy.” He was, to be sure, a good student of Zen Buddhism and took the making of Zen intelligible to the West to be one of his missions, but, unlike his friend, Suzuki Daisetsu, who explained Zen Buddhism positively and explicitly to the West, Nishida avoided Zen terms in his writing and strove to establish Japanese philosophy as an independent form of thought, while making his concepts intelligible to Western thinkers. It should be noted here that the title of the work employs a pun on the word “good” and the name of the religious sect, both of which are pronounced *zen*, though not written with the same character.


There are significant similarities between Nishida and Tokieda both in style and the manner in which they came to establish their theories. First, they both spent significant portions of their lives in remote regions of the country far from academic circles. This had the consequence of their reflecting upon their ideas in solitude and committing them to writing apart from the mainstream scholarship of their disciplines. Nishida, after this isolation, was invited first to Gakushuin University and then Kyoto University to teach philosophy, as Tokieda was invited to Tokyo University to teach Japanese linguistics. Nishida had his *Zen no Kenkyū*, published shortly after taking up his position at Kyoto University, and Tokieda his *Kokugogaku Genron*, after his arriving at Tokyo. Nishida wrote no other book; and although throughout his career he wrote many papers; all the philosophical problems and ideas developed in his later papers had their origin in his maiden work. Similarly, *Kokugogaku Genron* was the work in which Tokieda’s Language Process Theory (*Gengo Kateisetsu*) first appeared systematically, and it served as the wellspring from which he continued to develop his theory. Although, unlike Nishida, Tokieda wrote

other books apart from *Kokugogaku Genron*, his subsequent publications focused on a specific themes that had a direct or indirect link to *Gengo Kateisetsu*.

It is a philosopher Nakamura Yūjirō who best describes the relation between Nishida's philosophical thought and Tokieda's *Gengo Kateisetsu*.¹ According to Nakamura, it was the study of Tokieda's linguistic theory that led him to realize that the logic of locus (*basho*) in Nishida embodied the logic of Japanese language. He points out that when Tokieda uses *bamen*, it was not to refer purely to the objective world, or to a subjective function, but to the world that integrates them. It is here that Nakamura believes the two thinkers offer useful concepts for those contemporary thinkers who are attempting to find a middle course between empiricism and rationalism.²

The concept of *bamen*, one of the most important concepts in Tokieda's linguistic thought, is explained in *Kokugogaku Genron* as being one of the three conditions in which language takes place. As seen in Figure I, the other conditions are *shutai* (the functioning subject) and *sozai* (the material context).³

FIGURE I The three conditions



Nakamura also points out that the Japanese syntax presented by Tokieda – one where a sentence consists of *shi* (objective expressions) and *ji* (subjective expressions) and their synthesis by the latter's enveloping the former – is closely related to the logic of place in Nishida. While these concepts will be dealt with more fully in the next section, it should be noted here that these three elements are intimately interconnected.

As Nakamura tells us, Tokieda conceived of *ji* as being grammatically the more crucial aspect of the Japanese language process because it encompassed the subject and therefore isolated it in a less critical position in any given *bamen*. This thought is closely linked to Nishida's philosophy in that he tells us that the wider and more fundamental element is not the subject but the predicate in logic; that is to say, the predicate is the basis of judgement. Nishida seeks that which becomes the predicate of a connotative judgement and not the subject, not things, but acts. This formulation gives dominance of the predicate over the subject, and permits sentence types that can in Nishida's theory place the subject in "the place of absolute nothingness."⁴ Nishida here presents the structure of Japanese language as critically involving the synthesis of a sentence made by the predicate within a locus.

It should be pointed out that Nishida does not speak specifically about the nature of the Japanese language in his writing, but does help us to understand better Tokieda's linguistic theory by focusing our attention on the relevance of a predicate dominated logic to the study of language.

3.1.2. Phenomenology and Tokieda's Concept of *Locus* (*Bamen*)

The concept of *bamen* is frequently translated with the word "situation." But this can be misleading. As Tokieda (1938a)⁵ has explained the *bamen* includes not only the place and circumstances of a speech event, but also the subject's mood, emotion, and attitude concerning the scene. We live within such loci at all times. He writes:

For example, if I am walking along a busy street at night, I may perceive the people and cars as they come and go under the streetlights while experiencing a cheerful feeling. I am in such a *bamen*.⁶

Because locus does not refer merely to the objective things that surround the subject, nor is it opposed to the subjective, the concept of *bamen* does not isolate the subject from the objective world. Linguistically, *bamen* impinges upon expression and expression impinges upon *bamen*. It is the purpose of this sub-section to consider the phenomenological implications implicit in *bamen*, and relate them, in the next sub-section, to the Buddhistic perspective that Tokieda brought to his interpretation.

Let us examine the relation between the concept of *bamen* and phenomenology, for in its departure from the mainstream of Western philosophy can be found not only the seeds of Postmodernism, but also a general critique of the modernist attempt to apply the methods of the natural sciences to the human sciences. As a result of the Meiji Restoration, Japan began to absorb the science, technology, and philosophy of the West; and in that process Edmund Husserl's phenomenology came to have its influence. But even before Itō Kikuchinosuke in 1915 translated his *Die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Philosophy as a rigorous science) of 1911, under the title of

“*Gaku to shite no tetsugaku* (Philosophy as -logy),”⁷ Nishida (1911)⁸ also had already taken notice of phenomenology by criticizing Husserl’s concept of consciousness and by doing so played a leading role in introducing Husserl’s phenomenology to Japan. We also find many now well-known Japanese philosophers studying at the University of Freiburg in the 1920s, often with the encouragement of Nishida. Among them were Tanabe Hajime (1925)⁹, Yamanouchi Tokuryū (1930)¹⁰, Takahashi Satomi (1931)¹¹, and Mutai Risaku (1933)¹². All of these scholars were leading figures of the period, and their works had a significant influence throughout the teens, twenties, and thirties.

Tokieda, too, came under this influence, and as a consequence incorporated phenomenological views into his Theory. The first indication of this is the reference, in his graduation paper of 1924, to *Kagaku Gairon* (An introduction to science) by Tanabe, which had been written under Husserl’s influence. In raising the question of the difference between the objects of natural science and those of the human sciences, Tokieda introduced the idea that the objects of natural science can be recognized as distinct elements of matter, or as individual things, and thus more easily observed and explained than the phenomena of our human experience.¹³ While this does not indicate the direct influence of phenomenological views in his linguistic thought, it does show his methodological inclination towards phenomenology as early as his graduation paper.

It is in his “*Gengo ni okeru bamen no seiyaku ni tsuite* (On the restrictions of *bamen* in language)” that Tokieda explains the concept of *bamen* by directly using the words taken from Yamanouchi (1930); expressions such as *shikōteki kyakutai* (*intentionales Objekt*), *chūiteki henyō* (*attentionale Modifikation*) and *hosokusareta*

kyakutai (erfasstes Objekt). For Tokieda, *bamen* was to be understood as the state of consciousness of the self, which relates the subject to the world that surrounds it. He explains:

If we speak of *bamen* from the point of view away from the subject and with the object, it would be *shikōteki kyakutai (intentionales Objekt)*. [From Yamanouchi Tokuryū, *Genshōgaku Josetsu (Presentation of Phenomenology)*, p.321.] When I am going to talk to boys and girls, they exist with their pretty and innocent faces in front of me. They exist as objects for which my utterances of the speech event are intended even before I begin to speak and also as I speak. This is the *bamen* of my speech. Since *bamen* is the *shikōteki kyakutai* of the subject, a specific object does not always create the specific *shikōteki kyakutai*, that is to say, a specific *bamen*. There are instances of different *bamen* even though the situations seem similar. If another person comes and talks to these children, his or her existence is not the same as in the previous event even though the children are the same. The relationship between a person and the children, and therefore the existential context, is different in each instance. We call this the *chūiteki henyō (attentionale Modifikation)* of *bamen* according to phenomenology.¹⁴


He also discusses the object:

Concerning the meaning of “object,” we have to distinguish the object that will be spoken of from the one that exists as the intentional object. When we are surprised by an event and feel sad, such an intentional object is not immediately the material object. A material object should come into existence after it has been grasped (*hosoku sareru*). This can be called *hosoku sareta kyakutai (erfasstes Objekt)*.¹⁵

This distinction, however, does not seem to have been readily understood by his

readers, or by the immature Tokieda himself. Indeed, he did not pursue this phenomenological means of dealing with the concept of *bamen*, nor did he use these terms in *Kokugogaku Genron* (The principles of the Japanese language study). Figure II illustrates what has become the increasingly simpler representation of his early theory.

FIGURE II The concept of *bamen*




Tokieda tells us that the line CD represents things and their setting, which belong to the objective world for the subject (*shutai*) A; while B shows A's mood, emotion, and attitude towards the objective world which is represented by CD. B and CD are integrated and united to construct A's *bamen*. Therefore, *bamen* does not signify the purely objective world, nor the purely subjective awareness, but a world that integrates the two.¹⁶

Although there is no explanation of how he came to construct this figure, it is clear that Tokieda thought it was useful for the presentation of his ideas.¹⁷ Among the other works in which this figure was used, the most important is his work of 1960¹⁸, a work also important for its explanation of his theory of sentences and

paragraphs, together with their relationship to the structure of consciousness. The presentation employs such terms as *noema*, *noesis*, and by using this phenomenological approach, he illustrates the structure of consciousness with Figure III.

FIGURE III The structure of consciousness



Consciousness consists of the two *Konstitutione*, one is "*taishō no men (noema)*, the aspect of object"; and the other is "*shikō sayō (noesis)*, its function in relation to *taishōno men*"¹⁹ Here again we find phenomenological terms taken from Satake (1954)²⁰. However, unlike their previous use, they are now directly connected to the explanation of the structure of consciousness. What is important here is that Tokieda is not trying to clarify the relation between *bamen* and consciousness but the relation between consciousness and process of expression.

As Tokieda states later,²¹ it was through the phenomenological view of the structure of consciousness that he came to realize more clearly the relation between *shi* and *tenioha*, a realization that had been initiated by his study of Suzuki Akira's *Gengyo Shishuron* of 1824, and now modified so that the concept of *noema* corresponded to *shi*, and that of *noesis* to *tenioha*.

It is clear that the phenomenological view led to Tokieda's clearer understanding the relation between *shi* and *tenioha*, a view that connects the process of expression to the structure of consciousness. However, when we consider how it played a role in the concept of *bamen*, it is impossible to see any positive influence on his use of the concept, much less its formation. He did not make use of Western phenomenology to explain *bamen*, beyond his explanation of the process of expression.

3.1.3. Buddhistic Phenomenology and the Concept of *Locus*

In the West, it is perhaps not common to approach the study of language from the viewpoint of religious thought and concepts, and for this reason it may not be inappropriate to reemphasize the observations made earlier concerning Buddhism. Buddhist thought is not theological concern (there is no God in Buddhism), it is rather a philosophical activity whose goal is correct understanding; and here understanding encompasses not only a person's spiritual awakening but also intellectual awareness of the nature of things as they are. And so what is discussed here is not to be taken as an excursion into metaphysical abstraction, but as an attempt to offer a practical examination of the relation between the way things are and how we experience and speak of them.

It should be noted here that in this sub-section, when the word "Buddhistic" is used, it is employed strictly in a philosophical sense. The Madhyamika (Middle Way) School of Buddhism, founded by Nagarjuna in the third century A.D., had as its aim the deconstruction of the various schools of philosophy of the time, schools such as

Realism and Idealism, in order to demonstrate that their premises created irreconcilable contradictions.²² He was perhaps the first to argue that if, like contemporary Empiricists, a school takes only what is “objectively observable” as valid, then the statement “only what is objectively observable is true” cannot be verified on the basis of their premises. In the same way, the “I” of the Cogito must be posited prior to the act of thought which it performs. And it is between the unverifiable objects of realism and unsubstantiatable subjects of rationalism that the Madhyamika School charts its course.²³

Let us begin by considering the remarks that Tokieda makes concerning Buddhist thought. While this is not a topic frequently discussed in the study of linguistics, Tokieda (1960), while contrasting Eastern and Western philosophy, introduces the Buddhistic view of consciousness. He says,

It is said that there are two aspects in the structure of consciousness. One is *taishōmen* (*noema*) and the other is *shikō sayō* (*noesis*). Such an explanation of the structure of consciousness, however, is not the thought that has been only seen in the Western philosophy but also seen in the Buddhist thought. That is to say, there are two elements of consciousness in Buddhism. One is *kon* (*indriya* in Sanskrit, sense-organ) and the other is *kyō* (*artha* or *visaya*, object). *Kon* means that *shiki* (consciousness) takes *kyō*, and also is something that gives a basis on which *shiki* recognizes *kyō*. Each of the concepts of *kon* and *kyō* is divided into six elements, the so-called “*rokkon* (*sad indriyani*, the six sense-organs)” and “*rokkyō* (*sad visayah*, the six objects of cognition)”. And there is a one-to-one correspondence between *rokkon* and *rokkyō* as seen below.

<i>rokkon</i> (The six sense-organs)	<i>rokkyō</i> (The six objects)
<i>gen</i> (eyes, sense of vision)	<i>shiki</i> (colour and shape)

<i>ni</i> (ears, sense of audition)	<i>shō</i> (sound)
<i>bi</i> (nose, sense of smell)	<i>ko</i> (odor)
<i>zetsu</i> (tongue, sense of taste)	<i>mi</i> (taste)
<i>shin</i> (body, sense of touch)	<i>soku</i> (tangibility)
<i>i</i> (mind)	<i>hō</i> (objects of the mind) ²⁴

The Japanese meaning of *kon* is a root, and comes from the translation of the Sanskrit word *indriya* whose meaning implies a powerful act, one capable of producing something. Thus just as the root of a plant has the power to produce a sprout, so the sense-organs are able to produce their corresponding mode of consciousness.²⁵ The word *kyō* is the translation of the Sanskrit word *artha* or *visaya*. *Artha* means thing, and *visaya* means scope or reach of sense-organs. Both *artha* and *visaya* are used to mean the object of cognition.²⁶ Tokieda continues:

For example, according to the Buddhistic view, it is said that *gen* (the sense of vision) functions to capture *shiki* (colour and shape). And therefore, it is obvious that *kon* is the *shikō sayō* (*noesis*) to *kyō*, and *kyō* corresponds to *taishōmen* (*noema*). This way of the human cognition in Buddhism has been explained as the basis for releasing ourselves from the worldly passions and desires (*bonnō gedatsu*). It is also said that since all worldly passions and desires occur when we have been caught by *kyō*, and therefore, most important thing for releasing ourselves from the worldly passions and desires is to purify our *rokkon* that function to recognize the corresponding *kyō*.²⁷

In this way Tokieda connects *shikō sayō* to *noesis* and *taishōmen* to *noema*. He used the phenomenological view of *noema* and *noesis* in explaining the structure of consciousness, as we observed in the previous section, but here for the first time he is attempting to connect these concepts to the Buddhistic view of human cognition. He

is referring here to the principle that we have to make our *rokkon* pure in order to free ourselves from the ignorance that causes our failure to comprehend properly the true nature of the human cognition, a failure that is the root cause of all the misconceptions that prevent us from attaining full understanding and therefore enlightenment. And we should notice here that this understanding of our existential nature is more intellectual than spiritual in the traditional Western sense.

While the view of human cognition presented by Tokieda is one basic to Buddhism, he does not in his writings explain it in any detail, perhaps because he thought it was sufficiently well understood by his Japanese audience. But it may help to understand his view of human cognition by looking more closely at what Tokieda meant in the remarks he made above.

The most obvious difference between this and the Western view of perception is the inclusion of the mind as a sense organ and thoughts as objects. It is on the basis of “*i* (mind)” that we are consciousness of “*hō* (objects of the mind).” According to Buddhist tradition, *hō* refers to every existent thing, including the process by which it exists. Only a Buddha has full knowledge of *hō*.²⁸ This precludes the possibility of an unenlightened creature from formulating anything other than a generalized description of the process by which cognition and consequently language functions. This aspect of Buddhist thought gives a pragmatic proclivity to any theoretical system that is founded on its precepts.

Another question to be asked is what Tokieda means by saying in the same work, “*gen* (eyes, sense of vision) functions to capture *shiki* (colour and shape)” and “we have been caught by *kyō*.”²⁹ It seems that Tokieda finds a relationship between the *gen* and *kyō*. The sutra *Kan Fugen Bosatsu Gyōhōkyō* (The sutra on meditating on

Fugen Bosatsu)³⁰ describes the relation between the two as correlative. It tells us that desire for many *shiki* (colours and shapes) is caused by the functioning of *gen kon* (eyes), and since we attach ourselves to the *shiki*, our proper vision is denied and we are left with only an illusionary understanding, which is to say, a misunderstanding of the world. What is important to notice here is that while the main thrust of the Sutra is to purify one's thought for the purposes of enlightenment, and while enlightenment in the Buddhist context has a spiritual end, it is a process intimately associating the senses and the intellect. It is this process and the way that it binds the senses and the intellect with their perceived objects that sets Tokieda's thought apart from traditional Western philosophy and science and makes the understanding of these Buddhist concepts so important for the study of his Language Process Theory.

The basic thought here is that through the functioning of one's *kon* a person moves toward *kyō*, and at the same time *kyō* approaches a person's *kon*. Subject and object are not in Buddhist philosophy considered to be separable. Therefore, since there is no clear distinction between them, they are perceived to combine in the construction of our perception of the world rather than as being in the dualistic relation between subject and object.

On the basis of this, Tokieda associates the relation between *kon* and *kyō* with the relation between *ji* and *shi*.

Teniha Taigaishō (The outline of *teniha*), which is the basis of my theory of *shi* and *ji*, states that *shi* is like a temple (*jisha*) and *teniha* (*ji*) like solemnity (*shōgon*). Here the relation between a temple and its being solemn is exactly the same as the relation between *kyō* and *kon* in Buddhism. This means that *shi* corresponds to *kyō* and *ji* to *kon*.³¹

And finally Tokieda discusses the expression of consciousness.

On the basis of such the structure of consciousness, an expression exists as an expression of consciousness. However, since the expression is able to be restricted by material objects, it does not necessarily express the whole of consciousness, and at the same time, the circumstances of one's consciousness select the material for expression.³²

This statement is closely associated with the concept of *bamen*. Tokieda emphasizes the fact that the relation between *bamen* and expression by language is correlative, thus:

The reality of locus (*bamen*) is nothing less than that we live. Because *bamen* always has a close functional relationship with our actions, the concept is needed when considering language. The *bamen* places constraints on the expressions we make with language, and at the same time what is expressed in language constrains the *bamen*. Therefore, there is an inexorable relation between the two. It is true that we cannot read quietly in the exciting locus, but it is also true that if we clear our mind of all worldly thoughts, we can find the locus quiet.³³

He also tells us:

If a sculptor begins by imagining the place where his or her sculpture will be placed, perhaps in a main hall of a temple or in front of the wall in a drawing room, the location will be united with his or her feelings towards the location, and this union will form a *bamen*. When the sculpture is created to be suitable to the place, it can be said that the situational value has been determined by the sculptor and the locus that constrained the creation. Therefore, we can say that when a subject expresses something, that subject expands itself towards the

locus until it is limited by it, and also that the locus exists prior to the expression and thus constrains it from the very beginning.³⁴

Here we can see how Tokieda has used the Buddhistic view of human cognition to explain his concepts of *shi*, *ji*, and *bamen*.

To sum up, there are three points to be stressed. The first is that Tokieda found the Buddhistic view of human cognition, with its terms, such as *kyō* and *kon*, as well as the western phenomenological view and its terms, such as *noema* and *noesis*, useful in explaining the structure of consciousness. He made this explicit in his work of 1960. The second is that Tokieda explained the basic concepts of *shi* and *ji* using the concepts of *kyō* and *kon* in Buddhism. And finally that he closely associated the Buddhistic view of human cognition, which manifests itself through the mutual relationship between *kyō* and *kon*, with verbal expression. The relationship between expression and consciousness presented by Tokieda is in accord with his understanding of the relationship between an expression and its *bamen*. And so it is that Tokieda, near the end of his life, articulated the possibility that we can approach the important factors of Language Process Theory from the point of view of Buddhist philosophical thought.

3.2. TOKIEDA'S OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE EXPRESSIONS (*SHI* AND *JI*)

As we have noted above, the first book to present systematically Tokieda's Language Process Theory (*Gengo Kateisetsu*) is his *Kokugogaku Genron* (The principles of the

Japanese language study) of 1941, a work that brought to maturity the ideas that had been presented in his graduation thesis of 1924.

Crediting Suzuki's grammatical insights as the major achievement of earlier times, Tokieda developed his own theory by synthesizing Suzuki's with his own. It should be noted, however, in his *Kokugogaku Genron*, Tokieda moved beyond the descriptive formulation of Suzuki and developed an approach where language is regarded as the process by which humans express themselves and understand others. This approach, his Language Process Theory, is a further development of traditional Japanese grammatical theory in contrast to those modern linguistic theories that treat the word as a combination of sound and meaning. Within this context, we now turn our attention to the relationship between Tokieda's treatment of language and those of Western linguistics.

It was one hundred years after the appearance of *Gengyo Shishuron* that Suzuki's categorization was revived by Tokieda and employed to establish two types of words, each expressing a different process. The first comes to be expressed through the process of conceptualization in speaker's mind; the other is expressed without this process. The former includes nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, the latter postpositional particles, auxiliary verbs, conjunctions, and interjections. Initially, Tokieda (1937a)³⁵ called the former *gainen-go* (notional words) and the latter *kannen-go* (conceptual words). The terms, *gainen-go* and *kannen-go* had been originally used by Yamada Yoshio.³⁶ Following this experimental study, Tokieda (1937b)³⁷ presented his further thoughts on the language process and his position on the systematic study of language. The whole of the paper appears, with some modifications, as the main component of *Kokugogaku Genron*. One of the significant

modifications made for the second presentation was his replacement of the terms, *gainen-go* and *kannen-go* with *shi* and *ji*, terms also taken from classical Japanese linguistics.

Now, since they will continue to serve as central terms throughout his work, let us look more closely at Tokieda's remarks on *shi* and *ji* and examine in detail their function in Language Process Theory. First, he writes:

Although the terms of *shi* and *ji* have been used in the tradition of the study of the Japanese grammar, I think that we can grasp the nature of the terminology best by considering the difference between the two. *Shi* is a form that includes the process of conceptualization (*gainen katei o fukumu keishiki*), while *ji* is without the process of conceptualization (*gainen katei o fukumanu keishiki*). This point of view is in accord with the definition of Suzuki Akira.³⁸

As mentioned in the section 2.2.1 of the previous chapter, Suzuki had differentiated the two by stipulating that *shi* are words that points at something while *ji*, represented by the *tenioha*, have no such objects. If the *shi* are bead, the *ji* are the cords on which the beads are strung. Together they make a necklace. Tokieda continues:

Shi alone cannot express a unit of thought, while *ji* always emerges with *shi* in a concrete expression, Therefore, only the combination of *shi* and *ji* expresses a concrete thought. The relationship between the two is that *shi* is contained by *ji*, and therefore, they belong to different dimensions.³⁹

He also uses the analogy of a *furoshiki*, a cloth used in Japan to wrap up a bundle, and says of the relationship that it is similar to the relationship between a *furoshiki* and its contents:

The contents that are contained by *furoshiki* belong to the one same dimension; on the other hand, the *furoshiki* itself, which functions to wrap the contents, belongs to another.⁴⁰

Since a *furoshiki* is flexible, it can contain items regardless of its shape. And at the same time, the function of a *furoshiki* is not only to contain the contents but also to combine them into a package. The function of a *furoshiki* is complete when we have wrapped many things in it and tie the four corners of the square cloth together to make a package as a whole. Tokieda emphasises the fact that *ji* function not merely to contain *shi* but also to unite *shi* to make a unified sentence, a concrete expression of thought. Tokieda stresses the point that the two terms of *shi* and *ji* are not merely morphological categories, but aspects of the fundamental structure of expressions. The function of *ji* in Japanese syntax is that which comes at the end of a construction and synthesize *shi*.⁴¹

According to the classification of words in traditional Western grammar, there is the distinction between lexical and grammatical items. The former refer to words which have lexical meaning, i.e. they have semantic content, while the latter refer to words items whose sole function is to signal grammatical relations, such as *of*, *to* and *the* in English);⁴² It is possible to apply this distinction loosely to the difference between *shi* and *ji*, and to interpret *ji* as corresponding to grammatical words and *shi* to lexical words respectively. However, we need to pay close attention to the fact that Tokieda, on the basis of his recognising a fundamental difference between the concepts of *shi* and *ji*, applies the concepts not only to word classes or parts of speech, but also to their interrelationship as the function within a phrase or sentence.

Sakai (1992) uses *shi* and *ji* as English words and explains the relationship in

this way:

Like the *furoshiki*, *ji* does not have its own determined shape; it assumes the shape of whatever is contained in it and keeps what is contained together as a synthesized whole. Suffice it to say that a *furoshiki* containing things can also be wrapped up by another *furoshiki*, and therefore, the synthesized whole, or an utterance, can contain many sheets of *furoshiki* in it. At this level, *shi* and *ji* no longer denote nominal and nonnominal: the *shi-ji* relationship, Tokieda claims, is the fundamental pattern of Japanese syntax.⁴³

Other scholars who have treated Tokieda's and Suzuki's concepts of *shi* and *ji* in English frequently use the terms lexical words and grammatical words. Karatani (1995) explains Suzuki's distinction as "the distinction between words (*shi*), which have a signifying semantic content, and linking elements (*ji*) such as particles and auxiliary verbs which, though having no such content, manifest an affective value."⁴⁴ Heinrich (2002) offers another functional definition, saying of *shi* that they are elements "referring to concrete things and conditions", while *ji* are those elements "referring to parts of speech in which the act of expression would manifest and reveal itself directly".⁴⁵

Given this general understanding of the terms, let us look at some examples presented by Tokieda (1950)⁴⁶.

(1) *Ume no hana ga sai ta.*

(The Japanese plum trees blossomed.)

ume – noun, Japanese plum tree, which belongs to the category of *shi*.

no – postpositional particle, which shows possessive case, is a *ji*.

hana – noun, flower, *shi*.

ga – postpositional particle, which shows subjective case, is a *ji*.

sai – verb, blossom (the form of *sak-u* before *ta*), *shi*.

ta – marker of past or perfect tense, phonologically enclitic on the preceding

word/phrase, *ji*.

Tokieda uses this example to show the process by which the combination of *shi* and *ji* are accomplished in a Japanese sentence. He writes:

The sentence *Ume no hana ga sai ta* can be analyzed in three phrases,

Ume no | *hana ga* | *sai ta* | ⁴⁷

And the relationship between the three phrases is not simply one of connection such as, *ume no* is connected to *hana ga* and *hana ga* is connected to *sai ta*. The phrase *hana ga* creates an independent element with *ume no*, and at the same time, it is the part of the structure of a larger phrase *ume no hana ga*, where *ume no hana* is a *shi* and followed by the *ji* “*ga*,” thus creating the larger phrase *ume no hana ga*.

Ume no hana *ga*

_____ =

As the figure above shows, the *ji* “*ga*” not only follows the *shi* “*hana*.” The “*hana*” has the modifier *ume no*. Therefore, “*ga*” is also connected to the phrase *ume no hana*. When a structure consists of a phrase wrapping a phrase, it is important to recognise the expression as a unit of thought. The smaller phrase is united with the larger. Next, *sai ta* is also a phrase made by the combination of a *shi* and *ji*. And at the same time, the *ji*, “*ta*” is not connected merely to “*sai*,” but to the whole predicate that has a subject (here *ume no hana*), making yet another phrase.

Ume no hana ga *sai ta*

_____ =

Therefore, the structure above is regarded as a phrase made by the combination of *shi* and *ji*. However, because the *ji*, “*ta*” functions to synthesize the phrase as a complete expression, it should be called a sentence.⁴⁸

Tokieda illustrates this structure with Figure IV and FIGURE V.

FIGURE IV The structure of the sentence “*Ume no hana ga sai ta*”





FIGURE V The structure of nested boxes (*ireko gata*)



Tokieda calls such structures “nested boxes (*ireko gata*)”, where a *shi* is contained by a *ji* to make a phrase, and that phrase is contained by a larger phrase.⁴⁹ In a well-formed construction, the *shi* and *ji* are always combined in such a way that the *ji*

contains the *shi* to make a unit expressing the speaker's thought.

With respect to the nested-box structure, there are two points to be noted. First, there are instances where there is no overt expression of *ji* after *shi* in a phrase. For example, Tokieda compares the two phrases below,⁵⁰

(2) *kirei na mizu*

(clean water)

kirei — adjective, clean, *shi*.

na — auxiliary verb, the attributive form of “*da*,” *ji*.

mizu — noun, water, *shi*.

(3) *nagareru= mizu*

(flowing water)

nagareru — verb, flow, the attributive form of “*nagareru*,” *shi*.

mizu — noun, water, *shi*.

According to Tokieda, phrase (3) has no overt *ji* after the *shi* “*nagareru*,” while phrase (2) has the *ji* “*na*”, which emerges after the *shi* “*kirei*”, making a phrase *kirei na*, which in turn is connected to another *shi* “*mizu*.” Tokieda assumes the existence of *ji* in such structures as phrase (3) and calls them *zero kigō no ji* (zero sign *ji*). That means that there is a “zero” *ji* after the word “*nagareru*” creating a phrase with the structure of *shi – ji*, just as in the phrase *kirei na*. He further, connects the idea of *zero kigō no ji* to the idea of *zero kigō no chinjutsu* (zero sign *chinjutsu*), saying that even where there is no overt *ji*, such as with auxiliary verbs, it is possible to assume the existence of *ji* and therefore, the existence of *zero kigō no chinjutsu*, which function to synthesize the *shi* and complete the sentence. He illustrates this with the following examples:⁵¹

(4) *Inu ga hashiru.*

(A dog runs.)

inu — noun, dog, *shi*.

ga — postpositional particle, which shows subjective case, *ji*.

hashiru — verb, run, the ending form of “*hashiru*,” *shi*.

(5) *Kikō ga atatakai.*

(The weather is warm.)

kikō — noun, weather, *shi*.

ga — postpositional particle, which shows subjective case, *ji*.

atatakai — adjective, warm, the ending form of “*atatakai*,” *shi*.

(6) *Kokyō no yama!*

(My hometown’s mountain!)

kokyō — noun, hometown, *shi*.

no — postpositional particle, which shows possessive case, *ji*.

yama — noun, mountain, *shi*.

The sentences of (4) and (5) are examples where there are no *ji* after the *shi* “*hashiru*” and after the *shi* “*atatakai*”, and where both sentences end with *shi*.

Tokieda first says that sentence (6) is similar to the following expression,

(7) *Kokyō no yama yo.*

(Oh, my hometown’s mountain.)

kokyō — noun, hometown, *shi*.

no — postpositional particle, which shows possessive case. *ji*.

yama — noun, mountain, *shi*.

yo — postpositional particles, which shows the speaker’s emotion. *ji*.

in which the *ji*, “*yo*” occurs at the end of the sentence expressing the speaker’s emotion. And he further states that we can similarly regard (4) and (5) as sentences that are completed by the function of a zero *kigō no chinjutsu*, though there are no overt *ji* at the end of the sentences. Tokieda presents the sentences that have no overt *ji* in this way:

(8) Inu ga hashiru □

(9) Kikō ga atatakai □

(10) Kokyō no yama □

The small boxes at the end of each sentence indicate the existence of *ji* and at the same time, the existence of *chinjutsu*. By establishing the concepts of *zero kigō no ji* and *zero kigō no chinjutsu*, the basic structure of the combination of *shi* and *ji* in phrases and in sentences – where *ji* functions as *chinjutsu* to unite the whole of expression as a completed sentence – is maintained.⁵²

“*Nagareru*,” for example, is not made up of the verb “*nagare*” and the auxiliary verb “*ru*”, but is the attributive form of the verb. Therefore, “*nagareru*” is the *shi*. Similarly, “*atatakai*” is the dictionary form of the adjective, and therefore, “*atatakai*” is the *shi*. Both “*nagareru*” and “*atatakai*” have no overt word of *ji* following the *shi*. On the other hand, “*saita*” is made up of the verb “*sai*”(conjunctive form) and the tense marker “*ta*.” And therefore, “*saita*” is made up of the combination of *shi* and *ji*. According to the theory of *shi* and *ji*, every phrase (expression) should be made up of a word of *shi* and a word of *ji*. However, there are cases where no overt *ji* follows the *shi* such as the examples above. Tokieda maintains the principle of the combination of *shi* and *ji* by assuming the existence of *ji* (*zero kigō no ji*). Tokieda further explains that while “*ru*” is interpreted as an integral part of the verb form, “*ta*” is analysed as an abbreviated form of “*te ari*” contacted in the classical language to “*tari*” and then in the early modern period to “*ta*.”⁵³ Here too we may be observing the influence of Suzuki on Tokieda’s theory.

Tokieda contends that the nested box structure is fundamental to Japanese syntax. And therefore, he does not offer examples of the sentences that cannot be

illustrated by the nested box structure. That is a structure in which a word is used in concord with the other words in a sentence and not one in which they are placed continuously in line. For example,

(11) *Kimi shika ko nai.*

(Only you come.)

kimi — pronoun, you, *shi*.

shika — postpositional particle, which shows restriction (only), *ji*.

ko — verb, come, the form of *kuru* before the auxiliary verb *nai*, *shi*.

nai — auxiliary verb, which shows negation, *ji*.

The *ji*, “*shika*” is used in concord with another *ji*, “*nai*” in this sentence. The relationship of the usage between “*shika*” and “*nai*” in the sentence cannot be shown as a nested box, though the relationship of the combination of *shi* and *ji* can be shown.

The nested box cannot show the relationship between those words that do not occur closely in the sentence although the structure of the combination of *shi* and *ji* is shown as other sentences. Tokieda emphasizes this by showing the nested box as a structure combining *shi* and *ji* and presenting this relationship as essential to Japanese syntax. In Chapter 4 these concepts will be employed and further discussed in the analysis of texts.

3.3 TOKIEDA AND THE CONCEPT OF PROCESS (*KATEI*)

Finally, when considering the significance of Tokieda’s graduation paper in the establishment of his linguistic thought, we must take into account his use of the term “process.” In the first chapter, he states:

After thinking over this problem, I have concluded that language is a form of expressive activity by human beings such as pictures, music, and dance.⁵⁴

And later in the same chapter this idea is expanded using the word “process”:

I think that the essential nature of language is not sounds, nor letters, nor ideas, but the means by which we try to express our ideas in sounds or letters. The object of linguistics is to study that process. On this point, the object of linguistics is very different from that of the study of sounds. When linguists deal with sounds, they are actually dealing with the process by which those sounds mediate between ideas and their expression, although they appear to be studying the sounds themselves.⁵⁵

He subsequently tells us that he took the term “process” from *A Primer of Psychology* (1898) by Edward Bradford Titchener, in which the author says that psychology is the study of a mental process⁵⁶. Tokieda wrote the word “process” in English, perhaps because its usage was not well-known at the time, or that it seemed to him a more appropriate way of emphasizing the concept. Later, in the fifth chapter, Tokieda used the term “*katei* (process)” in the subtitle “Hyōgen no *katei* to shite no gengo no mikata (A view of language as the process of expression).” Language is a human activity whose nature is to be found in the process of speech acts. Language is an act by which human beings express or understand their ideas through the sound. This view, which takes language not as a material thing (*mono*) but as an unsubstantial thing (*koto*), Tokieda takes as the starting point for the consideration of all linguistic study.

Since the idea of “process” is central to Tokieda’s theory, let us examine in

detail how he uses the idea and what he means by the term when he uses it after the presentation of his graduation paper. There are two significant papers written by Tokieda on the matter. One is Tokieda (1937a) and the other is Tokieda (1937b). These papers later became the main components of his *Kokugogaku Genron*. In the first paper Tokieda presents his view of language as a mental act performed by human beings. He writes:

We can say that the nature of language is as a mental act (*seishin katsudō*) through which human beings express their thoughts and emotions to the outside using the medium that can be heard and seen such as sounds and letters. If it is true, studying linguistic phenomena including the study of the grammatical system must begin by re-establishing the process of the mental act of the person who expresses through the medium. This is clearly an interpreting work.⁵⁷

Thus Tokieda confirms the view that the use of language as a starting point for the study of language. On the basis of this, he establishes a difference in the nature between such linguistic elements as postpositional particles and auxiliary verbs on the one hand and nouns, verbs, and adjectives on the other. The former are elements by which the speaker expresses his or her conscious awareness through the process of the conceptualization, and the latter the expressions that function without that process. For example, Tokieda says,

The process of the conceptualization means that speaker expresses the content of his/her consciousness in a way that is detached from the speaker, as something that belongs to the world outside the speaker. And therefore, those words that have been conceptualized can express not only the speaker's state of mind but also other persons' states of mind. We can say, "*Ware ni kaeru* (It returned to me)" and "*Kare mo*

iku (He, too, goes).” On the contrary, the words of the other group, which are expressed directly without the process of the conceptualization, can only express the matter that is related to the speaker’s consciousness.

Kare mo ika mu.

(He would go, too.)

kare — pronoun, he, *shi*.

mo — postpositional particle, too, *ji*.

ika — verb, go, the form of *iku* before the auxiliary verb *mu*, *shi*.

mu — auxiliary verb, which shows guess, *ji*.

In this sentence, “*mo*” does not show that he himself has the intention to go as well as other persons. It shows the speaker’s consciousness with respect to “his intention” within the relationship between the speaker and “him.” Similarly, “*mu*” does not show “his guess.” It shows the guess about “him” in the speaker’s mind. Interjections also have such a feature. Because this is clear to us, we can without fail interpret the meaning of sentences correctly. However, we must pay close attention to the fact that the difference is on the basis of the nature of words.⁵⁸

As we have already seen in the previous section, this is the difference between *shi* and *ji*, although Tokieda used the term *gainen-go* and *kannen-go* respectively.

Tokieda emphasizes further the idea of the language process in the second paper mentioned above. Here Tokieda says,

If we recognize the nature of language as a mental process (*shinteki katei*) we can study language by studying the process of expression as an object, which is different from other means of the expression of thought such as music and painting. We cannot assume language without concept (*gainen*) and sound (*onsei*); therefore, both are the

indispensable factors to the process of language. We can recognize the existence of language only in the process of language.⁵⁹

He then explains the process of the expression of *gainen-go* as follows,

- 1 From concrete matters (*gutaiteki jibutsu*) or symbols (*hyōshō*) to concepts (*gainen*)
- 2 From concepts (*gainen*) to acoustic images (*chōkaku eizō*)
- 3 From acoustic images (*chōkaku eizō*) to sounds (*onsei*)

On the other hand, the process of the expression of *kannen-go* as follows,

- 1 From concrete matters (*gutaiteki jibutsu*) or symbols (*hyōshō*) to acoustic images (*chōkaku eizō*)
- 2 From acoustic images (*chōkaku eizō*) to sounds (*onsei*)⁶⁰

Tokieda continues,

The process of the later expression is not a process in which concrete matters or symbols move through the process of conceptualization, and then directly move on to the process of the acoustic images. Such expressions, because of the lack of the process of conceptualization, show only the speaker's feelings, emotions and positions. Interjections, postpositional particles, and auxiliary verbs are such linguistic forms.⁶¹

Tokieda also explains how the idea of the process functions in the interpretation of taboo words. He says,

The taboo words, for example, "*ase* (sweat)" means "*chi* (blood)," and "*kaminaga* (long of hair)" means "*sō* (priest)." However, from the point of view of the language process, the usage of the word "sweat" shows that the speaker expresses "blood" through the process of "sweat," and that the hearer understands "blood" as referring back to the process of "sweat," and thus, both the speaker and hearer can avoid expressing or understanding directly the concrete matter. That

is the nature of the usage of taboo words.⁶²

To sum up, the idea of the process of expression was central to the thought of Tokieda from the beginning. He first used the term “process,” in English, in his graduation paper in 1924, and after that he established the idea of the process more firmly by connecting it to the fundamental difference between the two categories of words in Japanese, initially *gainen-go* and *kannen-go*. The categorization on the basis of this difference appears in his *Kokugogaku Genron* in 1941 as the main components of the theory of *shi* and *ji*.⁶³ It is these terms that will be used in the ensuing chapters, where we will apply Tokieda’s Language Process Theory to texts, to the use of the respect language, and to the relation between linguistics and literature.

¹ Nakamura, Yūjirō, *Nishida Tetsugaku no Datsukōchiku* (Deconstruction of Nishida philosophy), Iwanami Shoten, 1987.

² An interesting paper could be written comparing and contrasting the terms *basho*, *bamen*, and Heidegger's *dasein*, terms created to meet the problems implicit in Cartesian dualism.

³ Tokieda, *Kokugogaku Genron* (The principles of the Japanese language study), Iwanami Shoten, 1941, p.41.

⁴ *Basho* (Place), *Nishida Kitarō Zenshū* (Complete works of Nishida Kitarō), Iwanami Shoten, Vol.4, 1965, pp.208-289.

⁵ Tokieda, Gengo ni okeru bamen no seiyaku ni tsuite (On the restrictions of *bamen* in language), *Kokugo to Kokubungaku*, Vol.15 No.5, 1938. This paper is also included in his *Gengo Honshitsuron* (The theory of the nature of language), Meiji Shoin, 1973.

⁶ Tokieda, 1973, p.343.

⁷ The abbreviated translation is found in the journal *Tetsugaku Zasshi* (The journal of philosophy), No. 343-346, Tokyo University, 1915. Husserl's *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (Philosophy as a rigorous science) originally appeared in *Logos*, I (1910-1911), pp.289-341. The English translation appeared as E. Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, translated with an introduction by Quentin Lauer, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1965.

⁸ Nishida Kitarō, Ninshikiron ni okeru jun ronriha no shuchō ni tsuite (On the theses of the pure-logic school in epistemology), *Geibun* 2, No.8 and 9, 1911, also in *Nishida Kitarō Zenshū* (Complete works of Nishida Kitarō), Vol.1, Iwanami Shoten, 1965.

⁹ Tanabe Hajime, Ninshikiron to genshōgaku (Epistemology and phenomenology), *Kōza* (A series of philosophical treatises), Vo.24, 1-20, Vol.25, 23-51, Ōmura Shoten, 1925.

¹⁰ Yamanouchi Tokuryū, *Genshōgaku Josetsu* (Presentation of phenomenology), Iwanami Shoten, 1930.

¹¹ Takahashi Satomi, *Husserl no Genshōgaku* (The phenomenology of Husserl), Daiichi Shoten, 1931.

¹² Mutai Risaku, Taishōron to genshōgaku (Object theory and phenomenology), *Gendai no Tetsugaku* (Contemporary philosophy), *Iwanami Kōza Tetsugaku* (Iwanami essay series: Philosophy), Iwanami Shoten, 1933.

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- ¹³ Tokieda, *Nihon ni okeru gengo kannen no hattatsu oyobi gengo kenkyū no mokuteki to sono hōhō* (Meiji izen), (The development of conception of language and purpose and method of language study, prior to the Meiji period), 1924 (published in 1976 by Meiji Shoin), p.17.
- ¹⁴ Tokieda, 1973, p.349.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p.350.
- ¹⁶ Tokieda, 1941, pp.43-44.
- ¹⁷ This figure was seen first in “Bun no kaishaku jō yori mita joshi jodōshi (The classification of postpositional particles and auxiliary verbs from the viewpoint of sentence interpretation)” 1937, not in the original paper, but in the offprint in which Tokieda later drew this figure. See *Gengo Honshitsuron* (The theory of the nature of language), Meiji Shoin, 1973.
- ¹⁸ Tokieda, *Bunshō Kenkyū Josetsu* (An introduction to the study of discourse), Yamada Shoin, 1960.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p.202.
- ²⁰ Satake Tetsuo, *Genshōgaku Gairon* (Introduction to phenomenology), 1954.
- ²¹ Tokieda, “Tokieda bunpō” no seiritsu to sono genryū (The formation and the origins of “Tokieda’s grammar”), *Kōza Nihongo no Bunpō* (Essay series on Japanese grammar), Meiji Shoin, Vol. 1, 1968.
- ²² For perhaps the most lucid description of the concepts used here see: T.R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika System*, George Allen & Unwin, 1955.
- ²³ This position has much in common with the Pragmatism of Peirce, the Hermeneutics of Gadamer, and the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty.
- ²⁴ Tokieda, 1960, pp.202-203. The English translations of the Buddhistic terms have been added by the present writer.
- ²⁵ It should be noted here that in Indian philosophy the mind is also one of the senses, making the number six.
- ²⁶ Inagaki Hisao, *A Dictionary of Japanese Buddhist Terms*, Nagata Bunshōdō, 1984.
- ²⁷ Tokieda. 1960, p.203.
- ²⁸ *Hōbenhon*, the first volume of *Myōhōrengekyō* (The Lotus Sutra).
- ²⁹ Tokieda, 1960, p.203.
- ³⁰ This sutra is more usually referred to as the *Kekkyō*, the concluding sutra, because it is regarded as the conclusion to the Lotus Sutra.

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- ³¹ Ibid., p.205.
- ³² Ibid., p.205.
- ³³ Tokieda, 1941, p.45.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p.159.
- ³⁵ Tokieda, *Bun no kaishaku jō yori mita joshi jodōshi* (The classification of postpositional particles and auxiliary verbs from the viewpoint of sentence interpretation), *Bungaku*, Vol.5 No.3, 20-56, 1937, also in Tokieda, 1973.
- ³⁶ See Yamada Yoshio, *Nihonbunpōron* (On Japanese grammar), Hōbunkan, 1908, and *Nihonbunpōgaku Gairon* (An outline of Japanese grammar), Hōbunkan, 1936.
- ³⁷ Tokieda, *Shinteki katei to shite no gengo honshitsukan* (A view of language as a mental process), *Bungaku*, Vol.5 No.6, 1-30, Vol.5 No.7, 1-21, 1937, also in Tokieda, 1973.
- ³⁸ Tokieda, 1941, p.232.
- ³⁹ Ibid., p.239.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., pp.239-240.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., p.240.
- ⁴² David Crystal, *A Dictionary of Linguistics & Phonetics, Fifth Edition*, p.268. From the similar point of view there is another division of “form (empty) words” and “full words.” This terminology also has links with Chinese terms of “xuci” and “shici.” With respect to the matter, see Naitō Masako, *Keitai to gojun* (Form and word order), *Chūgoku Bungaku Kenkyū* (Journal of the Waseda University Society of Chinese Literature), No.24, 1998, pp.1-11.
- ⁴³ Sakai Naoki, *Voices of the Past, the Status of Language in Eighteenth-Century Japanese Discourse*, Cornell University Press, 1992, p.273.
- ⁴⁴ Karatani Kōjin, Nationalism and Écriture, *SURFACES* 5 (201.1), 1995, p.19.
- ⁴⁵ Patric Heinrich, Gengo seikatsu, the study of language life in Japan 1945-1995, *Historiographia Linguistica* XXIX: 1/2, 2002, p.102.
- ⁴⁶ Tokieda, *Nihonbunpō Kōgohen* (The colloquial Japanese grammar), Iwanami Shoten, 1950, pp.212-213.
- ⁴⁷ It seems here that Tokieda indicates *shi* by a single line and *ji* by a double line under the each word in this sentence.
- ⁴⁸ Tokieda, 1950, pp.212-213.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., pp.213-214.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., p.86.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., pp.219-220.

⁵² Concerning other examples that Tokieda has presented in explaining *zero kigō no ji* and *zero kigō no chinjutsu*, see Tokieda, 1941, pp.243-245.

⁵³ Tokieda, 1950, pp.168-169.

⁵⁴ Tokieda, 1924, p.6. The wording in Japanese is: *Kono mondai o kangaete watashi wa gengo wa kaiga, ongaku, buyō to hitoshiku ningen no hyōgen undō no hitotsu de aru to shita.*

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.19. The wording in the original is: *Omou ni gengo no honshitsu wa oto demo nai, moji demo nai, shisō demo nai, shisō o oto ni arawashi moji ni arawasu sono shudan koso gengo no honshitsu to iu beki de wa nakarō ka, gengogaku no taishō wa jitsuni sono process o kenkyū subeki mono de wa nakarō ka, koko ni oite gengogaku no taishō wa onkyōgaku no taishō to wa akirakani kubetsu seraruru de arō, gengogakusha ga onsei o toriatsukau no wa onsei sonomono ga taishō no gotoku miete jitsu wa shikarazu, onsei o chūkai to shite shisō no arawasaruru process de aru.*

⁵⁶ Tokieda, 1968.

⁵⁷ Tokieda, 1973, p.268.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.271.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp.321-322.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp.331-332.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.332.

⁶² Ibid., p.338.

⁶³ See Tokieda, 1941, pp.229-236, and pp.406-421.

CHAPTER 4 THE CONCEPTS OF *SHI* AND *JI* IN TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

In this Chapter we will apply the concepts of *shi* and *ji* to the explication of two texts. The first is a Late Middle Japanese *zuihitsu* or miscellany, by the priest Yoshida Kenkō and the second a well-known modern short story by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke. These works have been selected to demonstrate not only the insight that Tokieda's Language Process Theory can bring to our linguistic analysis of texts, but also its flexibility and pedagogical potential. As all those who have dedicated their careers to helping learners master a foreign language will know, it is not the rules that are the most difficult to inculcate, but the sensitivity to those aspects of the language that reflects the speaker's and the writer's relationship to the events that he or she is communicating.

4.1. THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVE EXPRESSIONS

In this section we will apply the concepts of *shi* and *ji* to the relation between the elements within sentences. Since the effectiveness of this application is relative, much more study of its application to the relation between sentences, paragraphs, and even texts should be undertaken. Section 2 will attempt to point the way to further applications of the concepts of *shi* and *ji*.

In the subsection that follows, we will consider the usefulness of Tokieda's concepts by applying them to a classical corpus. We will use as a text the preface to *Tsurezuregusa*, a work written around 1330 by the Buddhist priest Yoshida no

Kaneyoshi (c.1283 to c.1352, also known as Kenkō Hōshi). The text and three of its English translations will be discussed. The translations are those of William N. Porter, C. S. Eby, and Donald Keene.

We will begin by analysing the original text by means of an expanded application of the relation between *shi* and *ji*. Then, its English translations will be examined in detail. This will not only demonstrate the feasibility of applying Tokieda's concepts of *shi* and *ji* to a whole text, but also suggest the usefulness of the Process Theory to the art of translation.

4.1.1. *Tsurezuregusa* (Idle jottings) by Yoshida Kenkō

Tsurezuregusa is a collection of the two hundred and forty three sketches and essays of varying length on miscellaneous subjects. Its author, Kenkō, lived the life of a recluse, but found himself able to forgo entirely the desires of this world. The work is familiar to every Japanese as one of the most important works of their classical literature, ranking with the first masterpiece of this mode of composition, *Makura no Sōshi* (The pillow book) written by Sei Shōnagon about the year 1000. Since Kenkō himself did not give a title to his jottings, it has, from the fifteenth century, been referred by taking the first word of the text *tsurezure*, "scattered," combined with the word *kusa*, "grass."

The preface is significant not only because it describes the author's daily activity at his writing desk, but also because it sets the tone for the whole work. Let us look at the opening passage in detail from a functional point of view. First, the original Japanese with only its literal translation:

- (1) *Turedure naru mama ni, figurasi suzuri ni mukawite, kokoro ni uturiyuku yosinasigoto wo, sokofakatonaku kakitukureba, ayasiu koso monoguruwosikere.*¹

Turedure naru mama ni
 Tedious, leisurely as it is

figurasi suzuri-ni mukawite
 all day inkstone-by sitting

kokoro ni uturiyuku yosinasigoto wo
 mind-in come and go trivial things-acc.

sokofakatonaku kakitukureba
 without purpose jot down-cond.

ayasiu koso monoguruwosikere
 oddly (part.) being mentally disturbed

The passage consists of one long sentence and can be divided into five phrases as above. The first phrase describes the author's manner of writing, the second the duration and place of his daily activity, the third the subject to which his mind is directed, the fourth is his manner of expression, and the last expresses his subsequent feelings. The functions expressed by the five phrases can be interpreted as shown in TABLE I.

TABLE I The functions of the five phrases

Phrase	Japanese	Function
1	<i>Turedure naru mama ni</i>	What is my mood
2	<i>Figurasi suzuri ni mukawite</i>	When and under what circumstances I write
3	<i>Kokoro ni uturiyuku yosinasigoto wo</i>	What I write
4	<i>Sokofakatonaku kakitukureba</i>	How I write
5	<i>Ayasiu koso monoguruwosikere</i>	How I feel as a result

The passage clearly shows the author's basic attitude towards writing, and at the same time gives a general direction of the work. Kenkō introduces the work not rhetorically but modestly, saying that neither the motive nor the subject of this work is important. Therefore, we can regard the passage as an introduction to the writer as well as what he has written – various passages ranging in length from a single line to several pages, all written in the natural tone set by the preface.²

It will be the purpose of our examination of Kenkō's text to show how Tokieda's theory is able to bring greater insight to its meaning than either traditional textual interpretation, which often approaches a text subjectively, or on the other hand grammatical analysis, which strives, often too diligently, to objectify the text. Here we will consider the passage on the basis of Tokieda's expanded notion of *shi* and *ji*.

The content of the passage, needless to say, reflects the author's personal impression of the act of writing, and so should be regarded as subjective. It remains such until it is brought into the process of expression by the speaker. The question that arises here is: does the passage still remain subjective after being turned into words through the process of expression?

Let us recall the basic difference between *shi* (objective expressions) and *ji* (subjective expressions). The ground of the difference between the two comes from the difference in the process of expression. *Shi* refer to what the speaker expresses directly without the process of subjective conceptualisation, while *ji* come into being through just such a process. This requires us to consider the concepts formulated by the process of *ji* to be in different realm from the state that existed prior to the process of expression. We cannot regard an expression as a *ji* simply because it describes the speaker's emotion or impression; the expression might well be stating

the emotional state as an objective fact. To say “I was surprised” is to state an objective fact, while to say “His behaviour was surprising,” shifts the expression to a different realm. Therefore, to answer the question posed above concerning the verbalisation of expressions, we must establish the difference on the basis of the process of expression, which is to say, we must establish the difference between *shi* and *ji* not on *what* is stated, but solely on the basis of *how* the materials are expressed.

We have confirmed that each of the five phrases of the passage presents its function within the context of the tone of the whole work. There is no doubt that although the passage consists of only one sentence, the phrases are arranged from the very beginning in a way to show the preface’s fundamental function and contribute to the foreshadowing of the entire work, a work whose subjects are of varied lengths and scattered across the pages. It is because of this synthesis that the preface is so significant. What we acquire through its reading is the state of the author’s state of mind, which is being observed calmly by himself, and through this process shaped into a detached observation. Kenkō has made his emotions the object of his expressions, the focus of what he is going to describe objectively. In this sense, his emotions are objectified and established as that towards which his attention is directed. They are no longer taken as subjective expressions even though his impression of them is made on the basis of his own experience. When we look at the passage in this way we can understand it as objective not subjective, as *shi* not *ji*.

But now, we face another question. Is it possible in practice to recognise a whole passage as a *shi*, even if its contents are a *ji*? Tokieda suggests that this is not only possible, but in certain instances necessary. According to the Process Theory,

the concept of *shi* and *ji* can be applied to whole sentences. To demonstrate that a sentence can be considered either the *shi*, or the *ji* as a whole, Tokieda cites two poems from the classical anthologies of Japanese poetry.³ And to demonstrate the practical value of his theory we can do no better than describe in detail how it is applied to the examples that he selected.

The first is as an example of *shi* as a whole; the second of *ji*. The poem that is a *shi*, is by Kakinomoto no Hitomaro (fl. late 7th, early 8th century AD) perhaps the greatest poet of the *Man'yōshū* (The collection of myriad leaves) compiled in the mid-eighth century and the oldest anthology of Japanese poetry. The poem cited by Tokieda is 3-266:

2) <i>Apumi no umi</i>	The Lake of Omi,
<i>yupu-nami tidori</i>	on evening waves, O plovers,
<i>na ga nakeba</i>	as you cry,
<i>kokoro mo sinwo ni</i>	my heart too is weighed down by sorrow,
<i>inisipye omopoyu</i> ⁴	as I think back on times long past.

And its literal translation:

<i>Apumi no</i>	<i>umi</i>
Omi-gen.	the lake
<i>yupu-nami</i>	<i>tidori</i>
evening waves	plovers
<i>na ga</i>	<i>nakeba</i>
you-nom.	call
<i>kokoro mo</i>	<i>sinwo ni</i>
mind too	is weighed down
<i>inisipye</i>	<i>omopoyu</i>
ancient times	think-non-past

Tokieda first divides the poem into two parts, *Apumi no umi yupu-nami tidori na ga*

nakeba and *kokoro mo sinwo ni inisipyē omopoyu*. In this instance the division is according to the tradition of the Old Japanese poetic form, the *waka*, which places a hiatus between the first unit of 5-7-5 syllables, and the latter 7-7. The former part presents the world that surrounds the poet, and is, at the same time, observed by him. Hitomaro sees the waves in the evening, and hears the plovers calling. In the latter part he presents his emotional reaction to the scene, and recalls past times for which he feels nostalgia. He does so, we may say, on the basis of his unique approach towards the objective world. However, Tokieda stresses that the latter segment, when viewed together with the total expression, corresponds to a *shi*. The reason for this is that in the process of being perceived in the poet's mind the latter part has been turned into an object, and he expresses it not directly but elliptically. By doing so, he transforms his feelings into an object that is being described by himself. This is in line with the process of *shi*, and if it is, Tokieda tells us, the latter part can qualify as an example of *shi*.

In this context he sights the example of the simple sentence: *Mizu ga hoshii* (water [marked by *ga* as the subject of the clause] is wanted [the non-past, adjectival predicate]). By this sentence, the speaker expresses the desire for water, which in Japanese is taken to be the desire of the speaker, since it is stated as an unqualified fact. Here the latter part, *hoshii*, seems to show the direct desire for water in the primary stage of experience. However, selecting the word *hoshii* in the process of expression, which is an adjective in Japanese grammar, suggests that the speaker's desire has come to be treated as an objective fact. Therefore, we can see both the former and latter belong to *shi*, and there is a certain logical relationship between them in that they are placed in the same realm, as in *Mizu ga hoshii*, perceived as an

object⁵ followed by a predicate. There is then a balanced relationship between the two parts in the realm of expression. Similarly, we can see the poem above as *shi*, and doing so better understand the cause and effect relation that exists between the former and the latter parts.

Then there is the poem cited by Tokieda as a *ji* in its totality. It is by the woman poet Shokushi Naishinnō (c.1153-1201) and from the eleventh chapter (11-1074) of the *Shin-Kokinwakashū*, an anthology of poetry edited by Imperial edict in 1205.

- | | |
|--|---|
| (3) <i>Sirubeseyo</i>
<i>ato naki nami ni</i>
<i>kogu fune no</i>

<i>yukufe mo siranu</i>
<i>yafe no sifokaze</i> ⁶ | Guide me,
there is no trace on the waves
to lead this boat,

I do not know which way to go,
oh, vast sea breeze. |
|--|---|

Structurally:

Sirubeseyo
Guide-imper.

ato naki nami ni
no trace waves on

kogu fune no
row boat-gen.

yukufe mo siranu
way to go even do not know

yafe no sifokaze
vast sea breeze

According to Tokieda, the whole poem corresponds to a single word such as “*aa* (oh)!” or “*aware* (how pity)!” Both are interjections showing grief, fear, or love, and belong to *ji*. Why is it possible to consider the whole poem by Shokushi Naishinnō to be similar to a one word interjection? Tokieda tells us that there is a similarity in

their mode of expression.

The theme of this poem is, of course, the poet's strong emotion of love. She expresses her love metaphorically yet candidly without trying to explain it. The whole poem is filled with one long, deep sigh, one that tells us that she does not know where her love will take her. Her love is not presented or even reflected upon as an objectifiable fact.

Further, we need to pay attention to the function of "*yafe no sifokaze*" at the end of the poem. At the beginning, the poet calls to the sea breeze, with "*sirubeseyo*," asking it to direct her boat. We can interpret the poet's calling to the sea breeze as her calling for guidance in her love.⁷ If we do not interpret the poem in such a way, we have a poem where the poet merely calls to the "*yafeno sifokaze*," and that there is nothing in it that has to do with her love.

Tokieda tells us that it is because the poem is to be interpreted as *ji* that we are obliged to find the object towards which the poet wishes to move, and that the act of the poet's calling to the sea breeze is itself the expression of her emotion.⁸ What is important in this context is not the content of the primary experience of the poet, but how she expresses it. When we pay attention to the difference between expressions, we can recognise whether an expression, which is based on the poet's emotion or mood, still remains as the expression of *ji*, or if it has been turned into what qualifies as *shi*.

With this introductory application of the Process Theory to poetry concluded, let us return to the preface of *Tsurezuregusa*. Through applying the concept of *shi* and *ji* from this expanded point of view, it becomes clear that we can interpret it wholly as *shi*. Furthermore, it can be divided into two parts. The former part is from *turedure*

naru to *kakitukureba* and the latter, *ayasiu koso monoguruwosikere*. The important factor, when we consider the relationship between the parts, is the inflected ending *-ba* in the phrase *kakitukureba*. This ending has two functions; one is to show the cause, and the other the reason. Here it is natural to take it as indicating a cause, and to consider that which precedes as the cause of the following effect. The passage presents Kenkō's daily life, which is one of quiet subjectivity that seems to come into being without his intention. It is this subjectivity that he observes and reflects upon. It is not, however, an expression in which Kenkō lets his feelings flow from his brush without intention. On the contrary, Kenkō gives expression to the scene of his daily life as well as his emotions and feelings by means of a well organized structure, as has been shown in the Table I. Therefore, we can say that the whole passage corresponds to a *shi* connecting the two parts in a relationship of cause and effect.

4.1.2. An Analysis of Three English Texts

On the basis of our analysis of the original passage, this section will examine three English translations of *Tsurezuregusa*. First, let me introduce in chronological order the titles, the authors, and the translations that we will examine:

(1) Title: *The Miscellany of a Japanese Priest*

Translated by William N. Porter, Humphrey Milford, London, 1914

Preface: Leisurely I face my inkstone all day long, and without any particular object jot down the odds and ends that pass through my mind, with a curious feeling that I am not sane.

(2) Title: *Tsure-dzure-gusa: Meditations Of A Recluse, By Kenko Hoshi*

Translated by Reverend C. S. Eby, Sankakusha, Tokyo, 1934

Preface: Living in solitary retirement, and sitting from morning to evening with ink and brush by my side, I have written, without any fixed arrangement, whatever wandering thoughts happened to present themselves to my imagination. I confess that it is strange and almost unaccountable that I should find myself engaged in such a work of recording vagrant reveries.

(3) Title: *Essays in Idleness*

Translated by Donald Keene, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967

Preface: What a strange, demented feeling it gives me when I realize I have spent the whole day before this inkstone, with nothing better to do, jotting down at random whatever nonsensical thoughts have entered my head.

Another well-known version might be mentioned here, the translation by George. B. Sansom (1883-1965) in 1911. It has not been included in this discussion because in all respects relevant to our analysis it parallels the translation made by Keene.

Before we move on to the translations, let us compare the three titles for *Tsurezuregusa*. The different translations of the title also contribute significantly to giving the reader different impressions. The original title, *Tsurezuregusa*, as we have seen, comes from the first phrase of the preface, makes a compound of the nouns, “*tsurezure*” and “*kusa*.” “*Kusa*”, however, certainly does not mean a specific kind of grass; it suggests something unkempt and perhaps wild. It describes the essay as an uncultivated thing, something written during an unstructured portion of Kenkō’s life. As a matter of fact, the manner of composition of *Tsurezuregusa* is still under discussion by the scholars of Japanese literature. The interesting suggestion that Kenkō wrote his essays on scraps of paper which he pasted to the walls of his little

house has not been completely rejected.

Porter's title does not translate the word *Tsurezuregusa* directly but is easily understood, and at the same time presents the author clearly as a Japanese priest. Eby's is self-explanatory, just as is his translation of the preface. It includes both the title, *Tsurezuregusa* and the name of author, Kenkō, and as such shows the translator's precise approach to the original. And the Keene title? This title is the shortest of the three. It is the least explanatory. However, it seems all the more to embody the translator's confidence in understanding the original. Although this title is difficult for the reader who is not familiar with Japanese literature, it can be said that the translator did include certain explanatory elements in his title. They are essays, perhaps in Montaigne's sense of the word, and they are written quite unlike the *Meditations* of Descartes.

Before employing the concepts of *shi* and *ji* to the translations of the prefaces themselves, it may be useful to compare them from a general point of view in order to find the overall features of each translation. I would suggest that we can approach them from at least two perspectives, both of which keep the topic of this section away from a discussion of the methodology of translation. One of these is the translator's, the other the reader's.

As we have seen in the previous section, if we are to interpret expressions by means of the concepts of *shi* and *ji*, we are required to take the existence of the speaker or writer into account. In other words, it is imperative when examining these three English translations that we pay close attention to how the translator approaches the state of mind in which the original was written. Therefore, let us examine the approach of readers before we go on to the main topic. Let us compare

three English translations as closely as possible from this point of view.

When we look at the three translations above, they seem to be quite different. But, do they in fact give us a similar impression? Are they presented in the same tenor? To find the answers of these questions, we might best begin by considering once again the structure of the original. These can most conveniently be discussed under the following headings: a) having nothing to do at present, b) sitting all day jotting down what comes to my mind without purpose, and c) being emotionally disturbed.

Now let us examine how the three translations match up with these headings. It is clear that there is no translation whose meanings widely differ from the original; and we can say that the tenors presented by all three translations are in general accord. Next we should look at their structure in terms of the composition of the English sentences. There are various grammatical elements to be discussed here. Let us focus on the vocabulary, word order, sentence pattern, tense, mood, and style. We might also consider where the phrases and sentences begin and end. Kenkō wrote without the help of commas and periods, and so we will have to interpret with care the punctuation supplied by Japanese scholars, as we attempt to reconstruct, as they did before us, the original organization of the text.

We have seen that the passage consists of one long sentence. While translations (1) and (3) also consist of one sentence, (2) contains two. There are, however, significant differences between (1) and (3). The structure of (1) is very similar to that of the original, in that the adverb “leisurely,” whose meaning corresponds to “*Turedurenaru mama ni*” in the original, comes at the beginning. The order of what follows, too, is basically the same as the original. On the other hand, the structure (3)

differs greatly, and is similar (1) only in that it consists of one sentence. The mode of expression adapted by (3) is exclamatory. Kenkō's expression of emotion comes to the beginning, and therefore the order is contrary to the original. The characteristic of translation (2) is that it is composed of two sentences that are long and explanatory rather than lyrical. The subject "I" is used three times, in contrast to the original where the subject is, as is characteristic of Japanese, unexpressed. This specification of the subject makes the structure of the sentence clear and logical to an English audience, but is at variance with intent of the original. And here we come upon a basic issue confronting linguistics.

It is Tokieda's position that the grammatical analysis of a language must go beyond the limits of its structure and unite both the syntax and the semantics. From a pedagogical point of view, which is central to this thesis, the position is that a student cannot learn to speak a language without the capacity to integrate its structures with its meanings. And so we present the Process Theory not only as a valuable means of textual explication but also as a useful pedagogical methodology. But before we turn our attention to the application of the Process Theory to language learning, let us focus on its usefulness in the task immediately before us.

4.1.3. The Usefulness of *Shi* and *Ji* to Textual Analysis

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the usefulness of the Process Theory in analysing the translations of texts by means of an expanded employment of *shi* and *ji*. The results obtained through examining the original passage in the previous section

was that we can now validate the assumption that the whole passage should be interpreted as *shi*. Now we must ascertain if we can usefully apply this process to the analysis of translations. And notice here that useful does not mean capable of assisting a translator in the performance of his or her art. The important aim here is to determine what structural and comparative insights the Process Theory is able to bring to the analyses of texts. And texts here refer to those both foreign and domestic.

Since the Process Theory approaches the position of the author aggressively, it will be more insightful to begin our discussion of the three narrations from the perspective of their translators rather than from that of their readers. Let us, therefore, examine closely how the translators have constructed their sentences, paying special attention to the relation between phrases. In this way we should be able to determine how best to understand the translated versions of the texts.

Version (1) consists of one sentence. And its basic structure reports the recording of his thoughts, beginning with the setting of the scene with “I face my inkstone.” By this means the translator shows Kenkō’s circumstances. The means of expressing this is in accord with that of *shi*. With regard to Kenkō’s feelings towards the situation, his emotional state is shown by the phrase “with a curious feeling that I am not sane.”

At issue here is how the following phrase is connected to the preceding one. The function of “with” here is not sufficiently clear to disambiguate the logical relation between the preceding and the following. This means that the act of writing by Kenkō is not shown clearly to be the one that gives him his curious feeling. In other words, it is ambiguous as to whether the translator wants us to understand Kenkō as feeling that he has lost his sanity as the consequence of writing or that he comes to

his writing with that feeling. As we have seen in the original, it is more likely here to interpret Kenkō's feelings as having been brought about as the consequence of his writing rather than as his coming to his desk with such feelings. In this sense, we can find the structure of the sentence of 1) significantly different from the original, and furthermore, that the relation between the expression that shows Kenkō's life of writing and the other that shows his feelings towards the objective world is not clear. However, we can say that Kenkō's feelings are also expressed as *shi* not as *ji*, in that the translator connects it to part of the *shi* without explicitly specifying the *ji*.

Concerning the structure of version (2), the translator has used two independent sentences. One is "Living in solitary retirement . . . present themselves to my imagination." The other is "I confess that . . . recording vagrant reveries." It is clear that the translator is expressing how Kenkō writes in his everyday life by the first sentence, and describes how he feels about it by the second. And as we have seen by analysing the original according to the concepts of *shi* and *ji*, there are two different parts to the preface in terms of the contents of the original single sentence. Now the translator has made it clear that these two aspects of the introduction can be divided into two independent sentences. The basic structure of the sentences is "I have written . . .," in the first, and "I confess . . .," in the second. There is a difference in tense between the two sentences. We know that Kenkō uses the non-past tense in the original, a very common device in such situations in Japanese. It seems that the translator, by using the present tense in the first sentence, has chosen to focus on Kenkō's writing, while focusing on his feelings in the second. Therefore, in the first sentence the translator is emphasizing Kenkō's act by using the present perfect form, while in the second he is focusing on his feelings by expressing them with various

adjectives such as ” “strange” and “unaccountable.”

When we look at them from the point of the total expression, it is clear that there are no features of *ji* in the sentences as they are expressed. Since both of the sentences are explanatory and analytic with a precisely determined structure, they are in accord with the proper way to express a *shi*. We find that the translator has even increased the sense of *shi* over the original in his selection of the structure of sentence.

Let us turn now to version (3). The structure that the translator employs here is that of a single sentence. What is interesting is that Keene begins in the exclamatory mode by using the clause “What a strange, demented feeling it gives me”, which given the structure of the two languages seems appropriate. However, we can take another point of view of this shift by applying the idea of *shi* and *ji*. The exclamatory expression is a typical feature of *ji*, in that it directly shows the emotion of the speaker. Therefore, the translator’s intention is to show Kenkō’s emotion in a way that keeps it as a *ji* and does not change it to a *shi*.

The phrase “When I realize”, we can conclude, is connected to the exclamatory part, having a relation with the latter as the object of the verb “realize,” that is, “I have spent whole days before this inkstone, with nothing better to do, jotting down at random whatever nonsensical thoughts have entered my head.” This structure indicates that the initial exclamatory part does not function independently of the latter. The first person narrator, Kenkō, realizes how he has spent his days, and also how he feels about it. The translator shows that Kenkō’s emotion and feeling, which are caused by his act of writing, are also realized and reflected upon by him.

Therefore, it would be more suitable to take the whole sentence as a *shi*, although it includes the exclamatory expression that exhibits certain features of *ji*.

Apparently, Keene has striven to embody Kenkō's feelings into his translation, and this effort has made the sentence a combined expression of *shi* and *ji*, even though it might be regarded as *shi* as a whole. If we say that Kenkō's emotion is the essence in the original, and that, therefore, how it is expressed is a key element in understanding it, this version would be the desirable one. It is a good example of how translators make use of the expression of *shi* and *ji*, whether they do so consciously or not. And perhaps more importantly, it shows how a sensitive examination of the structures of a language by the Process Theory can offer insights that more traditional analyses are able to achieve less systematically.

To consider this matter further, let me introduce a fourth and final translation.

(4) Title: *Idle Jottings: Zen Reflections from the TSURE-ZURE GUSA of Yoshida Kenko*

Preface: With nothing better in view, I plan to sit at my desk and pass my spare time jotting down, without order or purpose, whatever random thoughts drift into my mind. What a crazy thing to do!

A. Irwin Switzer
Empty Circle Press
South Devon, 1988

Switzer's Preface is not from a full translation of *Tsurezuregusa*, but a work of selected and adapted passages; and so it is not surprising that it is less literal than the previous translations. It does, however, provide useful clues concerning the requirements of an appropriate English translation. Switzer expresses the content of the original in two sentences, each having a different role. The first sentence describes "my" life as an objective fact, and the second expresses "my" attitude

towards that fact. The first is a long declarative sentence and the second a short exclamatory one. The stylistic feature of the second one is, as we have seen, similar to the beginning of the translation (3). What is interesting is not only that the style of the second sentence, which shows Kenkō's emotion, is completely different from the first, but also that it functions independently. We can say that Switzer created it to express as emphatically as possible Kenkō's feelings. Yet it might also reflect the feelings of Switzer himself, as they were inspired by the original. Clearly and boldly, Switzer expresses the original in the way that divides the content of the original into two different styles; one is *shi* and the other is *ji*. This is a good example of how a translator is free to use his or her creative discretion in free translation, but also points up the fact that to attain a fully accurate translation one must be sensitive to the distinction between *shi* and *ji*.

By examining these translations of *Tsurezuregusa*, we have observed that the translators have been impelled to make a great number of decisions ranging from the choice of words to those concerned with the structure of sentences. And at the same time, we found that applying the idea of *shi* and *ji* to the analysis of the English translations gave us another means to compare them, not only structurally but also stylistically. This is useful in that the process makes it possible for us to understand how a translator interprets the meaning of the original with respect to both form and content. And notice: how a translator interprets the content of a text is one thing, and how he or she expresses it is quite another thing. There is, however, no way for us to approach the former except by considering it through the latter. It is because of this and the insights it permits that the introduction of the idea of *shi* and *ji* is one very useful means not only to explicate a text, but to broaden our understanding of the

nature of a language and of languages.

Before concluding this section, we would do well to examine the usefulness of Tokieda's theory of *shi* and *ji* as a method for translation analysis as it relates to other current translation theories. It seems that there are two aspects to this task. One is the matter of interpretation, and the other equivalence. The former involves one of the basic processes by which a translator interprets a text when he or she translates it into another language. However, the interpretation is also a major factor in the field of the study of text analysis and discourse analysis. If we consider Tokieda's theory from this aspect of interpretation, the most challenging issue that faces us is whether or not the attempt to regard a text wholly as *shi* or *ji* is useful as an approach for the procedure of interpretation. As we saw in the section 4.1.1, Tokieda has offered two poems as examples; one is the poem by Kakinomoto no Hitomaro and the other is the poem by Shokushi Naishinnō. Tokieda defines the former *shi* as a whole and the latter *ji* saying that the whole poem of Shokushi Naishinnō corresponds to a single interjection. On the basis of Tokieda's analysis, we have arrived at the conclusion that the whole passage corresponds to a *shi* connecting the two parts in a relationship of cause and effect.

There are many works concerning interpretation in the field of the study of discourse analysis. Winter (1977) and Hoey (1983) have studied how the reader interprets a text by examining the relations between "segments" in a text. These segments include clauses, sentences, and the whole paragraph in a text. What they have shown is how semantic patterns are related to segments in a text, such as the relation of phenomenon-reason to phenomenon-example.⁹ There is no doubt that their study is useful in the analysis of acts of interpretation by the reader, but since

their focus is on the analysis of the relations between segments in a text, we cannot discuss their interpretation on the same plane as Tokieda's. Tokieda's goal is quite different from that of Winter and Hoey.

With respect to Tokieda's interpretation that regards the whole of text *shi* or *ji*, let me introduce an analysis made by Taneda Wakako in a study of context in 2004.¹⁰

On the basis of "Linguistics and Poetics" by Roman Jakobson, Taneda has examined the meaning of interjections as they are used in literary works. She argues that the interjections express the purely emotional level of language and at the same time, the interjection itself can have the same syntactic function that a sentence has. She takes up the issue of the function of the interjections from the point of view of what the writer means by their use.¹¹ She has interpreted the use of interjections in the Japanese work "*Oguri Hangan* (The legend of *Oguri Hangan*),"¹² which is one of the great myths of Japan's middle ages and has been a favourite theme of the narrative singing style called *Sekkyōbushi*. One of the stylistic features of the story is that the narrator often uses the interjection "ara (oh)", as in such expressions as "Ara itawashiya (Oh pitiful!)." Taneda says that such a usage means, for example, "I now tell you of a pitiful thing" and in so doing expresses the storyteller's sympathy towards the people in the story and at the same time functions to bring the reader in sympathy with the characters of story. What Taneda is seeking is a new approach to the study a writer's intention and its relationship to the reader as he or she tries to interpret the meanings implicit in the interjections. Tokieda has shown that we can regard the whole text as *shi* or *ji*, and used as an example the whole poem of Shokushi Naishinnō, as it corresponds to a single interjection. Taneda's attempt has shown the usefulness of the application by approaching it from the opposite

direction.

And then there is an issue of equivalence and its relation to Tokieda's theory and its relevance to the current translation theories. Linguistic equivalence is concerned with finding those words that mean as closely as possible the same in another language. This is often a complicated task, for even obvious words such as "professor," which can be understood very differently in different languages. Many words are too culture-loaded to have any linguistic equivalence in many other languages. The word "girl" in English is such an example. It is often impossible to convey a story or joke in another language because of the differences in meanings and implications of a single word in different languages. Also, certain sayings may simply not transfer into another language. A missing linguistic equivalent can often cause considerable confusion in an intercultural encounter. Venuti (2000) says that equivalence has been understood as "accuracy," "adequacy," "correctness," "fidelity," "identity", and that it is a variable concept for the field of translation.¹³

The concept of equivalence has been dealt with in several important studies. Baker (1992) discusses equivalence within the context of the division between "grammatical equivalence," "textual equivalence" (where thematic and information structures, and cohesion are dealt with), and "pragmatic equivalence" where coherence, implicature, and translation strategy are dealt with.¹⁴

Although the arrangement seems to cover many issues basic to the study of equivalence, the scope of the feature is not dealt with in relation to a whole text. Therefore, if we discuss the interpretation as it relates to a whole text as *shi* or *ji*, and whether or not a translation is made on the basis of that interpretation with the process of translating becomes more complex, we must find the broader framework

for our interpretation. It might be more practical for us to employ the concept of equivalence as a translation strategy as it functions within the wider range of “pragmatic equivalence.”

Kōno (1999), introducing this broader method of translation shows that translators have already applied this interpretation on their works even before the approach has been examined within the current theories of translation.¹⁵ He says that it is not appropriate for translators to render the English interjections of the original into the Japanese interjections without careful consideration of the meaning. For example: here is this passage in *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* by Thomas Hardy:

I shall give way—I shall say yes—I shall let myself marry him—I cannot help it!...O my heart—O—O—O!

I would translate it as follows,

*Mō makete shimaishō—hai, to itte shimaishō—ano hito to kekkon shite shimaukamo—mō kore ijō dame!...hontoni atashi wa dō shitara iino—dō shitara—dō shitara!*¹⁶

Kōno translates the interjection “O...” in the original with *dō shitara* (what shall I do), and by doing so suggests that we can express more effectively the original meaning by this construction than translating it with the homophonous interjection. Kōno’s example indicates that we can take further the range of the application of Tokieda’s theory from “one interjection to one sentence correspondence” to “one interjection to a whole of text correspondence.”

4.2. SUBJECTIVE EXPRESSIONS AND TEXTUAL COHESION

4.2.1. The Role of Conjunctions as *Ji*

Cohesion is a key concept in explicating the way in which we comprehend the general structure of a text, and by text here we mean all those aspect of language that deserve serious study. This section discusses *ji*, subjective expressions, and their role as cohesive devices.

With regard to the analysis of a text or a discourse, Tokieda (1950) had already pointed out the significance of the roles played by the pronouns and conjunctions. Their role in a Japanese text, particularly in the unfolding of a story, had not been dealt with as a major issue until he took up the matter in the work. He tells us that:

Conjunctions have never been seriously treated. The reason is that the study of grammar has been limited to the field of words and sentences, and not beyond. Therefore, the elements such as subjects, predicates, and modifiers are always paid close attention to as the major elements that construct a sentence, while conjunctions have been excluded from such elements and not been treated as significant. However, when we look at a text as the unfolding of thought, the relationship between each sentence that construct a text becomes a significant matter. And therefore, we must pay close attention to pronouns and conjunctions, as they play a significant role in the structure of text.¹⁷

Tokieda begins by defining the basic function of conjunctions as one that connects two words, phrases, or sentences and indicates the relations between them. For example, in the two sentences below:

- (1) *Sore wa watashi mo yonda. Shikashi omoshiroi hon de wa nai.*
 It-topic I too read but interesting book is not
 I read it, too. But it was not an interesting book.
- (2) *Sore wa watashi mo yonda. Omoshiroi hon de wa nai.*
 It-topic I too read interesting book is not
 I read it, too. It was not an interesting book.

Example (1) expresses the idea that the speaker read the book, but it was not interesting, contrary to his or her expectations, while example (2) simply expresses the two events without indicating any relation of cause and effect. The difference between these two examples is in the speaker's cognition and judgement of the relation between the events. Choosing a conjunction to link the two events is a direct statement by the speaker regarding the events being expressed. Therefore, the conjunction belongs to the class of subjective expressions.¹⁸ When we relate this view to the difference in realm or dimension that exists between objective expressions and subjective expressions, we can see that Tokieda considered the role of conjunctions as presenting the speaker's (writer's) view of the whole paragraph rather than simply linking its elements. The use of a conjunction leads the text in a certain direction, a direction judged by the speaker (writer) to contribute most effectively to the cohesion, and therefore the meaning, of the text. It seems that Tokieda already anticipated in the fifties that the study of conjunctions would increase in the field of text or discourse analysis.

It is worth noting that there are similarities between Tokieda's view and that of Beaugrande and Dressler (1981). On the basis of the category of conjunction presented by Halliday, Beaugrande and Dressler analyze the function of conjunctions from the point of view of the text producer. They state:

The intricacies of junction are far greater than our sketch might imply. Except for disjunction, the use of junctives as explicit signals is rarely obligatory, because text users can recover relations such as additivity, incongruity, causality, etc. by applying world-knowledge. But by using junctives, text producers can exert control over how relations are recovered and set up by receivers. For instance, using 'then' in [The President emotionally declared that he was "glad to be home". *Then* he told the gathering what it had come to hear.] makes it clear that the President's 'emotional declaration' was not (as might be assumed if 'then' were deleted) what 'the gathering had come to hear'; the producer can thus insert his or her own interpretation into the monitoring of the situation.¹⁹

We will return again to the idea of "situation monitoring" as the role of conjunctions. Here, let us look at the study of Japanese conjunctions after Tokieda. Although Tokieda indicated the significance of the study of conjunctions in the field of text or discourse analysis, the study of conjunctions in Japan went in a different direction from the study of cohesion in a text. In other words, the scholars of the study of Japanese linguistics have begun by dividing the types of the semantic relations between sentences when considering the function of conjunctions. First, Tsukahara (1958) argued that conjunctions should be studied more semantically in a field distinct from grammatical studies.²⁰ And Nagano (1959) also tried to divide the conjunctions into the seven groups on the basis of their semantic relations.²¹ Ichikawa (1978) after dividing the semantic relations between sentences into groups, categorized them according to the types of the relations they governed.²² Ichikawa establishes eight categories for the relations between sentences, with the conjunctions to indicate those relations listed as follows:

1. junsetsu (coordination): dakara, sorede, shitagatte, sorenara, suruto, to, kakute, kōshite
2. gyakusetsu (adversary):shikashi, keredomo, daga, sorenanoni, sonokuse, shikaruni, tokoroga, sorega
3. tenka (addition): soshite, sōshite, tsuide, tsugini, sonoue, soren, mata, narabini
4. taihi (comparison): toiuyori, sonokawari, soretomo, aruiwa, matawa
5. tenkan (change): tokorode, tokini, sate, soredewa, dewa, tomoare
6. dōretsu (equal): sunawachi, tsumari, yōsuruni
7. hosoku (supplement): nazenara, toiunowa, tadashi, mottomo, nao, chinamini
8. rensa (context): no use of conjunctives ²³

The semantic divisions of the conjunctions presented by Ichikawa have been widely accepted and used as the basis for study of Japanese conjunctions and the semantic relations between sentences. There is also Sakuma (1990)²⁴, which shows on the basis of Ichikawa's categories and with many examples the differences between Japanese conjunctions. Yet another work is Ishiguro (2005)²⁵, which similarly on the basis of these category studies deals with the successive use of conjunctions. All of these studies, while being in part influenced by Tokieda, have tended to work within one or other of the sub-fields of linguistics rather than strive to unify them.

When we compare Japanese conjunctions to those of English, using the categorization of Halliday and Hasan (1976), we can see the differences in their use. Their four categories are as follows:

1. additive: and, and also, nor, and... not, or, or else
2. adversative: yet, though, only, but, however, nevertheless, despite this
3. causal: so, then, hence, therefore, consequently, because of this, for

this reason, on account of this, as a result, in consequence, for this purpose, with this in mind

4. temporal: then, next, after that, just then, at the same time, previously, before that, finally, at last, first... then, at first... in the end ²⁶

These categories are now regularly used as the basis of discourse analysis.²⁷ As Ichikawa's category shows, the Japanese conjunctions seem to be much more used than English although there are issues to be resolved, such as the definition of conjunctions and the criterion for the establishment of each type. With respect to the difference between languages in the use of conjunctions, Baker (1992) writes that some languages, such as German, tend to express relations through subordination and complex structures, and that others, such as Chinese and Japanese, prefer to use simpler and shorter structures and mark the relations between these structures explicit where necessary.²⁸

As I have mentioned earlier the purpose of this section is to examine conjunctions as subjective expressions and consider their role in cohesion. This approach, although suggested by Tokieda, has yet to be undertaken. Therefore, by examining a Japanese text and using his model, we will attempt to reach a deeper understanding not only of the text being examined, but of his concept of cohesion and its place in the Process Theory.

Employing this model, let us examine some concrete examples of the use of conjunctions in a Japanese text and consider how they help to give direction to a text, and in so doing, contribute to its cohesion. I have selected, as our text, a well-known short story, "*Kumo no Ito* (The spider's thread)," by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke (1892-1927),²⁹ and will compare it with three English translations in an effort to demonstrate how translators interpret the role of the conjunctions. In doing this, I will

also attempt to shed light on how cohesion is perceived and achieved across cultures. This is not, however, an attempt to compare the English translations from the point of view of which one is the best. As we have seen earlier, there are significant differences between the languages. And therefore, it is natural for us to find in the translations places where the use of conjunctions in one language does not necessarily correspond to that in another language because of the irreconcilable differences between the two, as some contrastive studies of Japanese and English have already shown.³⁰

4.2.2. *Kumo no Ito* (The spider's thread) by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke

Before we examine the role of the conjunctions in Section 4.2.2, it will be helpful to briefly introduce “The spider’s thread” and how it is perceived within its Japanese context. The story is a tale written in 1918 by Akutagawa, a student of Natsume Sōseki (1867-1916) and a well known, a gifted author. The story consists of three parts, which can be summarised as follows:

One day, the Buddha was taking a walk beside the Lotus Pond in Paradise, when he glanced down between the lotus leaves at the side of the pond and saw a man writhing in agony among the other sinners in Hell. The man, whose name was Kandata, was a notorious robber and had committed many crimes including murder and arson. But despite these facts, he had done one good deed in his life. Once when Kandata was passing through a forest, he saw a spider creeping along by the side of the path. He was about to crush it with his foot, when he suddenly thought that though it was very small, it still was a living creature, so he did not kill it. The Buddha remembered this good deed

and decided to help Kandata from Hell. He took hold of a spider's thread and lowered it to the bottom of Hell.

Kandata, writhing, saw the spider's thread descending towards him. Delighted, he thought that if he could take hold of the thread he might be able to escape from Hell, and so he began desperately to haul himself up. But before reaching Paradise, he looked down to see many other sinners holding on the spider's thread and following him up from the bottom of Hell. He was terrified that the thread might be too thin to sustain the weight and snap, letting him drop back onto the mountain of needles below. He shouted, "This spider's thread is mine. Get off! " Just as Kandata shouted, the thread snapped, and he fell head over heels to the bottom of the Hell.

In Paradise the Buddha observed the event from beginning to end and was saddened when he saw Kandata sunk deep into a pool of blood. Then, after a moment of reflection, the Buddha began his stroll again.

The translated passages we will use in the discussion of conjunctions and subjectivity have been selected from versions by Glenn W. Shaw, Takashi Kojima, and Dorothy Britton.

4.2.3. Conjunctions and Subjectivity in "The spider's thread"

Let us now look carefully at the conjunctions in the original and compare them with those employed by its translators.

4.2.3.1. *Soredemo*

Let us begin by examining the adversative conjunction, *sore demo*.

- (1) *Kandata to iu otoko wa, hito o koroshitari, ie ni hi o tsuketari, iroiro akuji o hataraita odorobō de gozaimasu ga, soredemo, tatta hitotsu, yoi koto o shita oboe ga gozaimasu.*

<i>Kandata to iu otoko wa</i>	The man named Kandata
<i>hito o koroshitari</i>	committed murders
<i>ie ni hi o tsuketari</i>	set fire to houses
<i>iroiro</i>	many
<i>akuji o hataraita</i>	did evil things
<i>odorobō de gozaimasu ga</i>	though a great robber
<i>soredemo</i>	but, even so
<i>tatta hitotsu</i>	only one thing
<i>yoi koto o shita</i>	did a good deed
<i>oboe ga gozaimasu</i>	has memory

The three English translations are as follows:

- (1a) This Kandata was a great robber who had done many evil things, murdering and setting fire to houses, **but** he had to his credit one good action.

(From “The Spider’s Thread,” in *Tales Grotesque and Curious*. Translated by Glenn W. Shaw. The Hokuseidō Press. 1930)

- (1b) He was a notorious robber who had set houses on fire, committed murders and many other wicked crimes. **But**, he retained in his memory the recollection of one good deed in his life.

(From “The Spider’s Thread,” in *Japanese Short Stories*. Translated by Takashi Kojima. Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York. 1961)

(1c) This Kandata was a notorious thief, perpetrator of countless crimes from murder to arson. **Nevertheless**, he had performed one good deed.

(From “The Spider’s Thread,” in *The Spider’s Thread and Other Stories*. Translated by Dorothy Britton. Kōdansha International. 1987)

This passage is taken from the early part of the story where the narrator presents the character of Kandata. Kandata is believed to be a sinful person and one who therefore deserved to be in Hell, but he had done one good deed in his life. The event is important here because it attracts the Buddha’s attention and prompts him to consider Kandata as someone deserving release from Hell. The narrator tells us this not as a simple fact, but as a significant factor that will effect the subsequent action of the Buddha. Here, the attitude of the narrator is affirmative and emphatic. The structure of the sentence reflects this. The expression consists of one sentence, one that shows that there is no clear difference in the tone between the clauses, and so we find here the role of the conjunction *soredemo* significant. In this sentence, the adversative relation between the former clauses and the latter might also be expressed by the postpositional particle *ga* in the phrase of *gozaimasu ga*, without the conjunction *soredemo*. Its function here emphasizes the attitude of the narrator and points the two clauses in a clear direction, rather than indicating the adversative relation alone.

When we look at the three English translations from this point of view, we see several differences among them. In both translation a) and b), “but” is used to indicate the adversative relation, the first as a conjunction and the second as a sentence adverb. On the other hand, in c) the adverb “nevertheless” is used at the

beginning of the new sentence. Its use shows more clearly the attitude of the speaker, and is, therefore, more appropriate than “but,” since it comes closer to the function of *soredemo* in the original.

There is also a difference in structure among the translations. While it is expressed as one sentence in the original, both b) and c) translate it as two, while a) follows the structure of the original. We should also notice that the narrator in the original, by employing *soredemo*, places the emphasis on the latter clause, and from this point of view it seems more effective in English to divide the structure into two sentences.

4.2.3.2. *Tokoroga*

The conjunction *tokoroga* is also one that indicates an adversative relation. But it can be used also to change the scene, as in the passage below:

- (2) *Desu kara, sasuga odorobō no Kandata mo, yahari chi no ike no chi ni musebinagara, maru de shinikakatta kawazu no yō ni, tada, mogaite bakari orimashita. Tokoroga, aru toki no koto de gozaimasu. Nanigenaku Kandata ga atama o agete, chi no ike no sora o nagamemasu to, sono, hissori to shita yami no naka o, tōi tōi tenjō kara gin iro no kumo no ito ga, maru de hitome ni kakaru no o osoreru yō ni, hitosuji hosoku hikarinagara, surusuru to jibun no ue e tarete mairu no de wa gozaimasen ka.*

desu kara

so, therefore

sasuga odorobō no Kandata mo

Kandata, great robber as he was

yahari chi no ike no chi ni musebinagara

also suffocated with the blood in
the Pond of Blood

maru de shinikakatta kawazu no yō ni

like a dying frog

<i>tada mogaite bakari orimashita</i>	did nothing but squirm
<i>tokoroga</i>	but,
<i>aru toki no koto de gozaimasu</i>	one day it happened
<i>nanigenaku</i>	unconsciously
<i>Kandata ga atama o agete</i>	Kandata raised his head
<i>Chi no ike no sora o nagamemasu to</i>	looked up at the sky above the Pond of Blood
<i>sono hissori to shita yami no naka o</i>	in the silent darkness
<i>tōi tōi tenjō kara</i>	from the heavens far far above
<i>gin iro no kumo no ito ga</i>	a silvery spider's thread
<i>marude hitome ni kakaru no o osoreru yo ni</i>	as if it feared to be seen
<i>hitosuji hosoku hikarinagara</i>	glittering as a ray of light
<i>surusuru to</i>	stealthily
<i>jibun no ue e</i>	toward him
<i>tarete mairu no de wa gozaimesen ka</i>	it is certain that it is descending

The English translations are:

- (2a) So, great robber though he was, Kandata, also suffocated with the blood, could do nothing but struggle in the pond like a dying frog. **But his time came. One day** when Kandata lifted his head by chance and looked up at the sky above the Pond of Blood, he saw a silver spider's thread slipping down toward him from the high heavens, glittering slightly in the silent darkness just as if it feared the eyes of man.

Glenn W. Shaw

- (2b) Such being the case, incorrigible robber as he was, Kandata was struggling and squirming like a dying frog, choked with blood in the Pool of Blood. **One day**, he happened to raise his head and look up into the gloomy sky. Then what should he see but the silvery white thread of a spider slipping gradually down toward him trailing a slender glimmering ray of light as stealthily as though it feared to be caught sight of the vigilant eyes of the damned.

Takashi Kojima

- (2c) Thus it was hardly surprising that the monstrous thief Kandata, like the rest, merely squirmed like a half-dead frog as he choked in the lake. **Just then** Kandata happened to raise his head, and looking up at the sky above the Lake of Blood, what should he see gliding down through the silent darkness but a silver spider's thread descending from the heavens far, far above – a glistening gossamer filament coming straight toward him, secretly, as if to avoid attracting attention.

Dorothy Britton

The use of the conjunction *tokoroga* to indicate a change of the scene is of particular significance here. In the scene preceding the use of *tokoroga*, Kandata was struggling like a dying frog in the Pond of Blood, and in the scene that follows, he finds a spider's thread, the sight of which is nothing less than a sign from Paradise. There is a profound shift from one scene to another. Therefore, the conjunction *tokoroga* plays a significant role grammatically as well as in making the dramatic semantic change of scene that leads to an unanticipated situation. This is a subjective expression in that it shows directly the narrator's judgement concerning the connection between the Kandata's circumstances and his possible salvation.

When we look at the English translations, we see how difficult it is for the translators to capture the function of *tokoroga*. None of them use a conjunction in its narrow sense. In b), there is no word corresponding to the conjunction. The sentence begins with "One day", by which a change of time is indicated, but the narrator's attitude is not indicated. It is the same with translation c). Although the sentences are connected by "Just then", and this could be taken corresponding to the role of *tokoroga*, it indicates a temporal relationship and not the narrator's attitude. The most interesting translation is a). The sentence "But his time came" is inserted between the

two scenes. By means of this expression the narrator gives us a clue regarding the ensuing events. It suggests that something good may be in store for Kandata. We can take the role of the inserted sentence as indicating the narrator's explicit judgement concerning the events that follow, which is a function included in the original *tokoroga*.

4.2.3.3. *Sōshite . . . Saiwai*

Let us move now to the additive and causal conjunction *sōshite*, which is used in the first part in the passage, and then to the adverb *saiwai*, which carries on the action forward:

- (3) *Oshaka-sama wa, jigoku no yōsu o goran ni narinagara, kono Kandata ni wa, kumo o tasuketa koto ga aru no o ōmoidashi ni narimashita. Sōshite, sore dake no yoi koto o shita mukui ni wa, dekiru nara, kono otoko o jigoku kara sukuidashite yarō to okangae ni narimashita. Saiwai, soba o mimasu to, hisui no yō na iro o shita hasu no ha no ue ni, gokuraku no kumo ga ippiki, utsukushii gin iro no ito o kakete orimasu.*

<i>Oshaka-sama wa</i>	the Buddha
<i>jigoku no yōsu o goran ni narinagara</i>	as (he) looked down into Hell
<i>kono Kandata ni wa</i>	this man Kandata,
<i>kumo o tasuketa koto ga aru no o</i>	had once spared the spider's life
<i>ōmoidashi ni narimashita</i>	(the Buddha) remembered
<i>sōshite</i>	and
<i>sore dake no yoi koto o shita mukui ni wa,</i>	in reward for that good deed
<i>dekiru nara</i>	if possible

<i>kono otoko o jigoku kara sukuidashite yarō to</i>	rescue this man from Hell
<i>okangae ni narimashita.</i>	(the Buddha) thought
<i>saiwai</i>	fortunately,
<i>soba o mimasu to</i>	when he looked around
<i>hisui no yō na iro o shita hasu no ha no ue ni</i>	on the jade-green lotus
	leaves
<i>gokuraku no kumo ga ippiki</i>	a spider of Paradise
<i>utsukushii gin iro no ito o kakete orimasu</i>	spinning a beautiful silver
	thread

English translations are:

(3a) As he looked down into Hell, the Buddha remembered how this Kandata had spared the spider's life. **And** in return for that good deed, he thought, if possible, he would like to deliver him out of Hell. **Fortunately** when he looked around, he saw a spider of Paradise spinning a beautiful silver thread on the halcyon- coloured lotus leaves.

Glenn W. Shaw

(3b) While surveying Hell beneath, Buddha remembered how he had once spared the spider's life, **and** in reward for his good deed, he thought of giving Kandata a chance of escaping from Hell. **Fortunately** at the very moment he saw, close at the hand a spider of Paradise weaving its beautiful silver silken web on the jade-green lotus leaves.

Takashi Kojima

(3c) While the Lord Buddha was observing how things were in Hell, he remembered that Kandata had spared the life of the spider. **So** as a reward for that single good deed, he decided to rescue this man from Hell if it were at all possible. **As luck would have it**, he looked about him and noticed a Paradise spider spinning a beautiful silver web on a jade-green lotus leaf.

This time let us consider the three English translations first. Both translations a) and b) use the conjunction “and.” However, there is a clear difference between the two. Shaw uses “and,” as in the original, to begin a second sentence, while Kojima uses it to join the two sentences of the original into one.

Let us begin with translation b). If we were to consider the conjunction *sōshite* to have only a conjoining function here, we would be incorrect. The role of the conjunction is not to connect the sentences in parallel, but to show the relation of cause and effect between them. A sentence beginning with an “and” is semantically much closer to a “so” than a simple conjunction. In the original, the theme in the first sentence is the Buddha’s remembering a good deed done by Kandata, while in the second it is the Buddha’s decision to help him escape from Hell. Moreover, this idea is realized in the next sentence by the Buddha’s discovery of a possible solution to the problem when he notices a spider spinning its web.

Therefore, the sentences in this paragraph might best be organized in a sequence that builds towards the Buddha’s act of letting the thread down into Hell. When we look at the role of the conjunction *sō shite* from this point of view, it is clear that it plays the role of showing the effect that was caused by the circumstances presented in the previous sentence, and develops them further. It confirms the fact that the narrator has the reader’s understanding of or consent to the fact expressed in the previous sentence and, at the same time, shows the narrator’s affirmative judgement. Here the use of *sōshite* is quite subjective, and it seems to be expressed more closely by the use of “so” rather than “and.” And the adverb “so” in c) is used there as a conjunction to relate the sentences, and as suggested in the discussion of a) and b)

captures better the original intent. These differences in translation raise problems related to the role of *sōshite* in the original. One is syntactic, the other semantic.

The affirmative judgement is strengthened by the use of a noun, *saiwai*, which is here placed at the beginning of the following sentence and used as a conjunctive adverb. *Saiwai* expresses the narrator's judgement towards what follows, whether it is translated as "fortunately" or "As luck would have it" in English. And by the use of *saiwai* here, the building process of the two preceding sentence is reinforced.

With regard to the syntactic problem, let us consider it to have the form of one sentence without the conjunction, such as:

*Oshaka-sama wa, jigoku no yōsu o goran ni narinagara, kono
Kandata ni wa, kumo o tasuketa koto ga aru no o ōmoidashi ni
narimashite, sore dake no yoi koto o shita mukui ni wa, dekiru nara,
kono otoko o jigoku kara sukuidashite yarō to okangae ni narimashita.*

This hypothetical sentence combines the two sentences of the original. The verbal phrase, *narimashita*, has been changed to *narimashite*, now consisting of three elements; *nari* (verb), *mashi* (auxiliary verb), and *te* (postpositional connective particle). There is no conjunction used here, and so the clauses move smoothly within one sentence. The relation, however, is little more than additive, and no indication of the narrator's attitude can be found. Furthermore, the synthesizing effect achieved by the use of *saiwai* in the following sentence has also disappeared. The structure fails to guide us in the direction towards which the narrator is building the passage. It simply constructs a sequential story line. From this we can see that a structure consisting of two independent sentences and using a conjunction to connect them is the more effective in this context, in this *bamen*.

Through the analysis of these three conjunctions and one conjunctive adverb as they are used by Akutagawa, it becomes clear that their careful employment contributes significantly to the cohesion of the narration by expressing the narrator's attitude and leading the reader in the desired direction. The role of conjunctions in the linguistic process is to express the narrator's interpretation of, attitudes toward, and judgements concerning the content, and sometimes to confirm the reader's conjectured assumptions. Conjunctions do not merely concatenate the objective content of the message. They also contribute subjectively to the expressions and help to synthesize the text by indicating the narrator's judgements in a realm different from the cohesiveness of the content. It is this that is the role of conjunctions as subjective expressions, their function as *ji*. The examining of the use of conjunctions in the text from the point of view of *ji* has confirmed their functions as cohesive devices, as has been presented by Halliday and Hasan and others. It is worth noting, however, that the approach of *ji* is closer to the idea of Beaugrande and Dressler than that of Halliday and Hasan in that the view of *ji* leads us to pay a close attention to the speaker's (writer's) intention in the use of conjunctions. Beaugrande and Dressler explain the function of the text producer with the term "situation monitoring" and "situation management." They say,

If the dominant function of a text is to provide a reasonably unmediated account of the situation model, situation monitoring is being performed. If the dominant factor is to guide the situation in a manner favourable to the text producer's goals, situation management is being carried out.³¹

The function of the narrator in a text that leads the reader in the desired direction can be considered as one of the functions that guide the situation in a manner favourable

to the text producer's goals. Here, the approach of *ji*, which regards the role of conjunctions as indicating the narrator's intention, can be useful in further discussion on the study of conjunctions and their semantic relations in a text. This also leads us to re-consider the category of conjunctions.

However, there are some points to be noticed. First, apart from the difference between languages, there are also differences between styles and between genres in the use of conjunctions. Concerning the former issue Blakemore (1992) comparing the use of "so" to "therefore," points out that "while *so* can be used as a more informal substitute for *therefore*, it seems that *therefore* cannot always be substituted for *so*."³² With respect to the latter, there is Smith and Frawley (1983), which shows the study of the use of conjunction in different genres in English and suggests that some genres are generally more conjunctive than others, for example, religion and fiction use more conjunctions than science and journalism.³³ In the study of Japanese conjunctions, too, the research into the use of conjunctions in different genres is increasing. For example, Ariga (1993)³⁴ and Takahasi (2005).³⁵ Both the papers examine the use of conjunctions in specific genres.

Next, it is also necessary to research the use of conjunctions in texts relating it to the types of utterance or speech. To this end, Hamada (1995), for example, finds the differences between the similar conjunctions such as *soshite*, *sorede*, and *sorekara* to be related to their use in various types of discourse.³⁶

Concerning the English translations of "The spider's thread," they have been discussed from the point of how they interpreted the function of the conjunctions in the original. In some cases we found their function similar, in others not, which points up the fact known to all accomplished translators that it is often difficult and at

times impossible to express in one language what is perfectly simple in another. An American Colleague of mine tells of visiting some friends in Kamakura and watching the children play out in the yard. It began to rain, and the four-year-old came into the house, pointed to his younger brother who was still outside, and said, "Ame ga futteiru no ni!" My colleague tried to imagine an American four-year-old expressing his or her complaint by saying "In spite of the fact that it's raining!"

Sapir and Whorf might argue here that different languages make different cultures. Leaving that to one side, one cannot ignore the fact that each culture has its unique ways for any given locus for expressing the relationships that exist between the objectively observable facts and their subjectively interpreted expression. And so, this analysis may serve as a useful beginning for the study of cohesion in more than one language.

4.2.4. Further Applications of the Concepts of *Shi* and *Ji*


In the previous section, we examined the role of conjunctions in the text of "The spider's thread." On the basis of that discussion let us, in this section, expand the scope of our analysis of *shi* and *ji* in order to gain further insight into the semantic relation between them. The first subsection will be an attempt to apply these concepts to the analysis of utterances as they reflect the endeavour to integrate thought. In the second subsection, the concept of "*kouqi*" in Chinese presented by Chao Yuen Ren will be introduced as another reinforcement of the value of looking at language in a way that takes the context (*bamen*, with its *shi* and *ji*) into account. In both parts of this section we attempt to show the benefit of linking the structure and the semantics

of language for a better understanding of texts, and for its usefulness in language learning.

4.2.4.1. The Application of the Process Theory to Longer Passages

In the work of 1960, Tokieda discusses the relativity of the concepts of *shi* and *ji*.³⁷ By this he means that we can distinguish the different types of sentences, paraphrases, and even texts in a way similar to the way we divide the types of words by the interplay of *shi* and *ji*. If the relation between them is applied to one sentence taken as a whole, it takes the now-well-known form shown in Figure VI.

FIGURE VI *Shi* and *Ji*



With this basic structure in mind, let us return to “The spider’s thread” and examine the relation between the *shi* and *ji* from this expanded point of view. The sentence below is from the conclusion of the story.

(4) *Jibun bakari jigoku kara nukedasō to suru Kandata no mujihi na
kokoro ga, sōshite, sono kokoro sōtō na batsu o ukete, moto no jigoku
e ochite shimatta no ga, Oshaka-sama no ome kara miru to,
asamashiku oboshimesareta no de gozaimashō.*

<i>Jibun bakari jigoku kara nukedasō to suru</i>	save only himself from Hell
<i>Kandata no mujihi na kokoro ga</i>	the heartlessness of Kandata

<i>sōshite</i>	and
<i>sono kokoro sōtō na batsu o ukete</i>	received the proper punishment
<i>moto no jigoku e ochite shimatta no ga</i>	fell back into Hell
<i>Oshaka-sama no ome kara miru to</i>	from the eyes of the Buddha
<i>asamashiku oboshimesareta no de gozaimashō</i>	it appeared to be pitiful

English translations are as follows:

- (4a) Doubtless Kandata's cold heart that would have saved only himself from Hell and his having received proper punishment and fallen back into Hell, had appeared to the Buddha's eyes most pitiful.

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- (4b) The black heart of Kandata, which sought only for his own way out of Hell at the expense of all the others finally to bring about his own

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- (4c) How piteous it must have seemed to the Lord Buddha – Kandata's heartlessness in desiring to save only his own skin, and his just

- (4c) punishment.

Dorothy Britton

punishment.

Dorothy Britton

This is a passage in which the narrator makes a presumption concerning the

Buddha's final thought about the event and then presents it to the reader.

Immediately before this, he had told us that the Buddha looked sad as a consequence

of having watched Kandata fall back into Hell. Therefore, this is also a


reconfirmation of that state. Kandata was selfish, and because of this he failed to

escape from Hell. It is, however, the narrator's conjecture that these two factors are

the reason why the Buddha looked sad. The relation of cause and effect is shown on

the basis of the narrator’s supposition. Thus, the sentence might be analysed as the difference between the objective expression and subjective expression as shown in Figure VII.

FIGURE VII The structure of the sentence “*Jibun bakari---gozaimashō*”



This illustrates the manner in which *ji* wraps *shi* in the utterance. When we look at the English translations, we find that in two of them the translated elements corresponding to the subjective expression in the original are placed at the beginning of the sentence; “Doubtless” in a), and “How piteous” in c). “Doubtless” is used to express the narrator’s judgment in advance of how the Buddha would perceive Kandata’s action, and to indicate the function of the sentence within the paragraph. It must be noted, however, that the “doubtless” is semantically quite different from the “-*mashō*” termination in the original. Perhaps a more complex English locution would be needed here, such as: “Alas, would not the Buddha have found pitiable Kandata’s cold heart that . . .”

The Britton’s translation is a bit more complex, attempting as it does to capture the narrator’s doubt and the certainty of the Buddha’s knowledge. The exclamatory expression in c) is a typical way to show a speaker’s feelings, while the “must have” is semantically ambiguous. It is both “must have,” not far removed from “should have,” and “must” plus the auxiliary verb for “seemed.” If Britton, in fact, wanted the narrator to suggest that the Buddha, quite certainly omniscient in his eyes, only

seemed to know the consequences of Kandata's actions, is an open question. The thrust of the construction might better be expressed by: "How piteous Kandata's cold heart . . . had to have appeared to the Buddha," which suggests that Shaw was more sensitive to this nuance, although "appeared," by it self is like "must have," not without its ambiguity. The sense of the original is something like, "It seems to me (though I am unable to report with certainty another's thoughts) that the Buddha (who is all knowing) saw the actions of Kandata as piteous," but, needless to say, such nuances, which are suggested by the ending *-mashō*, cannot be captured in English without destroying the literary nature of the narration.

The relation between these subjective expressions and what follows in the English translations of a) and c) can be seen in Figures VIII and IX.

FIGURE VIII The structure of Shaw's translation





FIGURE IX The structure of Britton's translation



And we might conclude with the observation that subjective expressions, which indicate the speaker's judgements or feelings, are in English more frequently put initially; "I think . . .," "It seems to me that . . .," and the like. To speak another language requires one to adapt to the nature of its subjectivity. And this is not as well dealt with by methods that assume the objectivity or subjectivity of language as it is by the Process theory, which is sensitive to the presence of both within any given locus.

Now to develop further the function of the *shi* and *ji* let us examine another example, a paragraph from part one, where the narrator is describing Kandata's one good deed.

- (5) *To mōshimasu no wa, aru toki, kono otoko ga, fukai hayashi no naka o tōrimasu to, chīsa na kumo ga ippiki, michibata o hatte iku no ga miemashita. Sokode Kandata wa, sassoku ashi o agete, fumikorosō to itashimashita ga, "Iya, iya, kore mo chīsai nagara, inochi no aru mono ni chigainai. Sono inochi o muyami ni toru to iu koto wa, ikura nandemo, kawaisō da." to, kō kyū ni omoikaeshite, tōtō, sono kumo o korosazu ni, tasuketeyatta kara de gozaimasu.*

<i>to mōshimasu no wa</i>	I tell you
<i>aru toki</i>	once
<i>kono otoko ga</i>	this man
<i>fukai hayashi no naka o tōrimasu to</i>	when walking through a deep forest
<i>chīsa na kumo ga ippiki</i>	a little spider
<i>michibata o hatte iku no ga miemashita</i>	(he) saw it creeping along by the side of the road
<i>sokode Kandata wa</i>	and then Kandata

<i>sassoku ashi o agete</i>	lifted quickly his foot
<i>fumikorosō to itashimashita ga</i>	(he) was about to crush it
<i>iya, iya</i>	no, no
<i>kore mo chīsai nagara</i>	though this thing is small
<i>inochi no aru mono ni chigainai</i>	it is a living creature
<i>sono inochi o muyami ni toru to iu koto wa</i>	to take its life recklessly
<i>ikura nandemo kawaisō da</i>	would be too cruel
<i>to, kō kyū ni omoikaeshite</i>	in this way (he) suddenly changed (his) mind
<i>tōtō</i>	finally
<i>sono kumo o korosazu ni</i>	(he) did not kill the spider
<i>tasuketeyatta kara de gozaimasu</i>	and spared it

The English translations are:

- (5a) Once while on his way through a deep forest, he had noticed a little spider creeping along beside the road. So quickly lifting his foot, he was about to trample it to death, when he suddenly thought, “No, no, as small as this thing is, it, too, has a soul: it would be rather a shame to recklessly kill it,” **and** spared the spider’s life.

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- (5b) **This is how it happened:** One day while walking through a dense forest, he caught sight of a spider creeping along by the side of the path. He had an impulse to lift up his foot and crush it. A nobler thought, however, crossed his mind. “Although it is only an insignificant creature, life must be dear to it. Also, it would be too cruel of me to take its little life for no purpose or good reason,” he said to himself, and let it hurry away to safety.

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- (5c) Once, when Kandata was passing through a forest, he noticed a little spider crawling by the wayside. Kandata was about to crush it with his foot when he suddenly changed his mind. “No! It may be very small, but this is a living creature, and to take its life thoughtlessly would be cruel, to say the least.” **And so** he did not kill the spider but let it live.


Dorothy Britton.

As we have seen, the original consists of two sentences. The first is from *to mōshimasu no wa* to *miemashita*, and the second from the conjunction, *sokode* to *gozaimasu* at the end. However, another view of the contents can be taken without so strict a regard to the structure. This is an interpretation in which the narrator’s judgement wraps the entire event concerning Kandata’s action. If considered it in this way, it can be understood as follows:

To mōshimasu no wa
 ----- the narrator signals that he is going to tell us of the event,
Aru toki, . . . kumo o korosazu ni tasuketeyatta
 ----- he tells us the details of what happened and how,
Kara de gozaimasu
 ----- and he emphasizes that this is the good deed by Kandata,
 and at the same time, confirms our understanding it.

Figure X displays this structure.

FIGURE X The structure of the paragraph



The expression *to mōshimasu no wa* is placed at the beginning of the paragraph to

indicate the narrator's *bamen*, that is, from what locus he will narrate the events. Therefore, it is subjective, and with the other expression *kara de gozaimasu*, at the end of the paragraph, emphasizes the importance of the event, or more exactly the importance of this event in the story as the narrator wants it to be understood by the reader. The former is put forward as a collateral part of the latter, and together synthesize the paragraph, and for this reason the subjective expressions come both at the beginning and the end of the paragraph, and wrap the objective portion of the narrative between them. The subjective expression wraps of the relatively complex objective expression to indicate the unity of the nested thought.

We can easily imagine the difficulty encountered when one attempts to express the relation between these two expressions in the original by the means of the lexical and syntactic elements available in English. There are no easy translations by which subjective expressions are used at both the beginning and end when relating an event. In translation a), the use of "and" does not seem to play a role corresponding to the original. This "and" shows only the additive relation within the sentences.

Translation c) has no subjective element at the beginning either. And similarly it uses the conjunction "and." However, the use of "and" here is different from that of a)'s. Britton's sentence is independent, and the conjunctive adverb "and" placed at the beginning of the sentence is accompanied by "so." Therefore, the "And so" is able to emphasize the reason for Kandata's sparing of a spider's life, and by signalling the end of the narration of the event, it confirms the reader's understanding. Thus, the "And so" not only connects the sentence to the previous one, but also unites the whole event in a context beyond both.

In contrast to the above instances, there is an expression in English that can be

used to introduce the telling of the event in these circumstances, and it is employed in b). “This is how it happened.” This corresponds well with the expression of the original, *to mōshimasu no wa*, in meaning, and can be regarded as a signal, such as “Listen, I am going to relate an important event now.” Certainly, it does not have its counterpart at the end of the speech, which is unnecessary in English syntax. Therefore it is not strong enough to show the narrator’s attitude and to determine the course of events. It does, however, indicate the beginning of a story, and shows a different dimension from that of the rest of the paragraph, which is concerned with the presentation of the story.

One should note here that it is the Japanese native speaker who comes closest to capturing this nuance. In addition, it is interesting to try to imagine the English syntax for such subjective expressions, expressions that come both at the beginning and end of a paragraph and wrap the objective expression. It seems clearly redundant to say, “It seems that he is coming, I think,” although such construction can be heard from Japanese speakers speaking in English.

4.2.4.2. The Process Theory and Chao’s Concept of “*Kouqi*”

Having considered the general usefulness of Tokieda’s notions *shi* and *ji* in textual analysis, I would like to conclude this chapter with brief consideration of the related work of a Chinese linguist, Chao Yuen Ren, whose approach to language shows certain parallels to that of Tokieda. Although more closely associated with structuralism, Chao Yuen Ren is a scholar who recognized the need to take the emotive aspect of language into account, not only theoretically but also

pedagogically.

There are two points that I would particularly like to take up here. One is the fact that Chao's idea of *kouqi* (tone, or way of speaking) has many points that can be profitably compared to Tokieda's idea of *ji*, and the other is that both scholars consider the grammatical and pragmatic aspects of language to be matters that cannot be as neatly separated as one might wish.

Let us begin by considering the idea of *kouqi* as it is presented by Chao in his 1926 essay.³⁸ According to his view, there are six general types of address found in speech:

1. Using content words:

“*Wo xiang jintian yexu hui xiayu* (I think that it may rain today).”

“*Shui liaodao ta hui jiale zhege ren le* (Who expected that she would marry that man? = Nobody expected her to marry that man).”³⁹

These are examples that show the way of talking by using explicit words, such as *wo xiang* and *shui liaodao*.

2. Using adverbs or conjunctions:

“*The shiqing yiding yao shibai* (This matter necessarily fails).”

“*Ta xianzai qule qinle, suoyi meiyou congqian name kuaihuo le* (He is married now; so, he is not as happy as used to be).”

3. Using inflections:

“I would if I could, but since I can't, I shan't.”

As in the German: “*Ich sei unglücklich? Nein. Das bin ich gar nicht.*”

Since inflections are mostly expressed by particles in Chinese, this kind of category is not necessary.

4. Using interjections:

Normally the term “*gantanci*” is used to translate “interjections,” but since many Chinese interjections do not necessarily have exclamatory characteristics when they are used to show the way of speaking, let us here call them *danhuci* (words for calling or responding to a person). For example, to respond to the utterance “*Ta hui nanbian qu le* (He has gone back to the south).” One can use several *danhuci*, and each carries its own nuance as follows:

Word Intonation		Meaning
(1) <i>M!</i>	Quiet	Yes, I have already heard.
(2) <i>O!</i>	Quiet	Has he? I didn't know.
(3) <i>Oo!</i>	Low, long, falling ending	Has he? It was really unexpected.

5. Using a change of intonations:

In a broad sense, such intonations include not only a change in pitch, but also in rhythm, that is, the relation between stress and length. The cases of *O* or *Oo* above are also examples that show the changing tones to be one such way of speaking, and this can be found in the case of whole sentences. For example, there are several ways to say the sentence “*Bie qu ba* (Do not go).”

	Tone	Meaning
(a) <i>Bie</i>	slightly long,	You must not go. (imperative)
<i>qu</i>	medium long	
<i>ba</i>	very short and low like <i>le</i> .	
(b) <i>Bie</i>	medium long,	You had better not go. (suggestion)
<i>qu</i>	medium long,	
	both are at normal pitch,	
<i>ba</i>	medium long, at medium pitch, quiet.	

6. Using particles:

- (a) *Ta zhuanle sanwan kuai qian.* (normal speech)
- (b) *Ta zhuanle sanwan kuai qian na.* (He earned *that* much money.)

(c) *Ta zhuanle sanwan kuai qian ma?* (Did he? Is it true?)

In this way, Chao shows, by the use of many Chinese examples, the variety that exists in ways of speaking. Although the focus in his essay is a detailed study of Chinese particles, which have been introduced briefly in the examples above, it is clear that his study is based on a broad recognition of *kouqi*, and therefore, his aim ultimately is to clarify the *kouqi* in speech. He considers *kouqi* to be one of the main features that produce differences in speech, and presents several examples that relate it to the various elements of sentences.

What is significant here is that Chao's idea of *kouqi* is not based on the traditional categories of Chinese grammar, *shi* and *xu*, which are loosely translated as "full (content)" and "empty (function)" in English.⁴⁰ He includes also *shici* and *xuci* in the elements that show *kouqi*. The Chinese element *ci* means "word." Therefore, *shici* means full (content) words, and *xuci* can be literally translated as empty (function) words. To avoid misunderstanding, we will use here *xuci* and *shici*, instead of functional words and content words.

Chao does not exclude the use of content words to show *kouqi*, from the speaker's point of view; neither does he restrict its use to the level of words. Rather than establishing two levels, he treats both words and phrases as grammatical elements that show *kouqi*. As we have seen in the examples above, he shows the words of *shici*, such as *yiding* and *suoyi*, and also phrases that consist of *shici*, such as, *wo xiang* and *shui liaodao*. In other words, Chao's concept of *kouqi* is not only restricted to the concept of *xu*, nor is its function limited to the word level. It has the potential of expanding the concept to the level of phrases, clauses, sentences, or even whole utterances. This shows a marked resemblance to the features of Tokieda's idea

of *ji*.

As we have seen, Tokieda's idea of *shi* and *ji* is based on his study of vocabulary items by Suzuki Akira in the Edo period, where Suzuki followed the traditional study of *tenioha*, which had originated as a method of reading Chinese sentences with Japanese pronunciation without changing the word order of the original text – a procedure necessary because of the basic difference between Chinese and Japanese. Unlike Chinese, Japanese is an agglutinative language, and therefore, when translating Chinese texts scholars traditionally retained the order of the Chinese characters and added particles such as, *te*, *ni*, *o*, *ha*, *su*, *no*, *to*, using the Japanese syllabary. Since these elements were mainly categorized as auxiliary verbs and particles in terms of parts of speech, *tenioha* has been often regarded as corresponding to *xu* in the Chinese category of words, even though *tenioha* came to be used more broadly to include suffixes to verbal or adjective stems in Japanese. This historical aspect of the study of *tenioha* tends to lead us to consider the concept of *ji* within the range of the concept of *xu* in modern Chinese grammar, putting aside for a moment the difference between the two.

For example, interjections are not included as a category of *xu* in modern Chinese grammar.⁴¹ However, they appear as examples of *kouqi* in Chao's theory, and this is quite reasonable given their nature. Similarly, according to Tokieda's view, interjections, too, are included in the category of *ji*. This is because, as far as the concept is concerned, interjections should be placed at the centre of *ji*, in that they directly express speaker's (writer's) feelings. We have examined an example of this in the section 4.1.1, where Tokieda's theory is applied to a poem by Shokushi Naishinnō, when he uses such expressions as *aa!* and *aware*. Both of them are

interjections showing grief, fear or love, and belong to *ji*. Therefore, if one were to consider *kouqi* along with *xu*, and present examples from among the elements of *xu*, one might find it problematic to offer interjections as examples.

Chao does not deal with the matter in this way. If we were to consider the idea of *ji* from the point of view of *xu*, it would be inadequate, and even misleading in virtue of its distracting our attention from the importance of the concept of *ji*. To consider Chao's idea of *kouqi* as being close to that of *ji* as conceived by Tokieda is a far more effective way to clarify the concept of *ji*, than by narrowing its scope to function words.

With regard to the possibility of expanding the idea of *kouqi*, there is no doubt that we can do so effectively, particularly by relating it to the expression of the speaker's point of view in speech, the basic study of which has been presented by Tokieda. This is a topic that should be discussed in both the study of *kouqi* in Chinese and Tokieda's conceptualization.

CHAPTER 4 NOTES

¹ Nishio Minoru (annot.), *Tsurezuregusa*, p.89, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei* 30, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1957. Old Japanese and Middle Japanese in the text examples in the dissertation are transliterated on the basis of the way of *Kogo Daijiten* edited by Nakada Norio, Wada Toshimasa, and Kitahara Yasuo, 1983, Shōgakukan, which basically uses the *rekishiteki kanazukai* (historically correct orthography). Other relevant references are as follows,

Jidaibetsu Kokugo Daijiten, Sanseidō, 1985.

Nihon Kokugo Daijiten, Shōgakukan, 1972.

Doi Tadao (translation), *Nippo Jisho: Hōyaku*, Iwanami Shoten, 1980.

Mabuchi Kazuo, *Kokugo On'inron*, Kasama Shoin, 1971.

Yamada Minoru, *Hatsuon Suitei Shindoku Man'yōshū*, Sōyō, 2000.

Tsukishima Hiroshi, *Heian Jidaigo Shinron*, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1969.

Takeuchi Lone, *The Structure and History of Japanese: from Yamatokotoba to Nihongo*, Longman, 1999.

² It might be noted in passing how closely this brief passage fits the criteria set out by Kenneth Burke in his pentad, the when-where, who, what, how, and why, of a text.

³ Tokieda, *Bunshō Kenkyū Josetsu* (An introduction to the study of discourse), Yamada Shoin, 1960, pp.220-221.

⁴ Takagi Ichinosuke, et al., (annot.), *Man'yōshū*, p.155, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei* 4, Iwanami Shoten, 1957.

⁵ Note that Tokieda calls it *taishōgo*. This is not the same as *mokutekigo*, the grammatical term currently used to refer to objects in English grammar.

⁶ Hisamatsu Senichi (annot.), *Shin Kokin Wakashū*, p.231, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei* 28, Iwanami Shoten, 1958.

⁷ Hisamatsu Senichi (annot.), *Shin Kokin Wakashū*, p.231, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei* 28, Iwanami Shoten, 1958. Also, Kubota Shōichirō (ed.), *Shin Kokin Wakashū*, p.227, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Zenshū* 12, Chikuma Shobo, 1962.

⁸ Tokieda, 1960, pp.221-222.

⁹ E. O. Winter, A clause-relational approach to English texts: a study of some predictive lexical items in written discourse, *Instructional Science*, 6/1, 1977, pp.1-92, and M.P. Hoey, *On the Surface of Discourse*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1983.

¹⁰ Taneda Wakako, *Yin'yō, ninshō, kontekusuto* (Quotation, person, context), *Kontora Tekusutoron* (The study on contra-text), Tokyo: Kōbundō, 2004, pp.74-101.

¹¹ Ibid., p.87.

¹² The story was published in 1675 and has been dramatized in many different ways in all kinds of genres, such as *Tōryū Oguri Hangan* by Chikamatsu Monzaemon in 1698. Oguri is the son of an imperial court noble, but he is exiled to the distant eastern province of Hitachi. See Araki S. and Yamamoto K. (eds.), *Sekkyōbushi*, Tōyō Bunko, Heibonsha, 1973.

¹³ Lawrence Venuti, *The Translation Studies Reader*, Routledge, 2000, p.5.

¹⁴ Mona Baker, *In Other Words*, London and New York: Routledge, 1992.

¹⁵ Kōno Ichirō, *Hon'yaku no Okite* (The rules of translation), Tokyo: DHC, 1999. Kōno has translated many English literary works of Emily Brontë, Thomas Hardy, and W. Somerset Maugham into Japanese.

¹⁶ Kōno, 1999, p.97.

¹⁷ Tokieda, 1950, p.144.

¹⁸ Tokieda, Ibid., pp.137-139.

¹⁹ Robert de Beaugrande and Wolfgang Dressler, *Introduction to Text Linguistics*, London and New York: Longman, 1981, p.74.

²⁰ Tsukahara Tetsuo, Setsuzokushi (Conjunctions), *Zoku Nihonbunpō Kōza*, Vol.1, 1958. Also see Tsukahara, Setsuzoku no ronri —setsuzokushi to setsuzokujoshi — (The logic of conjunction —conjunctions and conjunctive particles—), *Gekkan Bunpō*, Vol.2 No.2, 1969, pp.68-74.

²¹ Nagano Masaru, *Gakkō Bunpō Bunshōron* (The school grammar, on discourse), Tokyo: Asakura Shoten, 1959.

²² Ichikawa Takashi, *Kokugo Kyōiku no tame no Bunshōron Gaisetsu* (The introduction of discourse for the Japanese language education), Tokyo: Kyōiku Shuppan, 1978.

²³ Ibid., pp.66. 89-93.

²⁴ Sakuma Mayumi, Setsuzoku hyōgen (The conjunctive expressions), *Case Study, Nihongo no Bunshō, Danwa* (Case study, the text and discourse in Japanese), Tokyo: Ōfūsha, 1990.

²⁵ Ishiguro Kei, Setsuzokushi no nijū shiyō to sono hyōgen kōka (The double use of conjunctions and its effectiveness in the expression), Nakamura Akira et al. (eds.), *Hyōgen to Buntai* (Expressions and styles), Meiji shoin, 2005.

²⁶ M.A.K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, *Cohesion in English*, London and New York: Longman, 1976, pp.240-241.

²⁷ M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, London: Edward

Arnold, 1985, shows a more detailed list of the types of conjunction with the categories of elaboration, extension and enhancement. See pp.306-307.

²⁸ Mona Baker, 1992, p.192.

²⁹ *Akutagawa Ryūnosuke Zenshū* (Complete works of Akutagawa Ryūnosuke), Kadakawa Shoten, Vol.2, 1968.

³⁰ See Hayashi Shirō, *Bun no shōzen keishiki kara mita nichiei ryōgo no hikaku* (Successive forms in Japanese and English sentences, a contrastive study), *Gengo to Buntai* (Language and styles), Osaka Kyōiku Toshō, 1974, pp.364-375. And also Isshiki Masako, *Nihongo to Eigo, Hon'yaku no tame ni* (Japanese and English, for the translation), Tokyo: Aratake Shuppan, 1977, pp.144-149. Hayashi using James Joyce's "Eveline" as the text and Isshiki using the various examples of translation between English and Japanese, both show the difference in the use of conjunctions between the two languages.

³¹ Robert de Beaugrande and Wolfgang Dressler, 1981, p.163.

³² Diane Blakemore, *Understanding Utterances*, Blackwell, 1992, p.139.

³³ Smith, R. N. and Frawley, W. J., *Conjunctive cohesion in four English genres*, 1983, *Text* 3,4, pp.347-374.

³⁴ Ariga Chikako, *Taiwa ni okeru seshizokushi no kinō ni tsuite, sorede no yōhō o tegakari ni* (On the function of conjunctions in dialogues, from the research of the use of *sorede*), *Nihongo Kyōiku*, Vol.79, 89-101, 1993.

³⁵ Takahashi Yoshiro, *Daigaku kōgi o taishōto shita ruikeiteki buntai bunseki no kokoromi* (An attempt for the analysis of the stylistic types for the lectures in universities), Nakamura Akira et al. (eds.), *Hyōgen to Buntai* (Expressions and styles), Meiji Shoin, 2005.

³⁶ Hamada Mari, *Iwayuru tenka no setsuzokushi ni tsuite* (On the additive conjunctions), Nitta Yoshio (ed.), *Fukubun no Kenkyū* (Studies of complex sentences), Tokyo: Kuroshio, 1995.

³⁷ Tokieda, 1960, p.220.

³⁸ Chao Yuen Ren, *Beijing, Suzhou, Changzhou yuzhuci de yanjiu* (Studies on the particles of Beijing, Suzhou, and Changzhou), *Qinghua Xuebao*, Vol.3 No.2, 865-918, 1926.

³⁹ Chinese Characters are used in the original. The English translations of these sentences and of those that follow are mine.

⁴⁰ Note that *shi* in Japanese and *shi* in Chinese are romanized based on their pronunciations. They are written with different characters.

⁴¹ See Zhu Dexi, *Yufa Jiangyi*, Beijing Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1982, and Liu Yuehua, Pan Wenyu, Gu Wei, *Shiyong Xiandai Hanyu Yufa*, Beijing Waiyu Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu Chubanshe, 1983.

CHAPTER 5 THE PROCESS THEORY AND POLITE SPEECH (*KEIGO*)

5.1. POLITE-HONORIFIC LANGUAGE – *KEIGO*

Japanese possesses a highly developed system of polite-honorific language, which in our discussion we will refer to as *keigo*. It is a feature found not only in Japanese but also in other languages, for example Korean, Javanese, Persian, and Tibetan. The social importance of *keigo* in Japanese is extremely great.¹ It is the purpose of this chapter to explicate Tokieda's treatment of *keigo* in his Language Process Theory and to examine its usefulness in the modern study of *keigo*. Although various aspects of Tokieda's work have been well discussed, as seen in the Chapter 2 Tokieda's view of *keigo* has not been fully explicated. There are, to be sure, many works on *keigo* by both Japanese and non-native linguists, and they have undoubtedly made valuable contributions to the studies. These studies will be referred to in the section 5.1.2, following the definition of *keigo* and a brief discussion of how such a means of expressing politeness can be best understood linguistically.

Further, despite the increased research into *keigo*, there are several fundamental problems that have yet to be resolved. For example, there is the issue of the taxonomy of *keigo*. The National Centre for the Study of Language (*Kokuritsu Kokugo Kenkyūjo*) in 1990 and 1992 suggests that the traditional three-group classification of *keigo*, which divides the subject into respect language (*sonkei-go*), humble language (*kenjō-go*), and polite language (*teinei-go*), should be examined from the point of view of the function of the use of *keigo* in modern Japanese society, and that a more detailed classification should be used for the teaching of foreign

students.² On the other hand, there are scholars who are opposed to making the classification of *keigo* more complex and argue for the usefulness of the three-group classification. Hagino (2001), for example, takes the position that the classification introduced by Tokieda more than sixty years ago, is still the best for learners.³

It is within this context that we will take up Tokieda's view of *keigo* in this chapter and relate it to the concept of *bamen* and the theory of *shi* and *ji*.

5.1. 1. Narrow and Broad Definitions of *Keigo*

There are both narrow and broad definitions of *keigo*. According to Kikuchi (2003), *keigo* is in the narrowest sense an expression that states the same content but by the different ways in order to show the respect or politeness as the expression without the use of *keigo*.⁴ The content of what you want to say is free and unrestricted by polite-honorific language only as long as it remains in your mind. However, once it is formulated as an utterance it becomes an expression that cannot be realized without being restricted by polite-honorific language. For example:

(1) *Tanaka ga kita.*

Tanaka-nom. come-past

Tanaka came.

(2) *Tanaka-san ga kimashita.*

Tanaka-respect-nom. come-polite-past

Mr Tanaka came.

(3) *Tanaka-sama ga irasshatta.*

Tanaka-respect-nom. come-respect-past

Mr Tanaka came.

- (4) *Tanaka-sama ga irasshaimashita.*
Tanaka-respect-nom. come-respect-past
Mr Tanaka came.

The basic message is the same in these four sentences. The implications, however, are not. It is the speaker who employs one of these as his or her utterance. Therefore, we can say that honorific expressions are those expressions from which the speaker (writer) selects the one that will reflect the appropriate degree of respect or politeness for the context without changing the underlying message. This is the narrowest definition of *keigo*. The studies that focus on the lexical and grammatical aspects of *keigo* in the traditional three-classification are approaches of this sort.

According to Kikuchi the next broader definition of *keigo* is shown by the term “*taigū hyōgen*.” *Taigū* means treatment, and therefore, the literal meaning of the term is the expression of treatment. Kikuchi defines *taigū hyōgen* as an expression employed when the speaker expresses the same content but articulates it differently according to the person referred to, the hearer, and the situation. We can here see the similarity to the narrowest sense of *keigo* in that it refers to the same content but by means of different expressions. This is, however, an approach to *keigo* from the broader point of view of communication. Usually, such approaches focus on how the speaker shows his or her treats the hearer or the third person in communication. Moreover, as Kikuchi explains, the treatment means not only respect or politeness but also contempt or impoliteness, and therefore, *taigū hyōgen* includes words such as *nukasu*, *hozaku*, and *iiyagaru*. These three verbs are vulgar words meaning “say.”

The broadest description of *keigo* is indicated by the term “politeness.” Kikuchi defines “politeness” in the broadest terms, terms that take into account the various

aspects of respect, politeness, good impression, consideration, and suitability in the various speech acts in our daily life, and that the study of *keigo* in the broadest sense also includes the study of the broader implication of “politeness.” Kikuchi suggests that the studies of *keigo* under the concept of “*kēi hyōgen* (expressions of respect)” should be also regarded as one of the ways to study politeness. The significant difference between the study of politeness or *kēi hyōgen* in the broader sense of *keigo*, and the study of *keigo* and *taigū hyōgen* in the narrower sense, is that the former treats not only the issue of how the speaker expresses differently the same content, which is the main issue of the latter, but also the issue of what and how the speaker expressed his or her message. As Kikuchi points out, this means that the scope of the study of politeness or *kēi hyōgen* is extremely broad.

5.1.2. Works on *Keigo* in Japanese Language

Let us begin by looking at relevant works that have come to shape our understanding on the function of *keigo*. Its study was begun with the research carried out by the Portuguese missionaries who came to Japan in the sixteenth century. In particular the work by João Rodriguez (1561-1633), *Arte de Lingoa de Iapam (Nihon Daibuntēn)*, published in Nagasaki between 1604 and 1608, describes in detail the use of *keigo*, as it manifested itself in the vocabulary, word forms, and the way it is opposed by the use of vulgar and disrespectful words.⁵ This is the earliest work to study *keigo* in the broad sense of *taigū hyōgen*. However, the work did not influence the Japanese scholars’ studies of *the subject* because of the closure of the country at the beginning of the seventeenth century.⁶ Indeed, the first study of *keigo* by a Japanese scholar did

not appear until Mitsuhashi Yoya's article "Hōbunjō no keigo (The keigo in Japanese)" in 1892.⁷ Other early studies are Okada Masami, *Taigūhō* (The modes of treatment) in 1900, Matsushita Daizaburō, *Nihon Zokugo Bunten* (A grammar of the colloquial Japanese) in 1901, Yoshioka Kyōho, *Nihon Kōgohō* (A grammar for the Japanese spoken language) in 1906, Mitsuya Shigematsu, *Kōtō Nihon Bunpō* (The advanced Japanese grammar) in 1908. Some of these works approach *keigo* in the narrower sense and some in the broader sense. As the title indicates, Okada's work is the first to consider the use of *keigo* in the several modes of treatment such as the modes of respect, humility, casualness, and contempt.⁸ The work by Matsushita also used the term *taigū* in explaining *keigo* in colloquial Japanese. On the other hand, Yoshioka's work is an early and representative approach to show the three classifications of *keigo* with the terms of *sonkei* (respect), *kenson* (humble), and *teinei* (polite), focusing on the use of *keigo* in the narrow sense.⁹ Mitsuya's work similarly shows the four classifications of *keigo* on the basis of his unique view.

After those early works on *keigo* the first book that specifically studied the grammar of *keigo* was written by Yamada Yoshio in 1924 with the title of *Keigohō no Kenkyū* (The study of the grammar of *keigo*). Yamada described *keigo* dividing its use into three styles, the spoken language, the written language of the formal style, and the written language of the plain style. Yamada's approach was to consider the use of *keigo* by connecting it to the concept of person in the sentence. He pays attention to the fact that fundamentally the Japanese language has no specific first person pronoun. What is a suitable expression to use depends on the context, and requires the speaker to choose the *keigo* expression that fits the situation. Indeed, there are a great number of words for "I" in Japanese. For example:

watakushi, watashi, boku, atashi, atai, ore, oira, ware, kochira, kocchi, uchi, temae, jibun, wagahai, soregashi, sessha, yo, shōsei

But none is used without situational restrictions and are nouns, not pronouns in the strict sense of the term. This is also true of the second person words:

anata, kimi, anta, omae, sonata, nanji, onushi, kiden, kikei, kisama

The first and second person designators, however, are generally avoided in polite speech – often making the relation indicated by these forms different to express in other languages.

This leads to the need to choose a personal reference that is suitable to the situation. If the relation between the speaker and the hearer changes, the speaker must choose another form to suit the new context. Since the honorific expressions of Japanese have developed in such a way that the personal pronoun cannot be used without taking context into account, Yamada has well shown the significance of the connection between honorific expressions and words of personal reference,¹⁰ and Yamada's work is a groundbreaking in the study of *keigo* in the narrow sense.

Tokieda's study on *keigo*, which appeared in his *Kokugogaku Genron* (The principles of the Japanese language study) in 1941, is regarded as following the line of Yamada's study in that Tokieda, too, treated *keigo* lexically comparing the words of *keigo* to the words of non-*keigo*. His view, however, also provides a deep consideration to the nature of *keigo* including not only the nature of vulgar words but, as we shall see in the section 5.2 and those that follow, also a concern for the broader concept of politeness. For this reason, it would not be appropriate to regard Tokieda's study as a study limited to *keigo* in the narrow sense.

With respect to the works that treat *keigo* from the wider point of view of politeness or *kēi hyōgen*, we can find many approaches. Hayashi (1973) and Minami (1987) present the basis of the study by defining *keigo* as a part of human behaviour. Hayashi considers the function of non-verbal polite behaviour as *keigo* applied to human acts.¹¹ Minami displays a broader range of *keigo* from two aspects; the form of an expression and its content. The former includes non-verbal expressions and the latter includes words of contempt described as *minus-keigo*.¹²

In Western scholarship one of the recent influential works on politeness in the English literature is that of Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), which presents a theoretical framework for the general debate of politeness as a human act. They regard politeness as “redressive” action taken to counterbalance the potentially disruptive effect of face-threatening acts.¹³ This work has been introduced to the field of Japanese linguistics by several Japanese scholars such as, Ide et al. (1986)¹⁴, Ikuta (1997)¹⁵, and Usami (2002)¹⁶. Mastumoto (1988, 1989)¹⁷ and Ide (1989)¹⁸ have argued that *keigo* in Japanese language cannot be fully explained as types of “politeness strategies” as presented in the framework of Brown and Levinson. We shall return to this disagreement when, in the section 5.3.2, we discuss the usefulness of Tokieda’s view of *keigo*.

5.2. TOKIEDA’S THEORY OF *KEIGO*

The main points of Tokieda’s theory of *keigo* are to be found in three papers: Gengo ni okeru bamen no seiyaku ni tsuite (On the restrictions of *bamen* in language), 1938,¹⁹ Bamen to keijihō to no kinōteki kankei ni tsuite (On the functional relation

between *bamen* and honorific expressions), 1938,²⁰ and *Keigohō oyobi keijihō no kenkyū* (A study on the nature and structure of honorific expressions), 1939.²¹ These have been developed and reorganized in his *Kokugogaku Genron* (The principles of the Japanese language study) 1941. The theory is presented under four headings, as follows:

1. The nature of honorific expressions and the two categories *shi* and *ji*.
2. Objective honorific expressions
 - a. Indicating the relation between the speaker and things
 - b. Indicating the relation between things
3. Subjective honorific expressions
4. The unity of objective and subjective honorific expressions

By dividing honorific expressions into two categories, the objective (*shi*) and the subjective (*ji*), Tokieda brings his Language Process Theory to bear on his thoughts on *keigo*. To understand fully these two categories, we should first look at how he defines what he designates as “expressions based on respect.”

5.2.1. The Three Kinds of Expressions Based on Respect

To begin his description of *keigo*, Tokieda divides the so-called *sonkei* “respect” expressions into three groups:

- 1) Expressions that represent respect as a concept:

These are expressions that conceptualize respect and make it objective. For example, *uyamau* (look up to), *sonkei-suru* (respect), both verbs express in themselves the concept of respect. Therefore, we can use both to show the third person’s respect as well as our own. We can say,

- (a) *Kō wa otsu o uyamau.*
 A-topic B-acc look up to

A looks up to B.

or

(b) *Kō wa otsu o sonkei-suru.*

A-topic B-acc respect

A respects B.

What is important here is that these words are the expressions of the concept of respect, and cannot of themselves function as honorific expressions.

2) Expressions that indicate restrictions based on respect:

When passing a person, if you walk in a manner showing respect, it can be said that this way of walking is restricted by that respect. In other words, your respect is represented by this way of walking. When you are invited to a dinner, you do not say *kuimasu* (the plain form for “eat”) but *itadakimasu* (the humble term for the act, meaning “I humbly receive”). The way you express yourself is constrained by your need to show respect. The speaker’s respect is represented by his or her choice of words, not by its conceptual substance.

3) Direct expressions of respect:

When you face your superior or an elderly person, if you take off your hat and bow politely to him, it is a direct expression of your respect. This act is neither an expression that conceptualizes your respect nor one that is performed under the constraints of respect. To bow politely is itself the expression of respect. If we apply this view to language, the direct expression of respect in speech belongs to *ji*, in that it directly expresses the speaker’s purported feelings and attitudes towards, and judgments concerning the objective world.²²

Tokieda says that the first group does not comprise honorific expressions, and that only the other two do. Furthermore, there is a definite difference between the second group and the third one, even though they are equally honorific. The second belongs to *shi*, and the third to *ji*, which makes the two groups entirely different with respect

to their level within the Process Theory. Tokieda calls the former *shi-keigo* and the latter *ji-keigo*. It is only in the latter that the speaker shows his or her respect towards the hearer, and can therefore be defined as an object of the speaker's respect.

5.2.2. Objective and Subjective Honorific Expressions

In defining the relation between the conceptualization of respect and its expression, Tokieda recognizes two types of *keigo*. The first is based on the speaker's respect but does not show it directly. This group of honorific expressions belongs to *shi*. The other shows the speaker's respect towards the hearer directly. This is the honorific expression that belongs to *ji*. Since a *shi* expression is conceptualized by the speaker, its expression indicates the relation between people and is expressed by the speaker. What is important here is that this does not show the speaker's respect towards the person referred to in the utterance, but shows how the speaker interprets the matter at hand and how he or she chooses to express it. It is thus the way the speaker grasps the situation, and not his or her respect for the object. For example,

- 1) (a) *Niwa o mita.*
garden-acc see-past
I saw a garden.

- (b) *O-niwa o haiken-shita.*
garden-respect-acc see-humble-past
I saw your garden.

- 2) (a) *Atsui ne.*
hot particle
It is hot, isn't it?

- (b) *Atsū-gozaimasu ne.*
hot-polite particle
It is hot, isn't it?

With respect to the difference between 1) and 2), 1) (a) is the sentence without honorific expression and 1) (b) includes the humble term *haiken-suru*. 2) (a) is a sentence in the plain form and 2) (b) includes the honorific term *gozaimasu*.

However, Tokieda points out that there is a fundamental difference between the two pairs. 1) (b) is not a sentence that shows the speaker's respect towards the hearer, who is the owner of the garden here. The verb *haiken-suru* is used to express an act that the speaker wishes to distinguish from the act that would be shown by the simple word *miru*. The speaker recognizes that there is a hierarchic relation between the one who sees and what is seen, and that it is expressed by the word *haiken-suru*. In this sense, the word *haiken-suru* is an honorific expression. This reflects, however, not respect towards the hearer, in that the one that sees and what is seen – the speaker and the garden – are both material (*sozai*), and the material objects in speech exist as objectives that are conceptualized by the speaker.

On the other hand, 2) (b), unlike (a), is the sentence that directly shows the speaker's respect towards the hearer. The object that the speaker respects is clearly associated with the hearer in this situation, with the speaker showing his or her respect directly towards the hearer by choosing sentence 2) (b) and including *gozaimasu*. Like other expressions of *ji*, this is a direct expression that shows the speaker's feelings, attitudes, and judgments – where judgement includes the speaker's assessment of the *bamen* and what he or she perceives to be proper irrespective of his or her true feelings or attitudes.

Tokieda tells us that the difference between *shi* and *ji* is also to be found in honorific expressions. Accordingly, both terms of respect (*sonkei-go*) and humility (*kenjō-go*) are contained in group 1) (b). There are in this group such verbs as:

Respect Form	Plain Form
<i>meshiagaru</i>	<i>taberu</i>
<i>irassharu</i>	<i>iku, kuru, iru</i>
<i>ossharu</i>	<i>iu</i>
<i>kudasaru</i>	<i>kureru</i>
<i>ukagau</i>	<i>iku, kiku</i>
<i>mairu</i>	<i>kuru</i>
<i>mōsu</i>	<i>iu</i>
<i>itadaku</i>	<i>morau</i>

In the same way forms such as *o... ni naru*, *...reru*, and *...itasu* also belong to this group.

- (5) *O-kyaku-san wa o-kaeri ni natta.*
 guest-respect-topic leave-respect-past
 The guest left.

- (6) *Sensei wa Yokohama e ikareru sō da.*
 teacher-topic Yokohama-to go-respect it seems
 The teacher seems to be going to Yokohama.

- (7) *Watashi ga setsumei-itashi-masu.*
 I-nom explain-humble-polite
 I will explain it.

The typical terms for group 2) (b) are *-masu* and *desu*. For example,

- (8) *Watashi wa ikimasu.*
 I-topic go-polite
 I will go.

- (9) *Are ga Fujisan desu.*
 That-nom Mt. Fuji be-polite
 That is Mt. Fuji.

Let us examine the difference between the two groups in another more contextualized example. A daughter is talking to her father,

- (10) *Yamada-sensei ga o-mie ni narimashita.*
 Yamada-teacher-nom come-respect-polite-past
 Mr Yamada came.

In this sentence, the speaker pays respect to Mr Yamada, who may be a teacher or a doctor, by using *sensei* and *o-mie ni naru*. And at the same time, she also pays respect to her father by adding *-masu* to the stem of *naru*. The former expressions are based on her recognition of the material objects, and the latter is expresses directly to the hearer. In contrast, a father might address his daughter in the same situation thus:

- (11) *Yamada-sensei ga o-mie ni natta yo.*
 Yamada-teacher-nom come-respect-past particle
 Mr Yamada came.

In this sentence, the speaker similarly pays respect to Mr Yamada with *sensei* and *o-mie ni naru*. He does not, however, pay respect to the hearer because the ending *-masu* is not used, and he uses this plain past plus *yo*, which is a particle to show a friendly, familiar, and close relationship.

It is important to make clear the difference between the hearer and the second person. The hearer is a situational factor that constitutes the *bamen* of the speaker. On the other hand, the second person is an element among the material objects that the speaker is talking about in the content. For example:

- (12) *Anata ni kono hon o kashite ageru.*
 You-to this book-acc lend-humbling the speaker

I will lend you this book.

(13) *Omae ni* *kono hon o* *kashite yaru.*
 You-humbling the hearer-to this book-acc lend-humbling the hearer
 I will lend you this book.

Both *anata* and *omae* have been used to address the same person. When *anata* is chosen, the verb *ageru* should be used to show respect, while if *omae* is chosen, the verb *youtu* should be used to keep the balance. Therefore, using honorific expressions is the matter of how the speaker grasps the situation (*bamen*), particularly the relation between people and how to express the content of the expression in a suitably balanced way. It is a positive choice on the part of the speaker.

By applying the theory of *shi* and *ji* to honorific expressions, Tokieda has made it clear for the first time that the structure of honorific expressions, which are uttered linearly and chronologically along the extension of speech, should be characterized as being three-dimensional. His seminal description of the nature of honorific expressions in Japanese has pointed other scholars in the direction of more rewarding studies.

5.2.3. The Distinction between the Concepts of *Sonkei* (Respect) and *Kenjō* (Humility)

One important contribution of Tokieda's theory of *keigo* is that it makes clear that concepts of respect and humility are not to be considered as being in opposition to one another but as closely related. He points out that the honorific expressions that show respect or humility were not originally clearly distinguished.²³ Historically, for

example, certain terms such as *tamau* and *tatematsuru* have had both the functions, and in the ancient tales, lovers often spoke to each other using the most honorific forms of address. Therefore, unlike many current categorizations of honorific expressions that are based on clear-cut distinctions, Tokieda does not divide honorific expressions solely on the basis of the distinction between these two concepts.

To illustrate this point let us examine several misuses of the forms below:

- (14) **Watashi wa kesa hachiji no densha ni o-nori shimashita.*
 I-topic this morning eight-gen train on take-humble-polite-past
 I took the eight o'clock train this morning

- (15) **Otōto wa maiban yashoku o o-tabe shimasu.*
 brother-topic every night midnight snack-acc eat-humble-polite
 My brother eats snacks every midnight

- (16) **Shokuji wa jibun de o-tsukuri shimasu.*
 meal-topic oneself-by make-humble-polite
 I cook my meals by myself

In all these examples the *o...suru* and *go...suru* are used as humble terms. But notice: such terms should be used to lower oneself within the locus of the recipient of an action done by a superior, who may or may not be the hearer. The speakers here have failed to realise that there is no person or object that should be made higher in three examples above, and so there is no need to use humble terms, which would here elevate the status of the train in (14), the snack in (15), and the meal in (16) when there is no reason to do so. This point is easier to understand when we look at the examples below,

- (17) *Watashi ga o-isha-sama o o-yobi shimashita*
 I-nom doctor-respect-acc call-humble-polite-past

I called the doctor to come here.

- (18) *Watashi wa shachō ni imōto o go-shōkai shimashita.*
I-topic president-to sister-acc introduce-humble-polite-past
I introduced my sister to the president.

- (19) *Kono hon wa anata kara o-kari shita mono desu.*
This book-topic you-from borrow-humble-polite-past one
be-polite
This book is the one that I borrowed from you.

The use of the humble forms here raises the status of the doctor in (17), the president in (18), and the owner of the book in (19) respectively. Notice too in (18), we can also say,

- (20) *Watashi wa imōto o shachō-ni go-shōkai shimashita.*
I-topic sister-acc president-to introduce-humble-polite-past
I introduced my sister to the president.

But we cannot appropriately say,

- (21) **Watashi wa imōto ni shachō o go-shōkai shimashita.*
I-topic sister-to president-acc introduce-humble-polite-past
I introduced the president to my sister

or

- (22) **Watashi wa shachō o imōto ni go-shōkai shimashita.*
I-topic president-acc sister-to introduce-humble-polite-past
I introduced the president to my sister

Thus we see that we can use *go-shōkai suru* only for an object that precedes the particle *ni*, and not *o*. Although this looks complicated, in practice it is not. It is not a matter related to the manipulation of a complex taxonomic system but rather a matter of social convention that is quite easily understood in terms of the *bamen*, where they

function to answer the question, who am I introducing to whom? Generally speaking, as in English, we introduce the younger or less well established, to the elder or more notable. The less well establish is indicated by the particle *o*, and the more notable by *ni* in Japanese. Therefore, the humble form *go-shōkai suru* makes the latter higher, and should not be used with the former. This would be difficult were we not to understand the function of the humble form from the point of view of its function as a means to raise the referent's status.

These examples viewed from the standpoint of Tokieda's theory suggest strongly it is misleading to memorize the functions of humble forms only as they relate to the abstract concept of humility. The concept of respect and that of humility are not only compatible; they are complementary, and quite easily understood if we view them from the standpoint of the appropriate *bamen*.

5.3. THE USEFULNESS OF TOKIEDA'S THEORY OF *KEIGO*

5.3.1. The Revival of Tokieda's Theory of *Keigo* as a Practical Tool

After Tokieda's study of *keigo*, the vast bulk of research into *keigo* carried out in Japan has been influenced by his insights. As scholarship develops, the classifications being currently made are becoming more detailed and more complex rather than more easily comprehensible. For example, Nishida (1987)²⁴ divides the subject as follows:

(1) Respect language

anata (you), *go-shujin* (husband), *Tanaka-sama* (Mr Tanaka), *irassharu*

- (go/come), *kudasaru* (give), *o-yomi ni naru* (read),
- (2) Humble language A
sashiageru (give), *itadaku* (receive),
- (3) Humble language B
itasu (do), *mairu* (go)
- (4) Polite language
desu, *masu*, *de gozaimasu*, *de arimasu*
- (5) Ornamental language
o-naka (stomach), *go-han* (meal), *o-biiru* (beer), *nakunaru* (die), *itadaku* (eat), *yasumu* (sleep)

And five years later, Tsujimura (1992)²⁵ offers the following divisions:

- (1) Respect language A
Tanaka-sama (Mr Tanaka), *go-jūsho* (address), *irassharu* (go/come), *o-yomi ni naru* (read)
- (2) Respect language B
kudasaru (give), *o-maneki kudasaru* (invite)
- (3) Humble language A
o-maneki suru (invite)
- (4) Humble language B
sashiageru (give), *itadaku* (receive)
- (5) Humble language C
itasu (do), *mairu* (go)
- (6) Ornamental language
o-kashi (snack), *go-han* (meal),
- (7) Respect-courteous language
anata-sama (you), *kisho* (your book),
- (8) Humble-courteous language A
o-maneki itasu (invite)
- (9) Humble-courteous language B
watakushi (I), *gusoku* (my son)

(10) Ornamental-courteous language

oto ga itashimasu (can hear a sound), *hon ga gozaimasu* (there is a book)

(11) Polite language

desu, masu, de gozaimasu

Although other classifications have been attempted by grammarians, such as Watanabe Minoru²⁶, Miyaji Yutaka²⁷, Ōishi Hatsutarō²⁸, Kikuchi Yasuto²⁹, there is as yet no generally accepted classification. Making the classification more detailed is not in itself bad, it is perhaps even inevitable for the development of the study of *keigo*. However, when we turn to the practical field of teaching and learning *keigo*, we cannot help but conclude that this has created certain obstacles for learners. Hagino Sadaki, a scholar of Japanese linguistics, argues in his books of 2001 and 2002³⁰ that those detailed classifications are not necessary for teaching, and that we should instead make better use of Tokieda's theory of *keigo* for the pedagogical purpose. Hagino tries to revive Tokieda's view of *keigo* in this more practical way. In this section, we shall take up the proposals made by Hagino in our examination of the usefulness of Tokieda's theory of *keigo*.

First Hagino observes that the current situation in the teaching and learning of *keigo* in Japan has become confused despite the current levelling trend in society. He points to several factors that have led to confusion for learners. First, he points to the detailed classifications of *keigo* made by scholars who offer varying definitions for the same terms or coin their own terms. As an example, he takes up the words of “*desu*” and “*masu*,” which are both honorific auxiliary verbs of affirmation, and shows how differently they are categorized by scholars. He writes:

There are too many classifications and terms for the group of words

“desu” and “masu.” This has created confusion for learners. For example,

Teineigo (Yoshioka Kyōho)
Keigo teki hanshō (Ishizaka Shōzo)
“masu” is *Kenshō dōshi*, “desu” is *Kenshō sonzaishi*
(Yamada Yoshio)
“masu” is *Kenshō no jodōshi*, “desu” is *Teinei no jodōshi* (Yoshida Kanehiko)
Taisha keigo (Tsujimura Toshiki)
Taiwa keigo (Mitsuya Shigematsu)
Kyōshō (Kindaichi Kyōsuke)
Taisha taigū (Matsushita Daizaburō)
Keiji (Tokieda Motoki)
Teichōgo, Bikago (Ōishi Hatsutarō)
Bikago, Teichōgo, Teineigo (Miyaji Yutaka)

These classifications of “desu” and “masu” only create confusion. What we need to understand is that both words are always used to show directly the speaker’s respect to the hearer. The current term for these words, *teinei-go*, however, does not indicate this fact clearly since *teinei* means polite, and therefore, the term might be understood ambiguously. One of the ways to resolve the problem is to follow Tokieda and regard only these words as *keigo* in order to distinguish them from other groups of *sonkei-go* and *kenjō-go*. These two groups are called *Shi-keigo* by Tokieda.³¹

Next, Hagino criticizes the dictionaries for their often misleading and at times incorrect definitions. He writes:

Nihon Kokugo Daijiten (Japanese dictionary) published in 2000, which is the largest dictionary of Japanese, explains that “*ageru* (give something to the superior)” in the sentence “*Kingyo ni esa o ageru* (I feed the angelfish)” is the *teinei-go* of “*yaru* (give something to the inferior).” This is a phenomenon of the

deterioration of dictionary. Such a use of the term *teinei-go* confuses more and more the concept of *keigo* and makes the use of the term difficult.³²

Thirdly, Hagino expresses doubt over the adequacy of the explanation of *keigo* that have been found both in academic works and in textbooks for students in Japan.

Hagino takes up Kabaya, et.al. (1998) as an example of the former. Hagino says,

Let us look at one of the main factors creating confusion in the work of Kabaya, et al. In their *Keigo Hyōgen* (The *keigo* expressions) in 1998, they fail to indicate the importance of distinguishing the person referred to in speech from the hearer, and even suggest not distinguishing them according to the circumstance. They tell us that in the sentence “*Shachō wa Kyōto e irasshaimasu ka* (Does the president go to Kyoto?)” if the hearer is the president we do not need to take the president as “the person referred to,” and can take him simply as “the hearer” in order to avoid confusion. Needless to say, the person referred to in speech and the hearer are the most fundamental factors for the speaker within the *bamen* of *keigo*. Although there are many circumstances where the person referred to is the hearer, distinguishing clearly the relationship between these concepts is vital for understanding *keigo*.³³

As an example of the latter, Hagino takes up the issue of misleading definitions in the current textbooks. For example, there are the definitions of the three-group classification of *keigo* as follows,³⁴

Respect language; the language that expresses your respect towards the one to whom you talk or the things that are of concern to him or her.

Humble language; the language that expresses your humility toward yourself or the things that concern you, and consequently

indicates your respect towards the one to whom you speak.

Polite language; the language that expresses politeness towards the hearer, or expresses a thought in a polite way regardless of the hearer.

Hagino says that those definitions are also misleading in that they fail to distinguish the person you talk about from a person you talk to. In particular, what “a polite way regardless of the hearer” means is uncertain.³⁵

On the basis of the recognition that there is a lack of effort to connect the study of *keigo* to their practical use, and that there are many problems of *keigo* in the pedagogical field, Hagino emphasizes the fact that what we need to do is to make the three-group classification of *keigo* more useful for the learners and at the same time make it clear that the classification system should be understood on the basis of Tokieda's view of the nature of *keigo*. He says that according to Tokieda the most fundamental categorization of *keigo* is to divide it into two. One is *ji-keigo*, which Tokieda defines as the direct expression of the subject (*shutai*); and the other is *shi-keigo*, which he defines as the expression of the material (*sozai*) in the speech. Hagino also says that the purpose of his books is to make the definitions easier for practical use by demonstrating that *ji-keigo* is only related to the vertical relationship between the speaker and the hearer, and that *shi-keigo* is not so related. In the three-group classification the former includes *teinei-go*, the latter *sonkei-go* and *kenjō-go*.³⁶

As Hagino calls to our attention, two points should be reconfirmed with respect to the nature of polite-honorific language shown by Tokieda and then applied to the three-group classification. One is that respect and humble language (*sonkei-go* and

kenjō-go), and polite language (*teinei-go*) do not function on the same level. The two groups of respect language and humble language have nothing to do with the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. Polite language, on the other hand, is used when the speaker shows his or her respect directly to the hearer. As a consequence of this, his second point is that we must treat the speaker and hearer as material in the speaker's utterances, when they occur within a *bamen* where the respect language or the humble language is required. The examples that Hagino has presented above as problematic show these basic concepts in Tokieda's theory of *keigo* has still its usefulness in the debate. Hagino claims that the way to apply Tokieda's view to pedagogical methodology is to determine whether the most popular three-group classification system has been understood from the point of view of the nature of *keigo*, rather than further increasing the taxonomic refinements as is being done in recent scholarship.

Finally, concerning Hagino's assertion that there is confusion and difficulty in learning the use of *keigo*, it may be useful to introduce here the results of surveys showing Japanese speaker's understanding of *keigo*. Let us look at a survey carried out by NHK (the Japan Broadcasting Corporation) in 1987. The survey asked whether polite-honorific language is needed by Japanese people. Surprisingly, ninety three percent of the respondents in Tokyo and ninety nine percent of the respondents in Osaka, both groups ranging in age from sixteen to twenty nine, answered yes. The survey was conducted sixteen years ago, when many people in Japan had already begun to feel that polite-honorific language might soon disappear, since the younger generation often used language that they considered far from polite. Teachers too were surprised by the large number of people who regarded honorific expressions as

an important part of the language.

Has this view of *keigo* changed significantly since then? Let us look at the following surveys. According to a public opinion poll concerning Japanese language taken by the Agency for Cultural Affairs in 1995, seventy eight percent of the respondents answered that speakers should use honorific expressions differently according to the addressee and the situation rather than use them as simply as possible in all situations, and ninety one percent answered that *keigo* should be used in expressions toward superiors and elders. Further, seventy one percent of the respondents answered that under certain circumstances speakers should use honorific expressions towards younger hearers, too. The survey also revealed that about thirty percent of the respondents wanted to use honorific expressions properly but were afraid that they could not. Among them, more than forty percent were women sixteen to thirty nine. Since this was a survey about how speakers think of their use of *keigo* in daily life, we can conclude that about thirty percent of people, particularly the younger generation, are not confident in their use of honorific expressions and are concerned over their use of honorific expressions.

A more recent survey concerning the spoken language conducted by the NHK Communications Training Institute in 2002 and targeting people in the personnel departments of some two hundred and seventeen companies supports the picture painted by the other surveys. The NHK survey asked respondents what concerns they had about the conversations they held with young people. The most frequent answer, given by sixty four percent of the respondents, was that young people cannot use *keigo* properly. The survey also revealed that eighty four percent of the respondents thought that the most needed training programme for new employees was one that

taught them the proper use of *keigo*. It is interesting to note that the training programme that ranked second was one that taught incoming employees how to express their ideas in an organised manner. Employers, it seems, place a higher priority on their employees being able to work harmoniously with others as members of organisation than on their capacity to think constructively.

Such surveys show that even in the highly commercialized sectors of contemporary Japan there are strong pressures to retain the traditional speech patterns of society. They also help to explain why so many guides to the proper use of honorific expressions, with titles such as *Kirei na Keigo* *Hazukashii Keigo* (Beautiful keigo, shameful keigo), are written and sold every year.³⁷ The demand for learning how to use *keigo* properly is as high as ever, and for this reason the most effective way to understand and teach this still-important aspect of the language is a major concern to teachers both of native speakers of Japanese and of those learning it as a foreign language. As Hagino shows, there is a perceivable need to discuss the issue of how Tokieda's theory can contribute to the more effective teaching and learning of the language.

5.3.2. Discernment or Volition?

The aim of this section is to re-examine the role of Tokieda's theory of *keigo* from the contemporary point of view of pragmatics. We will begin by reconsidering the concept of *bamen* and how it is of use to us in this context.

Bamen, as we have seen, is one of the most important concepts in Tokieda's linguistic thought. It is not a "situation" that can be explained abstractly but is a

concept that includes the speaker's mood, emotion, and attitude towards the scene as well as the location and background of a specific speech act. Let us look at an example given by Tokieda, bearing in mind that here as elsewhere Tokieda shows his characteristic sentimentality.

When we visit a shrine or temple in the early morning, we feel solemn and yet refreshed in mind and body as we breathe in the fresh air. This feeling with other elements, such as the green trees, the pure water of the nearby stream, and simple lines of the shrine building contributes to the construction of our situation. All of these things contribute to the construction of our *bamen*. If we imagine something from time immemorial that means that we are imagining it in such a situation, and at the same time it is the situation that leads us to imagine things in that way. If, however, we write these things and send them to a friend, these things are no longer our situation. They are objective things that we grasp and give expression to in the letter. They are constructions that inform the content of our letter. Now, the friend whom we write to and his or her family turn their attention to our new situation. Thus, our situation changes along with the change in location. As the situational object changes, our expressions must be changed. We express things in a different way than when we write to our parents. The expression changes according to the orbit of the situation. The use of honorific expressions has an effect on such changes in situation.³⁸

Despite the significance of *bamen* as a basic theoretical concept in the study of such honorific expressions as those just discussed, it has not always been used effectively in the more practical areas of linguistics. The passive aspect of the concept tends to be emphasized, even though the original concept was both passive

and active. It is true that our expressions are restricted by the situation, but the reverse is also true. We, as speakers (*gengo shutai*), restrict the situation, too. If the concept of *bamen* includes various functions in our minds towards the objective world, the positive role of the speaker in formulating the situation should be given equally full recognition. This concept can also reconcile the two key concepts of *wakimae* and volition as they are used in recent studies of honorific expressions and their use.

According to Ide, et al. (1999)³⁹, *wakimae* (for which “discernment” may be used as the closest English equivalent) is a mode for the realization of the pragmatic aspect of language, including politeness. With regard to behaviour based on socially expected norms, they say:

In the Japanese society, all speakers are expected to assess and acknowledge their sense of place in relation to both the situational and social context. This acknowledgment of one’s sense of place in relation to the situational context involves the participants’ interpersonal relationship and the formality of the situation. ...

Social convention requires that a speaker manifests an acknowledgment of this sense of place in relation to the situational context and the society through the choice of linguistic expressions. *Wakimae* in Japanese society means a person’s discernment of his or her own place.

This view is also supported by Matsumoto (1988, 1989) and Gu (1990)⁴⁰, when they both take the position that people in the society regard behaviour as being polite if it is congruent with the norm. On the other hand, Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) regard linguistic politeness as a volitional use of expressions. According to their view,

speakers use language intentionally as a strategy to achieve their ends, and in a given context use it politely. Unlike discernment, which is not determined by volition, the volitional use of language allows the speaker to use varying strategies towards his or her hearer.


This view is similar to that of Lakoff (1975)⁴¹ and Leech (1983)⁴². The former treats politeness as a problem of rules and the latter as a problem of language use. Brown and Levinson present three kinds of politeness strategies; positive, negative, and off-the-record. The first is used to establish a positive cooperative relationship with one's hearers, the second is used to show that the speaker has no intention of hindering, pressuring, or coercing his or her hearers, and the last, off-the-record politeness, is a strategy that invites conversational implicature, such as giving hints and associative clues. Although they further divide positive politeness into fifteen categories and negative politeness into ten categories, we will not go into such detail here since our aim is not to examine such taxonomies but to come to a fuller understanding of the basic concepts.

I would suggest that taking the concepts of discernment and volition as a theoretical dichotomy from which a speaker chooses his or her expressions, overlooks one important aspect of the language process. This is the relation between the speaker (*genko shutai*) and the situation (*bamen*). If we confine ourselves either to discernment or volition when considering the nature of honorific expressions, this point is missed. We need both views to understand why and how honorific expressions occur. At times we use honorific expressions because we are required to do so by social convention, but at others we, as speakers (*genko shutai*), choose these

expressions with some intention or purpose. When we say that a speaker chooses his or her expressions (in fact, there are no expressions that are not chosen by the speaker), we cannot deny the existence of the speaker's intention in the act of choosing. In this fundamental way, these two concepts of discernment and volition do not conflict with each other. In fact, it is essential that they should be united into one if we are to understand fully the language process. And this is none other than the concept of *bamen* introduced by Tokieda in the 1930s.


Let us now look more closely at the concept of *bamen*. According to Tokieda, it can be described as shown in Figure II below, where line CD shows things and their settings, which belong to the objective world of subject (*shutai*) A. Line B, on the other hand, shows A's mood, emotion or attitude towards the objective world, that is to say, where CD. B and CD are integrated and united to construct A's *bamen*. Thus, Tokieda tells us that *bamen* does not comprise merely the purely objective world, nor does it have a purely subjective function, but that in a very practical sense it is the world that integrates them.

FIGURE II The concept of *bamen*



This is also shown by the figure below, which Tokieda illustrates the structure of consciousness from a phenomenological point of view.

FIGURE III The structure of consciousness



Whether we employ the first figure or the second, close attention should be paid to the fact that the concept of *bamen* has two aspects, the objective and subjective. In a speech act, the subject is the speaker, and his or her *bamen* is constructed from both the objective situation such as the place and hearers and the subjective functioning of the speaker's feelings, and attitudes. The former, as we have seen, is the passive aspect of *bamen* and the latter the active. Therefore, when we say that expressions are restricted by the *bamen*, we mean that the expressions are restricted by both of the aspects. As Tokieda says:

When a speaker says, *O-atsū gozaimasu ne* (It is hot, isn't it?) to a superior, this shows that the *bamen* has caused the speaker to use such expressions in which honorific terms are used. While, if the speaker says, *Atsui ne* (Isn't it hot!) to a person who looks nervous or tense, this means that the person is being placed before the speaker as an existence having close relation to him or her. Thus, we often experience a change in our *bamen* by a change in our

language.⁴³

When honorific expressions occur in such *bamen*, their usage is volitional or strategic as well as in accord with one's discernment. Therefore, it is exceedingly helpful to employ the concept of *bamen* when we strive to clarify the nature of honorific expressions, either for theoretical or pedagogical purposes.

5.3.3. Where Our Mental Acts are Directed

In this subsection, we will consider more closely the active aspect of *bamen* in honorific expressions. The active aspect of *bamen*, which we shall call *kokoro no mukau tokoro* (where our mental acts are directed), is observed in the speaker's choice of honorific expressions. In many instances, we use honorific expressions when considering the vertical relation between people. However, it is ultimately the speaker's volition that realises it as an utterance. Therefore, honorific expressions can be used to refer to the person who is younger than the speaker, or not used to the speaker's superior. There is a variety of usages. For example, here is a conversation from the novel *Sanshirō* by Natsume Sōseki (1867-1916).⁴⁴

A: *Mā dō ka shimashō . . . Nari bakari ōkikutte baka dakara jitsu ni yowaru. Are de Dangozaka no Kikuningyō ga mitai kara, tsurete ike nante iun da kara.*

Oh, what should I do . . . I was annoyed at her. She appears grown up, but she is silly. She told me that she wanted to see the chrysanthemum figure at Dangozaka, and even asked me to take her there.

B: *Tsurete itte o-age nasareba ī noni, watakushi datte mitai wa.*

You had better take her there. I want to see it, too.

A is Mr Nonomiya and B is a woman friend, Miyako. They are talking, together with others, about Nonomiya's younger sister, Yoshiko. At the beginning of his utterance, he uses one polite termination, *-mashō*. This is directed at the hearers, who are not only Miyako but also Messrs. Hirota, Ogawa, Sasaki, though they do not take part in this segment of the conversation. On the other hand, in the reminder of his speech, he uses no honorific expressions. This is quite natural, since Nonomiya is talking about his sister, Yoshiko.

How about B? Miyako's use of honorific expressions is a little more complicated. The honorific expressions in the phrase *tsurete itte o-age nasareba* consist of *o... nasare* and *...age*. The former is a respect term, which is clearly directed towards Nonomiya. On the other hand, the latter is a humble term and its use places Nonomiya lower than Yoshiko despite his being older than her. He is an actor and taking Yoshiko to see Kikuningyō. According to the general usage based on the relation between Nonomiya and Yoshiko, it would be more appropriate to say something such as *tsurete itte o-yari ni nareba*, where the *yaru* is a term that shows that the actor, who is higher than a receiver in the relation, is doing something for the benefit of the receiver.

We frequently hear similar exchanges where the respect or humble terms are used to inferiors. In offices, it is observed that not a few employees use honorific expressions towards younger associates.⁴⁵ In universities, it is quite natural to overhear a professor using humble terms to his or her assistant, particularly when making requests. These facts tell us that the circumstance in which honorific expressions occur is not only where a speaker talks to his or her superiors, and that

the speaker (*shutai*)'s intention plays an important role when using such expressions. The usage is rather flexible. Furthermore, this is not a recent tendency. We can see similar examples in one of the most popular classics in the Heian period (794-1192), *Genji Monogatari* (The tale of Genji) by Murasaki Shikibu. The sentence below is from the Aoi Chapter.⁴⁶

*Wakagimi mitatematuri tamafeba, koyonau oyosukete utiwarafigatini
ofasurumo afare nari.*

[Genji] saw the prince, who was quickly growing up and smiling, and felt pity for him.

The prince is Yūgiri, one of Genji's children. After Yugiri's mother died, Genji visited him. The baby, who is then about four months old, understands nothing of his mother's death. Seeing his innocent laughing, Genji all the more feels pity for him. Since the subject of the narrator's sentence is Genji and the object of verb *mi(ru)* is Yugiri in this sentence, using *tatematuri* after *mi(ru)* does not seem appropriate, even though it is followed by a respect term *tamau*. The narrator, some 1,000 years ago, is using humble terms in much the same way as they are used today, and they can be interpreted in much the same way, when we make use of Tokieda's theory

Such examples are found in many other chapters. Furthermore, it is not only with Genji, the author also makes Kiritsubo no Mikado (the Emperor and Genji's father) or Fujitsubo (the Empress) lower than Genji in the several scenes, by using the same kind of expressions. Scholars are yet to reach a consensus on why the author expresses herself in such a way. However, one thing is clear from the point of view of appreciation. The literary taste of the tale would be damaged or reduced without such passages. In every scene, the narrator's description of Genji is quite

sensitive to his feelings for those about him, and this is shown by the use of honorific expressions. If Genji were described as a man who never used humble expressions to anyone (and in fact because of his social position, he had few superiors) it would be hard for us to appreciate this dominant characteristic – his consideration for others. The narrator describes in detail, from inside of their minds, the relationship between Genji and those who surround him. It appears that the adverse use of honorific expressions contributes a great deal to their perception of him and consequently to the reader's.

And most importantly from our perspective, this tells us that we would not be able to understand the honorific principle if we were to adhere to the idea that there was a one-to-one relationship between honorific expressions and the vertical relationship between people. We use honorific expressions not in a stereotypical way but more flexibly, sometimes showing our sensitive feeling to others, sometimes using them strategically, which is to say, in ways that can be most effectively interpreted by Tokieda's Language Process Theory – a theory whose concept of *bamen* is able to allow us most effectively to interpret such usage. It is the task of the linguist to come to an ever fuller understanding of how best to describe and teach such speech acts.

CHAPTER 5 NOTES

¹ Concerning the difference of the honorific language between Japanese and other languages, see Tsujimura Toshiki, *Nihongo no keigo no kōzō to tokushoku* (The structure and features of Japanese keigo), *Iwanami Kōza Nihongo* 4, *Keigo*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977, pp.84-88, and J.V. Neustupný, *Sekai no keigo, keigo wa Nihongo dake no mono de wa nai* (*Keigo in the world, keigo is not only the one seen in Japanese*), *Keigo Kōza* 8, *Sekai no Keigo*, edited by Hayashi and Minami, Tokyo: Meiji Shoin, 1974.

² Kokuritsu Kokugo Kenkyūjo, *Keigo Kyōiku no Kihon Mondai, Jō, Ge* (The basic problems in the teaching of *keigo*, Vol.1 and 2), Ōkurashō, 1990, pp.92-97, and 1992, pp.19-23.

³ Hagino Sadaki, *Minasan Korega Keigo desuyo* (This is *keigo*), Tokyo: Riyonsha, 2001, p.255.

⁴ Kikuchi Yasuto, *Keigo to sono omona kenkyū tēma no gaikan* (The overview of *keigo* and the major subjects of the study), *Asakura Nihongo Kōza* 8, *Keigo*, edited by Kikuchi Yasuto, Tokyo: Asakura Shoten, 2003, pp.1-30.

⁵ Nishida Naotoshi, *Keigo*, Tokyo: Tokyodō Shuppan, 1987, p.224. There is the Japanese translation of Rodriguez's work by Doi Tadao, Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1955.

⁶ Concerning the history of the study of *keigo* in Japanese language including *The Handbook of Colloquial Japanese* by Basil Hall Chamberlain in 1888, which is the first English work to use the term "honorific" systematically, see Bruno Lewin, *The understanding of Japanese honorifics: A historical approach*, Papers of the CIC Far eastern Language Institute, edited by J.K. Yamagiwa, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967, pp.107-125, and also Ōishi Hatsutarō, *Gendai Keigo Kenkyū* (The study of the modern *keigo*), Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1983.

⁷ Nishida, 1987, p.355.

⁸ Ibid., p.355.

⁹ Nishida says that Yoshioka's three-group classification of *keigo* seems to be the origin of the current three-group classification, *sonkeigo*, *kenjōgo*, and *teineigo*. Nishida, 1987, p.356.

¹⁰ Yamada's view of the relationship between *keigo* and person was influenced by Basil Hall Chamberlain's *The Handbook of Colloquial Japanese*.

¹¹ Hayashi Shirō, *Keigo no taikei* (The system of *keigo*), *Keigo Koza* 1, *Keigo no Taikei*, Tokyo: Meiji Shoin, 1973.

¹² Minami Fujio, *Keigo*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1987, pp. 10-16.

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- ¹³ P. Brown and S. Levinson, Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena, N. Goody ed. *Question and Politeness: strategies in social interaction*, Cambridge University Press, 1978. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- ¹⁴ Ide Sachiko, Ogino Tsunao, Kawasaki Akiko, Ikuta Shōko, *Nihonjin to Amerikajin no Keigo Kodo, Daigakusei no Baai* (Acts of politeness in Japanese and American people), Tokyo: Nanundo, 1986.
- ¹⁵ Ikuta Shōko, Politeness no riron (The theory of politeness), *Gengo*, Vol.26 No.6, 66-71, 1977.
- ¹⁶ Usami Mayumi, Politeness riron no tenkai (The development of the theory of politeness), *Gengo*, Vol.31 No.1-13, 2002.
- ¹⁷ Matsumoto Yoshiko, Re-examinations of the universality of face, *Journal of Pragmatics*, Vol.12:4, 403-426, 1988, and Politeness and conversational universals, Observations from Japanese, *Linguistic Politeness II, Multilingua*, Vol.8:2-3, 207-221, 1989.
- ¹⁸ Ide Sachiko, Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of universals of linguistics politeness, *Multilingua*, Vol.8:2-3, 223-248, 1989.
- ¹⁹ *Kokugo to Kokubungaku* (Japanese language and Japanese literature), May 1938.
- ²⁰ *Kokugo to Kokubungaku* (Japanese language and Japanese literature), June 1938.
- ²¹ *Gobun Ronsō* (A collection of articles on language and literature), Keijo Daigaku Bungakukai (The Keijo University Society of Literature), February 1939.
- ²² Tokieda, *Kokugogaku Genron*, pp.436-437, 1941.
- ²³ Tokieda, "Mōshitamō" ni tsuite no kō, *Kokugo to Kokubungaku*, Vol.30 No.12, December, 1953.
- ²⁴ Nishida Naotoshi, *Keigo* (Honorific language), Tokyodō Shuppan, 1987.
- ²⁵ Tsujimura Toshiki, *Keigoronkō* (On honorific language), Meiji Shoin, 1992.
- ²⁶ *Kokugo Kōbunron* (On Japanese syntax), Hanawa Shobō, 1971.
- ²⁷ *Bunron* (On Japanese sentences), Meiji Shoin, 1971.
- ²⁸ Taigūgo no taikei (The system of the polite language), *Gendaikeigo Kenkyū* (A study on the modern honorific language), Chikuma Shobō, 1983.
- ²⁹ *Keigo* (Honorific language), Kadokawa Shoten, 1994.
- ³⁰ Hagino Sadaki, *Minasan Korega Keigo desuyo* (This is keigo), Tokyo: Riyonsha, 2001 and Hagino, *Keigo no Iroha Oshiemasu* (ABC of keigo), Tokyo: Riyonsha, 2002.
- ³¹ Hagino, 2001, pp.195-197.

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- ³² Ibid., pp.105-106.
- ³³ Hagino, 2002, pp.241-243.
- ³⁴ Noji. et al. *Minna to Manabu Shōgaku Kokugo Rokunen Jō* (Japanese language for learning with everyone, the sixth grade), Gakkō Tosho, 2003, pp. 108-109.
- ³⁵ Hagino, 2002, pp.228-239.
- ³⁶ Hagino, 2001, p.113 and p.255.
- ³⁷ By Kusayanagi Daizō, Tokyo: Grafusha, 2001.
- ³⁸ Tokieda, *Kokugogaku Genron* (The principles of Japanese language study), Iwanami Shoten, 1941, pp.435-436.
- ³⁹ Ide Sachiko and Yoshida Megumi. Sociolinguistics: Honorifics and gender differences, *The Handbook of Japanese Linguistics*, Blackwell, pp.444-480. This view has already been shown in Ide's paper, Formal forms and discernment: Two neglected aspects of universals of linguistics politeness, *Multilingua*, 8:2-3, 1989, pp.223-248.
- ⁴⁰ Politeness in modern Chinese, *Journal of Pragmatics*, 14, 1990.
- ⁴¹ *Language and Woman's Place*, Harper Row, 1975.
- ⁴² *Principles of Pragmatics*, Longman, 1983.
- ⁴³ Tokieda, 1941, p.488.
- ⁴⁴ *Sōseki Zenshū* 5 (Complete Works of Sōseki Vol.5), p.107, Iwanami Shoten, 1929.
- ⁴⁵ Some research shows that more than seventy percents of the people think that they had better use sometimes honorific expressions towards those younger as well as towards those older than or superior to themselves. See the public opinion poll by Agency of Japanese Language Affairs, 1995.
- ⁴⁶ Abe Akio, et al.(annot), *Genji Monogatari* (The tale of Genji), pp.70-71, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Zenshū* 13, Shōgakukan, 1972.

CHAPTER 6 THE PROCESS THEORY AND READING

6.1. THE CONTROVERSY OVER READING IN THE TEACHING OF LANGUAGE

The controversy that we will discuss here is over the proper understanding of the relationship between language and literature within the context of language learning. Let us begin by looking closely at the dialogue that was carried on discontinuously in Tokyo through the 1940s, 50s, and 60s between Tokieda and other Japanese scholars of linguistics and literature who joined in a controversy whose consequences were not at the time assessed as positive contributions either to the field of linguistics or literature. The purpose of this chapter is to review this debate and consider the role of reading as an act within the frame of Tokieda's Language Process Theory. The topic, however, has only been treated piecemeal by Tokieda, and therefore, we should begin our discussion by organizing the related issues. As the first step, in this section, we will return to the controversy and view it within the context of the intervening scholarship.

6.1.1. An Outline of the Controversy

First, it should be noted that the theme was never fully discussed even though it was a fundamental issue for teachers of both language and literature. One of the main reasons for this was that Tokieda began the controversy late in life and was unable to argue his position as successfully as he might have at an earlier date. Secondly, after

his death, no serious attempt was made to consider the full implications of the issues involved, particularly in relation to Tokieda's Language Process Theory. A continuation of the argument might have led to a further development of the Language Process Theory as well as a better understanding of the relationship between reading and the teaching and learning of language and literature.

It is not the aim of this section to describe in detail the progress of the controversy or its outcome. This would in fact be quite difficult since only a few papers by Tokieda have been found that refer to the issue. There is however sufficient evidence to suggest that had he been able to organize his thoughts within the framework of the Process Theory, they would have served as a firm foundation for an integration of language and literature teaching. It is for this reason that we shall attempt such an integration here. Let us begin by outlining the main points of the argument and then assess the potential of Tokieda's theory to contribute to a more effective language pedagogy through the integration of language and literature.

The starting point of this controversy was Tokieda's speech entitled *Bungaku ni okeru Gengo no Shomondai* (The Problems of Language in Literature) given at Tokyo University in 1947.¹ In this speech, he questioned the accepted theory that language is merely the medium of literature, and argued that there exists a continuous interrelationship between language and literature, that there is no essential distinction between the function of the two.

After Tokieda made this point in 1947, the argument unfolded as follows:

1951 Tokieda publishes the paper "Bungaku kenkyū ni okeru gengogakuha no tachiba to sono hōhō (The position and method of linguistics in the study of literature)."² In this paper, he makes it clear that the Language Process

Theory, in which language is regarded as an act of expressing and understanding, leads us to conclusion that there is no line that can be drawn between these two aspects of language.

- 1952 Tokieda discusses with Nishio Minoru on “Language Education and Literature Education.”

Tokieda: Literature is in every respect a form of language.

Nishio: It is true. But at the same time we should also recognize that it is different from the philosophically complete form or the scientifically complete form, and that literature has its own peculiarities which make literature literature.³

- 1959 Yoshida Seiichi publishes the paper “Gengo to bungaku – Gengo Kateisetsu to bungaku (Language and literature – the Language Process Theory and literature).”⁴ Here, Yoshida claims that we should distinguish art from non-art, although he admits that language and literature are connected continuously in terms of the function, and therefore, literature is nothing less than language.

- 1960 A symposium on “Language and Literature” is held at the meeting of the Tokyo University Japanese Language and Literature Society.
Discussants: Yoshida Seiichi, Terada Tōru, and Tokieda.

- 1963 Tokieda publishes “Dokusha no tachiba to kanshōsha no tachiba (The situation of readers and the situation of those who appreciate).”⁵ In this paper, he argues that the reception of literature is not in the appreciation but in the reading of it as a reader. He also proposes a way to consider literature from a linguistically functional point of view and thereby to

understand better the interactive relation between the author and the reader.

Nishio publishes “Gengo to bungaku ni tsuite no ron (An essay on language and literature).”⁶ Nishio here argues against Tokieda on the basis of his own view of literature, according to which literature has its own special quality, even though it shares many functions with language. Therefore, despite of the difficulty in making a clear division between literature and language, we can distinguish a literary work from among other linguistic forms.

1964 Katō Shūichi publishes “‘Gengo to bungaku ni tsuite no ron’ ni tsuite no ron (An essay on ‘An essay on language and literature’).”⁷ Katō defines literature as a distinct expression of language in virtue of its symbolic nature and examines what makes it possible to recognize a literary work as literature.

1965 Okazaki Yoshie publishes “Bungei no kanshō to gengo no dokkai (The appreciation of literature and the reading of language).”⁸ Okazaki argues against Tokieda from the point of view of one who studies “literature as art (*bungeigaku*).” According to Okazaki, the function of appreciation is fundamental to the reading of a literary work, and the idea that literature shares many functions with language might lead us to include it within the field of linguistics, but to do so is to deny the independence of *bungeigaku* as the study of beauty.

6.1.2. The Inconclusiveness of the Arguments

As we have just seen, the arguments on either side have not yet been fully or successfully developed. To determine the cause of this inconclusiveness, let us consider the matter by examining the three papers by Nishio, Katō, and Okazaki, all of which were written sometime after Tokieda's introduction of the issue.

Nishio, who was Tokieda's colleague at the Second Municipal High School in Tokyo at the beginning of their careers, agreed that language and literature had continuity, but on the other hand, he insisted that the artistic function, which was unique to literature, should be divided from the general functions examined by linguistics. This view was closely related to his belief that we must pay individual attention to the significance of Japanese literature education in Japanese language education. According to Nishio, the appreciation of literary works is the starting point of education, even before one begins to study literature as a subject. This opinion seems to be close to that of Tokieda. Nishio, however, basically opposed Tokieda's view of the continuity between language and literature, and therefore, proposed to deal with the role of literature education separately from language education.⁹

Other scholars who joined the argument pointed out the confusion caused by using too loosely the conceptual terms. Katō tried to clarify the concept of literature. He raises three questions in his effort to isolate literature from other forms of language. First, what is the experience that is expressed by literature? Secondly, to whom does literature appeal? And finally, what is the linguistic function of a literary expression? With regard to the second and the third issues, although he admits that

the second is useful in considering the history of literature, he rejects its relevance in distinguishing literary expressions from other linguistic expressions. The third also makes the distinction between poetry and prose. As a result, Katō regards the first point as the most fundamental when we attempt to define literature. He says:

We must return to the first point to distinguish literary expressions from other linguistic expressions and to characterize the former. What becomes clear through the examination of the first point is that literature expresses experience not in its abstract universality but in its concrete peculiarity, and that this expression includes inevitably the author's attitude to the whole of life and takes this as its premise. Expressions in language that have these two characteristics as indispensable factors are literature.¹⁰

These views were read as a paper entitled "Buntai ni tsuite (On style)"¹¹ and published sometime later under the title "Bungaku no yōgo (In support of literature)" in 1976.¹² Katō insists on the necessity of defending literature against the influence of technological progress, and for this reason he defines literature according to his interpretation of extensive literary works. It would, therefore, be better to consider Katō's argument, which includes the definition of literature, in the context of his purpose in those three papers, rather than to incorporate it into the argument between Nishio and Tokieda.

As Katō admitted, he had only read Nishio's "Gengo to bungaku ni tsuite no ron (An essay on language and literature)" and not Tokieda's argument when he wrote "'Gengo to bungaku ni tsuite no ron' ni tsuite no ron" (An essay on 'An essay on language and literature')." And this may well have caused him to present his arguments on the same theme but on a different plane. It is quite obvious that the

third point, the functional difference between literary expressions and other linguistic expressions, would have been discussed more properly if he had better understood Tokieda's linguistic views. Certainly, Katō discusses the point in his paper, but it is only on the basis of the symbolic and non-symbolic functions of language. Although this division may be useful in distinguishing prose from poetry, it does not function effectively in distinguishing literary prose and non-literary prose. Both literary and non-literary prose may have poetic elements in them. The problem is that the function of language as defined by Katō simplifies the issue without examining the other functions of language, particularly the relationship between the writer and the reader. This was the issue that Tokieda focused on. Unfortunately, it was too late for Tokieda to clarify the point, for he had died before Katō presented his views. On the basis of the Process Theory, however, it can be argued that the division between language and literature made by Katō does not necessarily lead to a better understanding of the language process.

The last paper that we will take up is “Bungei no kanshō to gengo no dokkai (The appreciation of literary arts and the reading of language)” by Okazaki, a scholar who devoted himself to the establishment of *Nihon bungeigaku* (The study of Japanese literary arts) as a science in the 1930s.¹³ In this paper, he maintains the distinctness of the study of Japanese literature and art, whose object is the study of aesthetic values. He says:

Literature and art have an inner beauty. For example, the beauty of *mono no aware* (pathos) in *The Tale of Genji*, which is regarded as the very essence of the tale, cannot be explained as the linguistic phenomena and exists far beyond language as the question of judgement with respect to beauty. *Mono no aware* can also be

expressed where there is no language, in the form of sighs or tears.

Entering into the question of the beautiful is not our aim here. However, we can see the same problem as we saw in the definition of literature by Katō. Here, too, the argument for the unique beautiful of a literary work has been made on a different level with a different purpose than on the level that Tokieda was addressing the subject. It can be argued that Okazaki paid too close attention to the significance of the function of appreciation, and on that basis, criticized Tokieda for including the study of literature and art within the study of language.

Here again, issues such as the function of literary works in the relationship between the author and the reader, or the process of reading, are left undiscussed. It can be argued from Tokieda's position that a delightful dinner conversation can be aesthetically pleasing and appreciated for the same reasons that one appreciates a good short story. But again, it was never Tokieda's aim to diminish that value of literature. His goal was to understand more fully how it is that words on a page can become an effective means of communication.

6.1.3. A Process Theory Based Proposal

Through the examination of the three papers by Nishio, Katō, and Okazaki, we can conclude that the controversy over the understanding of the relationship between language and literature was not developed on a common ground or with a comparable purpose. We can also say that this was a major factor in preventing the dialogue from being developed successfully. This further shows that at the time there

was a great distance between the way the study of “language” and study of “literature” were approached, although the fact that the discussion was held suggests that efforts were being made to understand better the relationship between the two fields.

There are signs today that the gap is narrowing, as seen in Ashida (1997), where this leading scholar of Chinese literature in Japan has contributed quite effectively to constructing a bridge between the study of literature and linguistics mainly by focusing attention on stylistics.¹⁴ With Tokieda, he argues that the most elegant work of literary art is constructed by words brought together within a context.

Let us look, now, more closely at the argument from the point of Tokieda’s Language Process Theory. There are two things that were not introduced into the argument. One was to consider the Language Process Theory as what we might call a “reading act theory,” a theory that analyses the experience of the reader as he or she experiences the reading of a literary work. And further to consider the possibility of establishing a foundation upon which to unite the study of language and literature. With respect to the first, there appears to have been a failure in communication because the scholars opposing Tokieda were arguing in defence of a position that viewed literature as a unique aspect of culture, while they took Tokieda’s Language Process Theory as a method that was only able to deal with language as an object of scientific analysis. They did not understand that Tokieda saw language as an overarching aspect of culture. The arguments of Tokieda’s opponents were focused mainly on the distinction between language and literature and failed to take into account the broad range of functions in which they overlap.

And so it is that the next step for us is to take up these two issues in greater

detail in the following sections.

6.2. SPEECH ACTS AND READING ACTS

6.2.1. Language, Literature, and the Theories of Austin and Searle

Before examining Tokieda's Language Process Theory as a means by which language and literature might be integrated within language education, we may consider the scholarship in the field and how it can be brought to bear on our pedagogical concerns. To do this, let us first turn to the linguistic theory of J. L. Austin and look at his basic thoughts concerning "the use of language," thoughts that are now well known in pragmatics. We will in the next few sub-sections discuss matters that will be in a sense theoretical. It should be noted, however, that in a broader sense the discussion will be an application of Tokieda's process theory on the practical concerns of language teaching. With that understood, let us return to the scholarship that deals with language within a wider context than its vocabulary and grammatical structure.

According to Austin, there are three kinds of speech acts; the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary. He says of them:

We first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which together we summed up by saying we perform a *locutionary act*, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense. Second, we said that we also

perform *illocutionary acts* such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, etc, i.e. utterances which have a certain (conversational) force. Thirdly, we may also perform *perlocutionary acts*: what we bring about or achieve *by* saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising, or misleading. Here, we have three, if not more, different senses or dimensions of the 'use of a sentence' or of 'the use of language' (and, of course, there are others also).¹⁵

With that theoretical point established, let us consider within a practical context the idea of illocutionary acts as they are defined above. Austin explains elsewhere that it is the function of an illocutionary act that is different in meaning from the locutionary act, or from the effects that are achieved by the perlocutionary act. We can understand this as a force that acts through the speaker by means of many complicated elements, such as the lexical meaning of language, the objects of reference, the context, and the intentions of the speaker, all of which are to a greater or lesser degree transmitted to the hearer. The force is conveyed with the language that has been uttered by the speaker. It is, to be sure, impossible to measure such forces as a physicist might. By the use of language the speaker is entrusting this force to the language when he or she says something, which is to say does something in the form of a speech act. Moreover, it is because of this force that the language of the speaker affects the hearer.

The question here is whether or not we can apply the idea of illocutionary force to the function of reading a literary text. I believe that the possibility can be demonstrated. The language of a literary work, too, has a certain force and affects the reader in much the same way as language in its everyday context. If we consider the utterance of words, writing, hearing, and reading all as ways to experience language,

and that the language has an “illocutionary force” that is conveyed from the speaker (writer) to the hearer (reader), we can say that we receive this force from the author through our reading. Reading or hearing literary works (as not all literature is written) is an act of doing something with language, and is therefore generates a certain experience of language. The experience of literature is subject to the same force as is the experience of language in non-literary, everyday life. Which is to say that we experience the language of a work of literature not just within the context – the *bamen* – of the story, but within our own *bamen*.

Despite the possibility of including reading in his consideration of speech acts, Austin has not done so. He says rather:

I mean, for example, the following: a performative utterance will, for example, be *in a peculiar way* hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance—a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways—intelligibly—used not seriously, but in ways *parasitic* upon its normal use—ways which fall under the doctrine of the *etiolations* of language. All this we are *excluding* from consideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances.¹⁶

Thus, Austin excludes the language of literature from performative utterances because he considers fictitiousness to be an essential feature of literature, which has been the dominant view throughout the history of literary studies and supported by all but a handful of philosophers. Therefore, according to Austin, the language of literature does not perform an illocutionary act, and consequently, has no perlocutionary effect.

Now let us see how J. R. Searle has modified Austin's view of literature. Needless to say, he has contributed significantly to the development of Austin's speech act theory. By comparing a news item from the *New York Times* with one from the novel, *The Red and the Green*, by Iris Murdoch, Searle establishes four rules for illocutionary acts.

1. The essential rule: the maker of an assertion commits himself to the truth of the expressed proposition.
2. Preparatory rule-1: the speaker must be in a position to provide evidence or reasons for the truth of the expressed proposition.
3. Preparatory rule-2: the expressed proposition must not be obviously true to both the speaker and the hearer in the context of the utterance.
4. The sincerity rule: the speaker commits himself to a belief in the truth of the expressed proposition.¹⁷

Searle calls these rules vertical rules, and suggests that they correlate words to the world, and that what makes fiction possible is a set of extra-linguistic, non-semantic conventions that break the rule-established connection between words and the world. Furthermore, these conventions of fictional discourse are regarded as a set of horizontal conventions that break the connections established by the vertical rules. He says:

The pretended illocutions which constitute a work of fiction are made possible by the existence of a set of conventions which suspend the normal operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts and the world.¹⁸

The problem here is the precise meaning of such terms as "vertical" and "horizontal." It seems that in using them, Searle is asking us to consider literature as

having its existence only in space. However, when we consider literature and regard it as one of the experiences of language, it is also necessary to include the dimension of time. Reading is an experience of language that is made by us in the process of reading. And it is impossible to consider an experience fully only within the dimension of space.

Next, we must examine what Searle means by “break.” His claim is that the connections between language and reality are maintained by vertical rules, but these connections can be broken by horizontal conventions, conventions that suspend the normal requirements established by the rules and make the pretended illocutions of fiction possible. In establishing this dichotomy, Searle appears to be regarding literature as something that exists apart from reality. It is true, as he says, that we cannot find the exact same events or characters in history as those that we find in a literary work, even when an author is writing fiction against the background of history. In this sense, literature has an existence independent of history. However, when we read a literary work, we understand it by bringing our reality, our knowledge of experience, into the process of understanding. What makes this possible is that literary works exist in our culture, not in some place where all connections with the real world have been broken off. It is not because literature suspends the operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts to the world that the pretended illocutions become possible. There are, to be sure, works of fiction that distance themselves greatly from reality. The Harry Potter books come quickly to mind. But just as one must distinguish truth from falsehood in one’s mundane experience, one must differentiate the credible from the incredible in literature. The experiences we encounter in our day-to-day lives and those acquired through

literature, while distinguishable with reasonable success on the abstract level, are not separable aspects of our *bamen*. And for this reason it can be argued that the words we experience in a literary work also perform certain illocutionary acts, even though they might be different from the ordinary illocutionary acts in non-fiction.

Both Austin and Searle exclude the experience of reading literary works from ordinary linguistic experiences. Both of their theories deny illocutionary force to the words in a literary work, words that convey the author's intentions and function positively to influence the reader. Needless to say they have done this for good reasons. They are attempting to construct a philosophical system that will distinguish truth from falsehood. Tokieda takes the position that mundane truth is also always relative, both in news reports and parables, and that what is true is not able to be stated by means of human language. Tokieda strove rather to consider carefully all aspects of language in an effort to understand the nature of our *bamen*.

6.2.2. Reader Response and Stanley Fish

The view of literature held by Austin and Searle and considered in the previous section, is similar to that presented by Richard Ohmann (1971).¹⁹ Ohmann also rejects the notion that there is illocutionary force to literary works. But at the same time, he does admit that a perlocutionary effect could be experienced by the reader, since the reader holds the illocutionary force within him or her. This is not to suggest that literary works are in general more or less influential with respect to the reader, but that a reader receive a sentence from a text into his or her *bamen* as well as within the context of the text, even though it is known to be fiction. Even while

understanding it as a fiction, the reader does, at the same time, interpret it as if it existed in his or her *bamen*, and therefore the perlocutionary effect is experienced by him or her. In this sense, the role of the reader in the process of reading is no more or less complex and interactive than many events that “in reality” come to bear on our lives. If one is striving to construct a philosophical system by which the truth value of statements can be verified, the validity of the source of the reported information is essential. But if one’s purpose is to understand one’s lived experience, it is hard to imagine the value of discarding that which is derived from literature as experience unworthy of serious consideration because one has suspended one’s disbelief.

Without going back to Aristotle, we can easily find the role of the reader understood as that of an actor or actress. We read works not only as an onlooker, a scholar, or a critic; but also as a participant. The view of literature presented by Ohmann does not allow us to consider the role of the reader as interactive or experiential. There exist for him only scholars and critics who refuse to read in a way that allows for the intrusion of the emotional or the subjective aspect of the experience.

Although it might distract us briefly from the present task of finding a place for literature in the language classroom, let us examine one other view of literature, that of Stanley E. Fish, who stands diametrically opposed to those of Austin, Searle, and Ohmann. Fish (1980) regards reading as an event, no part of which is to be discarded. He says:

If at this moment someone were to ask, “What are you doing?” you might reply, “I am reading,” and thereby acknowledge the fact that reading is an activity, something *you do*. No one would argue that the

act of reading can take place in the absence of someone who reads—how can you tell the dance from the dancer? —but curiously enough when it comes time to make analytical statements about the end product of reading (meaning or understanding), the reader is usually forgotten or ignored.²⁰

The method that he suggests is to read a text asking the questions: what does this word do, this phrase, sentence, paragraph, chapter, novel, play, or poem? According to Fish, what the sentence does (not what it means) is give the reader something and then take it away, drawing him on with the unredeemable promise of its return. And so, an observation about the sentence as an utterance has been transformed into an account of the process by which it is experienced. It is no longer an object, a thing-in-itself, but an event, something that happens to the reader. He tells us that he found this useful with his students,

After a while they begin to see the value of considering effects and begin to be able to think of language as an experience rather than as a repository of extractable meaning. After that, it is a matter of exercising their sensitivities on a series of graduated texts—sentences of various kinds, paragraphs, an essay, a poem, a novel—somewhat in the order represented by the first section of this paper. And as they experience more and more varieties of effect and subject them to analysis, they also learn how to recognize and discount what is idiosyncratic in their own responses.²¹

Fish's goal is not obscure, but it has many implications that lead us to re-examine our own attitudes towards texts. Clearly, he rejects the notion that we cannot admit the same force in the language of literature as in the language of our daily lives just because literature is fiction. He suggests that reading a text is also a linguistic act,

and that we should make our experience of the words of a literary work the basis of our study of literature.

His argument also reminds us of two essential factors of linguistic experience. One is its being limited by time, and the other is its ephemeral nature. Linguistic experiences are experienced in the process of reading a text, they occur in time, and therefore, are restricted by it. They leave us once they have occurred, and we cannot alter this ephemerality. What is needed here is the reader's capacity to retain in his or her consciousness the words of the text until their illocutionary force is fully and firmly internalized. The question, what remains? points a way to the answer.

6.2.3. Tokieda and the Function of Reading

Fish directs our attention to the experiential and bodily features of an act, the act of reading, in the study of literature. It is Tokieda, in his speech in 1947, who a few years before Fish raised similar questions in articulating his linguistic theory. The content of the speech, which was delivered at Tokyo University and gave rise to the argument over language and literature, was further developed and included later in his work of 1955²². Within this context, our present purpose is to discuss Tokieda's views on the relationship between language and literature. Let us begin by briefly discussing Ishii Shoji (1934). Why it is useful to begin here will be seen as we proceed.

Ishii tells us of his journey to Hiraizumi.²³ He does so in an essay that reports upon his retracing a portion of the travels of the haiku poet Matsuo Bashō (1644-1694). In 1689, Bashō, accompanied by his friend Kawai Sora, made a one

hundred and forty day journey. His accounts of the events are found in *Oku no Hosomichi* (Narrow road to the interior) published in 1702, together with the haiku that it inspired. His journey started from Edo (the old name for Tokyo), took him to the Japan Sea on the northwest coast of Honshu, and ended in Mino (Gifu) in central Japan, covering in all more than 1900 kilometers. When Bashō visited Hiraizumi, he wrote the following:

*Sandai no eiyō issui no uchi ni shite, daimon no ato wa ichiri konata ni ari. Hidehira ga ato wa, denya ni narite Kinkeizan nomi katachi o nokosu. Mazu Takadachi ni noboreba Kitakamigawa nanbu yori nagaruru taiga nari.*²⁴

(The glory of three generations passed in a dream, the ruins of the main gate were one *ri* [a unit of distance equal to about two and a half miles] on this side. There are rice paddies and fields at the site of Hidehira's manor now, and only Mount Kinkei remains. First, when we climbed up to the Takadachi, the Kitakami was a large stream flowing from the Nanbu region.)

This passage describes the scene he viewed as he looked down at the River Kitakami from Takadachi. Grammatically, it would seem better to modify it, or divide it into two sentences. For example, it could be recast as a single sentence:

Mazu Takadachi ni noboreba nanbu yori nagaruru taiga Kitakamigawa miyu.
(First, when climbing to Takadachi, we saw the large river, Kitakami flowing from the Nanbu region.)

or, as two:

- a. *Mazu Takadachi ni noboreba Kitakamigawa miyu.*
(First, when climbing to Takadachi, we saw the Kitakami.)
- b. *Sowa nanbu yori nagaruru taiga nari.*
(It was a large river that flowed from Nanbu region.)

Usually, the last sentence is interpreted as the combination of these two sentences. In an effort to more fully appreciate this passage Ishii made his journey to Hiraizumi in the end of August 1924. Upon arriving, he too climbed along the narrow road towards Takadachi. What he saw was the very scene that Bashō saw. He writes:

And what came out of my mouth then was the sentence, *Mazu Takadachi ni noboreba Kitakamigawa nanbu yori nagaruru taiga nari*. I really wanted to shout, "It is true!" At this time, I had the idea that I was able to "read" the expression as a whole, which I had felt unnatural in the passage for a long time. It should not be interpreted in such a way that the sentence is lacking a word such as "*miyu* (see)," therefore, is to be read without this supplement.

It was only through this experience that Ishii was able to answer his question regarding an expression that he had had in his mind when reading Bashō and without a similar experience could not have resolved.

Let us examine again Ishii's actions. This time from the point of view of a linguistic experience and with the aid of Tokieda's theory. First, he doubted the expression he had found in Bashō's journal in terms of its usefulness, and so planned to make a journey to Hiraizumi. Next, he went there and saw for himself the Kitakami flowing. Then, he felt surprise when Bashō's sentence came out of his mouth. This must have been wonderful moment for him. It is clear that he had determined to hold the original sentence without any change as an attitude in reading, but at the same time, more interestingly for us, he also shifted the understanding to the creation of the text. We can say that he came to realize that the world of reading was intimately connected to the act of writing, the act by which the author created the text. In other words, this was a linguistic experience for him. What caused him to

act in such a way was, I believe, the illocutionary force in the writing of Bashō, and what made the force work effective was, as Fish suggests, his reading of the text as an act. As a result, what took place might quite correctly be considered an event that happened to the reader. And it was Tokieda, as a linguist, who tried to clarify this process.

Tokieda argues that we can find a similar function in the words of literature as those in the words of our daily lives. First, he assures us that his view of literature is based on the Language Process Theory, and then he says:

According to the Language Process Theory, which regards language as a process of expression, as a process of understanding itself, literature is essentially language. Literature exists as the expression of language, and as the understanding of language. It is impossible to say that from a linguistic point of view the function of language is to be considered outside the existence of the individual.²⁵

The functions of language, according to him, unify the practical, the social, and the appreciative. The practical function is the most essential one for our life as it is a method to express our thoughts. The social function is the use of language in the relationship between people such as greetings and the sharing of experiences and ideas. The appreciative function indicates that language is not used merely for its practical and social purposes but also has an aspect that is appreciated from the point of view of the beauty or ugliness of the expression.²⁶ He explains the most essential function with the sentence:

- (1) *Mizu o ippai kudasai.*
 water-acc glass of give-polite
 Please give me a glass of water.

He tells us that this utterance would be meaningless, if the hearer, after understanding the expression did nothing. The speaker expects the hearer to act. In other words, the speaker selects the expression in order to realize his or her expectation. He or she might change the approach according to the circumstance. For example, when the hearer appears perhaps too busy to help the speaker,

- (2) *Mizu o ippai itadake masen deshō ka.*
 Water-acc glass of receive not-polite may be particle
 Would you mind giving me a glass of water?

The speaker can use either sentence, but either way, the act of expression is not complete at the stage where the hearer merely understands the speaker's wish. An act of expression is made in such a way that the hearer is expected to do something as a consequence of understanding, and his or her action is restricted. Even when the hearer does nothing after understanding, this too is to be regarded as an act. Here, Tokieda finds a functional relationship between a speech act and another act, an act caused as a consequence of the speech act.

Thus Tokieda in the early part of the fifties directed our attention to the relationship between a speech act and another act, one which from the point of view of the function of utterance is caused by the speech act. It is possible to interpret the function by means of two approaches that have been widely utilized in the study of human communication. One is the meaning of the utterance proposed by Paul Grice in 1957 and the other is the approach of relevance presented by D. Sperber and D. Wilson in 1986. First, Grice (1957) on the basis of the distinction between "what the speaker said" and "what the speaker implicated" analyses what it is for an individual *S* to mean something by an utterance *x* as follows:

“[S] meant something by *x*” is (roughly) equivalence to “[S] intended the utterance of *x* to produce some effect in audience by means of the recognition of this intention”.²⁷

This definition is basically in accord with Tokieda's view. They both focus on the relationship between the speaker's intention and the hearer's response. Tokieda indicates that the speaker expects the hearer to act not merely understand the meaning. For Grice, the speaker expects the hearer to respond to his or her intention. From the position of the hearer, Grice observes that the hearer's response is affected by his or her recognition of the speaker's intention, while Tokieda regards the act of the hearer to be restricted by the act of the speaker. However, since Tokieda regards an utterance as an act of expression, he discusses the issue of the speaker's changing the style of expression by relating it to the speaker's intention. As seen above, the second utterance *Mizu o ippai itadake masen deshō ka*, which is more polite than the first, is the selection by which the speaker realizes his or her expectation.

D. Sperber and D. Wilson (1986) have proposed the theory of Relevance, which suggests that the theory of the meaning of the utterance by Grice cannot succeed unless the audience pays attention to the ostensive stimulus, and that it is manifest that a communicator who produces such a stimulus must intend to seem relevant to her audience.²⁹ They define the behaviour that makes manifest an intention to make something manifest with the term “ostensive behaviour” or simply “ostension.”³⁰ Accordingly, the speaker must choose the most relevant stimuli to the hearer in the utterance.

If we apply the principle of Relevance to the issue of the speaker's selection of the style of expression, we can say that the speaker must choose the most appropriate

style of expression taking into account relevance in order to draw the hearer's attention and as a consequence elicit the response of the hearer that the speaker expects. It is possible to explain the difference between the two utterances seen above from the point of relevance. If the speaker uses the first expression *Mizu o ippai kudasai*, and he or she fails to get some water, that means that the speaker does not fully take into account the relevance in choosing the expression. That might lead the speaker to change course and use the second expression *Mizu o ippai itadake masen deshō ka*, which would be the more relevant stimuli in the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. According to Tokieda the selection of the means of expression is the matter of the speaker's recognition of *bamen*. On the other hand, Sperber and Wilson propose bringing the consideration of relevance into the speaker's recognition of *bamen*.

Let us now return to Tokieda. He applies this practical, everyday function of language to the function of language in literature. First, he cites an Old Japanese poem that was made for a practical purpose.

*Yupuyami pa
miti tadutadusi
tuki matite
imase waga seko
sono ma ni mo mimu* ³¹

It would be difficult to walk
in the darkness of dusk,
wait until the moon rises,
so I may be with you
even this while longer.

This is the poem 4-709 in *Man'yōshū* (The collection of myriad leaves), the oldest

anthology of Japanese poetry. Obviously the poet composed the poem to stop her lover from leaving. The poem was how the woman expressed her wish. Therefore, the man is expected either to accept her entreaty and stay with her, or to refuse it and leave. According to Tokieda, this is the essential function of the poem, and because of this, we appreciate the effect of this practical function, the trying to persuade her lover to stay, and as a result our appreciation increases.

Next, let us look at a haiku poem by Bashō, in which Tokieda also finds a practical function.

*Araumi ya
Sado ni yokotau
Amanogawa* ³²

Wild seas,
lying to Sado Island,
the River of Heaven

He tells us that if the reader is so moved by the scene depicted in the haiku that he or she feels heartbroken and cries in profound pain as did Bashō, it is because of its practical function. The function is similar to our being moved by the mystery of the universe when looking up into the heavens or reading a book on natural science.

Tokieda regards a literary work as something that appeals to the reader, rather than as the object to which the reader is expected to feel only appreciation.

Then, what is to be said with regard to modern works of literature, are we not to take the words by the hero or heroine as seriously as those actually spoken to us?

Tokieda also finds here a similar practical function. Let us look at the statement that he makes on the influence of literature on society, citing a passage from the novel *Kare ga Sanjū no Toki* (When he was thirty) by Mushanokōji Saneatsu

(1885-1976).³³

Kare wa yume o mita.

Shinda aniyome ga detekite, kare ni kare ga hitogoroshi o shita to itta... Kare wa damatteita. Kare wa kono toki moshika shitara jibun no kaita mono ga, aru onna no kokoro ni shigeki o ataete, sono onna ga jibun no sukina otoko to kantsū shite, sorega gen'in de jisatsu shita no de wa naika to omotta.

(He dreamed.

A dead sister-in-law came and told him that he had murdered her . . .

He did not speak. He then thought that perhaps his writing might have influenced a woman's mind and the woman committed adultery with a man she loved, and because of that she killed herself.)

This is a reflection by the hero of the novel. However, as Tokieda says, it is possible to interpret it as an expression by the author himself. Tokieda finds here that the author, Mushanokōji, is reflecting on how seriously his works might influence readers. And we find that the influence of literature on society also comes from its practical function in terms of causing readers to both react and act. There is no essential difference, Tokieda would say, between the function of the woman's poem in the *Man'yōshū*, and the function that we find here. The woman's written poem affected the man instead of her spoken words, and the novel, too, has force in its words, words which can motivate the reader and cause him or her to act.


Tokieda indicated in the 1950s that the words used in literary works also have a practical function as compelling as the words of daily life. And so he tries to correlate two things within his Process Theory. One is the inclusion of the words of a literary work as speech act in our linguistic experience, and the other is to pay attention to the significance of reading as a closely related act. The linguistic experience by Ishii, reported at the beginning of this section, comes to be better

understood in the context of the practical experience that has been clarified by Tokieda. And so, after this rather lengthy introduction to the place of Tokieda's theory within the *bamen* that gives substance to our understanding, let us bring his theory to bear on the actuality of language.

6.3. THE READING ACT IN THE TEACHING OF LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

6.3.1. The Role of *Ji* in Communication

On the basis of Tokieda's view of the function of words in literature as understood within the framework of his Language Process Theory, we need to consider his thoughts on communication. The concept of communication is essential to his Language Process Theory. Tokieda displays the mechanism of communication using Figure XI,³⁴



A is the speaker (writer) and B is the hearer (reader). A expresses his or her ideas by sounds or symbols, that is, by expression. The sounds or signs stimulate B's hearing or vision, and he or she creates some image or concept in mind as a response. This is where communication occurs. What Tokieda emphasizes is that the hearer has received only the sound or sign from the speaker, and that comes through space. The ideas of the speaker seem to be given to the hearer. In fact, they are not. The hearer establishes the ideas by responding to the stimulation that is given by the speaker. Tokieda calls this the "creative act" of the hearer through understanding.

Thus, Tokieda establishes the hearer as having a positive function in communication. Not surprisingly, this concept was influential in the field of Japanese language education. For example, Saitō (1979) used it in his discussion of the problem of creativity in junior high school Japanese language classes.³⁵ Saitō clarifies the concepts of expression and understanding of language on the basis of Tokieda's Process Theory of communication. Saitō in particular insists that while we are aware of the significance of creativity in Japanese language education, it should be more clearly recognized as the creativity of expression and the understanding of language. He says that we need to recognize clearly that an act of understanding is creative as well as expressive. And he offers a number of practical examples that lead students to relate or receive something in speech or to report it as properly as possible, and then relates these to the training of their creativity.

Despite their long and fundamental influence in the field of Japanese language education, Tokieda's thoughts on communication have not made as great an impact on the field of Japanese linguistics. There have been few works treating it as a theoretical issue in linguistics. A review of the literature suggests that his thoughts

concerning the functions of language were hardly discussed in the period during which the relation between language and literature was being argued. Similarly, his thoughts on communication have not received the attention they deserve. And furthermore, little attempt has been made to consider the role of the reader of literary works on the basis of the concept of communication as a bilateral activity.

This leads us to another aspect of Tokieda's thoughts on communication – the role of *ji* in expression and understanding. According to the Language Process Theory, the concept of *ji*, together with *shi*, is a basic factor in the construction of an expression. Tokieda applied the concepts in several contexts, from the parts of speech in lexicology, to the unity of phrases and sentences in grammar, and to units beyond them. But when we examine the principle behind this, we find that every concrete expressions of thought by a human being can be argued to consist of a combination of objective expressions (*shi*) and subjective expressions (*ji*), both of which are inclined towards the objective and join the subjective to it. In other words, the subjective cannot be expressed apart from the objective. And here Tokieda takes up the principle again to clarify the meaning of communication. He tells us that there are also *shi* and *ji* in communication, and that we should more clearly recognize the important role of *ji*.

First, Tokieda points to the obvious fact that subjective and objective expressions coexist in communication. He observes that the news, which we hear, and now see, everyday through the media and which seems to be so objective, also includes the subjective. It expresses the journalist's thoughts or attitudes towards the incident; or more basically, it involves intentionality from the time the incident becomes public. There is no news that tells us the facts as they are. For this reason

Tokieda takes the news as an example of communication that has aspects both of the sender and the receiver of messages, and points out that what is important for the recipient in communication is as much subjective as it is objective.

Today, this is our basic perception of media information, and one upon which we develop our media literacy. One of these focuses is how we can cultivate our ability to employ our own values and judgments independently while we are ingesting the masses of information with which we are bombarded daily. It is interesting that Tokieda already pointed the subjective nature of the media, which was rather taken for granted at that time, and connected it, with all its complexity, to the basic and universal idea of communication.

Tokieda presents examples of *ji* expressions in order to show us how they function in communication.³⁶

- (3) *Kawa ni chikayoru na.*
River-to come close do not-particle
Do not come close to the river.

In this sentence, *Kawa ni chikayoru* is the *shi*, and expresses the material fact. On the other hand, *na* placed at the end of the sentence is the expression of *ji*, indicating prohibition, and makes the whole expression imperative. It thereby establishes the relationship between the person who orders and the person ordered, between the speaker who delivers the expression and the hearer who understands. Tokieda explains communication in this way and states that it is for the most part through the *ji* that the connection is made.

Let us look at another of his examples.

- (4) *Ano hito wa shin'yō no okeru hito desu.*
that man-topic can trust person be

That man is a person who can be trusted.

The verb *desu* is *ji* in the sentence above, and synthesizes the *shi* into a complete sentence. The *desu* shows the judgment of the speaker, and at the same time it can be taken as the element that shows a strong belief of the speaker as it is to be understood by the hearer. This leads the hearer to carry out his or her next act, for example, employing the man without reservation. On the other hand, if the speaker expresses him or herself in this way:

- (5) *Ano hito wa shin'yō no okeru hito deshō.*
that man-topic can trust person may be

That man may be a person who can be trusted.

it might lead the hearer to act differently – hesitating perhaps to employ the man – since *deshō* at the end of the sentence, instead of *desu*, signals the speaker's uncertainly and thus fails to provide the hearer with any degree of assurance with regard to the subject's reliability.

Originally, Tokieda had paid attention to these words from the point of their functions in interpersonal relationships. For example, he finds the postpositional particle *ne* to work in making the hearer a sympathizer of the speaker in such a sentence as below:

- (6) *Kaze ga samui ne.*
wind-nom cold particle

It is a cold wind, isn't it?

while another particle, *zo* forcefully asserts to the hearer the judgment of the speaker, as in the sentence:

- (7) *Ame ga futte iru zo.*
rain-nom is raining particle

It really is raining.

These examples can be found in Tokieda (1951),³⁷ the first work in Japanese linguistics to study the grammatical meaning of the particles and verbal endings from the point of their role in the construction of interpersonal relationships. The role of *ji* in communication was a conclusion he reached through his own ideas of the function of *ji* in interpersonal relationships.

6.3.2. The Reading of a Literary Text as a Linguistic Act

We have seen now the two factors that Tokieda regards as important when establishing his theory of communication. One is “understanding” as a creative act on the part of the hearer, and the other is the importance of recognizing the role of *ji* in establishing communication between the speaker and the hearer. Needless to say, he further emphasizes that the relation that exists between the speaker and the hearer can be taken as parallel to that which exists between the writer and the reader in the literary works. Taking this into account, I would like in this section to undertake a Process Theory reading of an illustrative text.

A text here is taken to mean all that is expressed by letters or characters.

Therefore, an attempt to read a text must involve not only the method for reading but also the meaning of “literature” as a specific range of linguistic expressions. Since our starting point is to consider the difference or lack of difference between the two kinds of expression, one being language in daily life and the other language in a literary work, it is quite natural that our attempt to consider the phenomenon of reading as an act, will open up the discussion to other issues concerning the text as

linguistic expression.

But now let us turn our attention to a concrete text, a true story by Fujiwara Tei (1918-), “*Shiroi Jūjika* (The white cross).”³⁸ It is the story of a Japanese mother, who saves her son’s life from the ravages of diphtheria in northern China during the state of chaos that existed just before the end of the Second World War. Being separated from her husband because of the upheaval, the narrator has to look after their three children including the six-year-old son Masahiro, who is suffering from the disease. The story begins with this passage:

Gogatsu no sora ni kane ga naru.

*Moedeta bakari no wakaba no nioi ga machi no sumi kara sumi made kyōkai
no kane no ne to tomoni hakobareru. Shiroi kimono o kita otoko no hito, fukai
aoiro ya, shinku no fuku ni kikazatta onna no hito no mure ga kyōkai e
atsumatteiku.*

*Nichiyō no kane wa machijū o ochitsuita haru no kūki no nakani
tadayowaseteita.*

(In the May air a bell rings.

The smell of fresh leaves, which are beginning to sprout from the trees, is conveyed to every nook and cranny of the town by the sound of the church bell. Groups of men wearing white clothes and women wearing beautiful dresses of deep blue or crimson are gathering at the church.

The sound of the Sunday bell drifts through the whole town in the calm air of spring.)

The passage consists of four sentences. As we read, we find that all except for the last sentence end with the non-past form, as indicated by the underlining: *naru* in the first sentence, *hakobareru* in the second, and *atsumatteiku* in the third. Only in the last sentence do we come across the past form *tadayowaseteita*. The author uses these forms to describe the day when the tragedy is going to happen, mixing *-ru* forms, which are commonly used to refer to present time events, with *-ta* forms

which are used to refer to past time events. Apart from the examples in the text such as, *naru*, *hakobareru*, and *atsumatteiku*, the *-ru* form includes,

The form of verbs: *iku* (go), *taberu* (eat), etc.

The form of adjectives: *aoi* (is blue), *utsukushii* (is beautiful),
shizuka-da (is quiet), *yūmei-da* (is famous), etc.

The form of nouns + auxiliary verb *da*: *haru-da* (is spring), *ame-da*
(is rain), etc.

On the other hand, the *-ta* form includes,

The form of verbs: *itta* (went), *tabeta* (ate), etc.

The form of adjectives: *aokatta* (was blue), *utsukushikatta* (was beautiful),
shizuka-datta (was quiet), *yūmei-datta* (was famous), etc.

The form of nouns + auxiliary verb *da*: *haru-datta* (was spring), *ame-datta*
(was rain), etc.

Let us look carefully at the use of *-ru* forms here and how the reader is to interpret the scene.

According to Tokieda's Language Process Theory, the writer's will, judgement, and attitude towards the content are basically shown by the *ji* at the end of the sentence in Japanese. They are the final elements that, as we have seen, play a major role in the act of communication. If this is so, whether the writer ends the sentence by using a *-ru* or *-ta* form should make a significant difference. From the point of reading, this is the key to understanding adequately the writer's intention. Therefore, we, as readers, need to consider with care the difference between the two. And so I would suggest that we reconsider the passage of time in the scene by looking closely at these forms.

First, let us examine the *-ta*. In colloquial Japanese, it shows the perfection of an act or the simple past, and it is often treated as corresponding to the past or perfect

tense in Western languages. This view is, however, problematic. The *-tari* in literary Japanese, which corresponds to *-ta* in colloquial language, originally consists of *-te* (the continuative marker) and *ari*, the verb to be. The *-te* here connects the main verb with the *ari* and signifies the existence or continuation of a situation. Neither element had the function of showing tense. And even in the modern language it is often hard to feel the consciousness of tense in their usage. The *-te* connects the preceding verb or adjective to the following elements, indicating the relation of sequence, cause, reason, or the like. Broadly speaking, it functions to indicate that the action indicated by the preceding verb has some objective relevance to the context. In other words, the *-te* shows the writer's assessment of the event. The function of *ari*, on the other hand, is to assert the existence of the situation as it is, again, from the outside. This, too, is the judgment of the writer. Therefore, we see that both of *-te* and *ari* essentially show the judgment or attitude of the writer, although they have been taken by many grammarians as showing the situation with respect to the temporal conditions of objective facts.

Here, let us look at the study of Japanese tense and aspect. Many works on tense and aspect in Japanese have been found within the traditional Japanese linguistics. Kindaichi (1950, 1955) are the most notable works in the study of tense and aspect as the systems of Japanese verbs. Kindaichi (1950) first tried to divide modern Japanese verbs into four classes, dynamic (*keizoku*) verbs, momentary (*shunkan*) verbs, stative (*jōtai*) verbs, and others from the point of view of aspect, and described the meaning and uses of those verbs.³⁹ On the basis of that, Kindaichi (1955) presented the basic categories of tense and aspect of Japanese verbs.⁴⁰ Following the two works there are Suzuki (1957, 1958),⁴¹ Morita (1968),⁴² Teramura (1969)⁴³ and Yoshikawa

(1973)⁴⁴. In particular Yoshikawa (1973) presented the data of the examples of *-shiteiru*, *-shitekuru*, *-shiteiku*, *-shiteshimau*, *-shitearu*, *-shiteoku* and tried to explain the semantics of those forms on the basis of the division of verbs made by Kindaichi.⁴⁵

There are also works on the tense and aspect systems of Japanese within generative linguistics. Nakamura (1994)⁴⁶ adopting the proposal made by Zagana (1990)⁴⁷ and Stowell (1993)⁴⁸ investigates some aspects of temporal interpretation in Japanese. Ogihara (1999)⁴⁹ discusses the semantics of tense and aspect and says that *-ta* is a relative tense morpheme in the sense of Comrie (1976)⁵⁰ showing that its interpretation is determined in relation to structurally higher tenses and not necessarily in relation to the utterance time. Yet another notable work is Takeuchi (1999), which concerning the issue of *-ru* and *-ta* argues that on balance, in spite of the common grammatical nomenclature non-past vs. past, the aspectual distinction, non-anterior as opposed to anterior, has probably wider generality in the language.⁵¹ As Takeuchi points out, it is clear that *-ta* cannot refer to an interval beyond the speech time, whereas *-ru* can include past in addition to present-future.⁵²

Next, let us look at *-ru* form in the story. It is incorrect to regard it as the present form corresponding to that which is found in Indo-European languages. Strictly speaking, there is no meaning of the present tense in *-ru* form, and many grammarians refer to it as the “non-past” ending. It indicates the continuation of certain situation rather than its presence, as a characteristic of tense. This means that the writer, as a storyteller, exists concurrently with the situation. Therefore, as long as the *-ru* form is used in the story, the time of the story is not specified. And as long as the storyteller remains at the moment of the situation in the story, the reader is also

required to do so. Otherwise, the reader cannot experience the “here” and “now” presented by the storyteller from within the situation. This use of the Japanese non-past is similar to the use of the “historic present” in English, where present tense is sometimes used by a narrator to refer to past events to make a portrayal more vivid.

Thus, the distinction between the *-ta* and *-ru* forms plays a major role not by distinguishing the past and present, but by reconstructing the delicate sense of the here and now of a certain situation in the consciousness of the reader, apart from the passage of time in the story as a whole. It brings the events into the *bamen* of the reader.

But let us return to “*Shiroyi Jūjika* (The white cross),” and consider the meaning of the *-ru* form from this point of view – the story as reminiscence. The harrowing events of the entire work are described most frequently by the use of the *-ta* form. However, quite a few *-ru* forms are mixed in with them. And this makes the reader feel a certain tension in the development of the events. As we have seen, this is a story of a mother’s desperate striving to save her six-year-old son from diphtheria. There are several critical points in the development of the story.

1. Masahiro gets diphtheria and bleeds a great deal from the nose.
2. His mother has no money for a serum injection.
3. Exhausted by trying and failing to borrow money, she finally takes him to the church affiliated Kyūsei Hospital in the town.
4. She meets a gentle doctor there, who injects Masahiro with the serum and accepts the Longines watch of her husband for payment, the value of which was quite little.
5. Masahiro survives

Significantly, the *-ru* form appears in the scenes that is related to the points

enumerated above. The beginning of the story, which we have seen, merely describes the church and the people of the town going to church on Sunday. In reading further, we learn that the church is next to the hospital, and that it is the hospital to which she is carrying her sick son in search of a doctor. And through the narration the reader gradually comes to know that the scene being presented is not simply the background of the story. The writer is relating the situation from inside, describing the church on Sunday morning. And by doing so, she leads the reader to the same experience.

Let us look closely at some of the sentences describing Masahiro's condition, sentences where *-ru* forms are used.

(8) *"Okāchan," Masahiro no koe ga suru.*

"Mum," Masahiro's voice says [something].

(9) *Masahiro wa watashi ga soba o hanareru no ga iya rashii.*

Masahiro appears to be in fear of my leaving.

(10) *Moshi jihuteriya dattara to omou to watashi wa jitto shite irarenai.*

I cannot keep calm because I'm worried about his getting diphtheria.

In the every description, time has not passed, though the event is not being presented as an isolated moment in time. It offers the circumstances as continuing from past and continuing for a while, even long into future. The first sentence contains the element, *Masahiro no koe ga suru*. (Masahiro's voice says [something]). It is neither:

(11) *Masahiro ga koe o dashita.*

Masahiro uttered [something].

nor,

(12) *Masahiro no koe ga watashi ni kikoeta.*

I heard Masahiro's voice.

The verb *suru* here does not, as it usually does, mean doing something. Rather, it implies something will happen. It shows the experience as a phenomenon that is experienced as a perception, rather than as an act. This suggests that the writer, as a mother, has perceived something strange in her son's voice, and this draws the reader into a situation, foreshadowing events. Moreover, by using the *-ru* form, the writer tells us of the events as if she is uttering them in the here and now. We are drawn into the time and space of the story. We can see similar examples in the descriptions concerning her husband's watch, which she had taken to a pawnshop with disappointing results.

Finally, with respect to the *-ru* form, we should notice instances where the progressive form *-teiru* is used at the end of a sentence. Not surprisingly, this also is dominant in descriptions of Masahiro.

- (13) *Nodo ga itai to ka, kurushii to ka, shikirini watashi ni uttaeteiru.*

He is continuously complaining to me of a sore throat or a pain.

- (14) *Miru to Masahiro no hana kara makkuroi chi ga dokudoku detekiteiru.*

I see pitch-black blood gushing out of Masahiro's nose.

- (15) *Kaiki no hito wa nattoku ikanai yō ni furimuita mama me o mihatteiru.*

The accountant is gazing at the doctor as if in doubt.

The last sentence describes the conversation between the doctor, who has just injected the serum into Masahiro, and the accountant of the hospital. The man was sitting at the corner of the room with Masahiro's mother. The doctor has said that he is going to pay for the treatment of the patient, but the man has not understood what he means. This must have been an uneasy moment for her. How does she describe it as a storyteller? The answer is in the sentence above, a sentence ending with the form, *mihatteiru*.

It is the writer who, from within the story, recognizes that *kaikei no hito wa me o mihatteiru* (the accountant is looking on), and it is also she who records the scene in this way. However, when and where does the writer exist as the articulator of the expression? If she were writing from the point of view of the present, it would be *kaikei no hito wa me o mihatteita* (the accountant was looking on). That would suggest that she is recalling the scene retrospectively. On the other hand, using the *iru* form at the end of the sentence means that she recalls it introspectively. The narrator is not here only reporting the time of the event. There are other more subjective concerns. First, the *-teiru* form functions as a means of separating the two people. One is the subject in the situation who recognizes the man's action and the other is the storyteller, who is writing it from the point of view of the present. And also, the form helps to make the time and space virtual, where the subject in the situation recognizes the scene, and at the same time, expresses it as an event within the time and space of the story.

Thus, the introspective effect is created. Both the one who experiences the past event and the one who writes it exist within the context of the story. This effect will continue until a sentence with *-ta* occurs; since, as we have seen, the *-ta* form functions in such a way as to treat the action that has been expressed as something objective. In other words, the subject of the event will depart from the scene with a *-ta* form, and at the same time, so does the subject of the expression.

We might observe in conclusion that the *-teiru* form was also used in the description of the church, where we, as readers, confirm the fact that the church has a special meaning in the narration by offering courage to Masahiro's mother by inspiring hope.

6.3.3. The Reading Process as a Way to Unite the Teaching of Language and Literature

By considering reading by means of Tokieda's Language Process Theory, it has become clear that for him language is action. It might be helpful to view it from yet another point of view.

The literary critic Kenneth Burke regards language as an act rather than as a means to reach absolute knowledge. He says in "Symbolic action in a poem by Keats,"⁵³

To consider language as a means of information or knowledge is to consider it epistemologically, semantically, in terms of "science." To consider it as a mode of action is to consider it in terms of "poetry." For a poem is an act, the symbolic act of the poet who made it – an act of such a nature that, in surviving as a structure or object, it enables us as readers to re-enact it.

It is interesting to see that there is here something in common with Tokieda's view of the function of literature. However, we might pay closer attention to Burke's thoughts regarding poetic meaning. He tells us in his "Semantic and Poetic Meaning" that the relation between the two is not one of opposition.⁵⁴

Seen from this angle, poetic meaning and semantic meaning would not be absolute antitheses. Poetic meaning would not be the opposite of semantic meaning. It would be different from, or other than, or more than, or even, if you want, less than, but not antithetical to.

And at the same time, he suggests that poetic meaning contains many pragmatic,

positivistic, futuristic values. Although we will not discuss here the difference between Burke's concept of poetic meaning and Tokieda's linguistic view, it would be correct to think of them as being closely related.

With respect to Tokieda's position, one important point should be noted. We must take into account that there are two distinct ways of considering meaning in Tokieda's theory. This has been discussed in his work in 1940.⁵⁵ According to him, we should distinguish the two positions towards language – the position of the user (*shutaiteki tachiba*) and the position of its study (*kansatsushateki tachiba*). The *shutaiteki tachiba* uses language as a means of expressing and understanding an idea, while *kansatsushateki tachiba* considers language as an object of study. From the former point of view, such issues as the beauty, ugliness, and value of language are concerned. From the latter, questions concerning observation, analysis, and description of language arise. Tokieda not only distinguishes these two positions, but also regards the former as essential for the latter. He says that the latter is possible only when it contains the former.⁵⁶ We can understand the latter position only by experiencing the former.

Seen from this point of view, the understanding of reading by means of Tokieda's Process Theory should include as an important concern its function in language education. For as long as we take the theory as a frame, we cannot divide the position of the reader from that of the researcher. It might be proper to discuss the reading of literature while recognizing our own literary experience as an ever present factor. In this way it would be possible to make use of the results in our literature education. But this is not necessarily the only purpose of such a union.

We have already seen that the Language Process Theory, unlike the speech act

theories of Austin or Searle, includes literary works as an integral part of language and that it finds in them similar forces that function to influence readers in the same way that language does in daily life. Moreover, we have seen that the theory also makes it clear that readers play the major role in an act of reading. The reader is acting positively and independently in his or her various relations with the author and the context, the *bamen*, constructed by the latter. It is reading that takes place at the time and in the space created by the text as it constructs the relation between the reader and author. Therefore, we might best understand the Language Process Theory as a theory that establishes an independent role for the reader in the reading, and places it properly within the process of learning of a language.

In summation, it should be observed that much of what has been discussed here falls within the purview of current scholarship. Semantics and pragmatics are very much part of the discipline of linguistics. Language, Tokieda would contend, is a process through which our objective and subjective selves are brought into being. His contribution is to offer a theory that strives to unify different aspects of language rather than assigning separable tasks to various sub disciplines. The tradition that divides language from literature and form and content limits our capacity to understand most effectively the interaction of communication, and as a consequence our being in the world.

CHAPTER 6 NOTES

¹ This was published in *Kokugo to Kokubungaku*, Vol.24 No.8, 1947.

² This paper was published with the previous paper “Bungaku ni okeru gengo no shomondai (The problems of language in literature)” in his *Kokugogaku Genron Zokuhen* (A sequel to “The principles of Japanese language study”), Iwanami Shoten, 1955.

³ Gengo kyōiku to bungaku kyōiku (Language education and literature education), *Kyōiku Kensetsu*, Vol.8, 1952.

⁴ *Gengo to Bungei*, March 1959. This paper was also contained in his works *Kanshō to Hihyō* (Appreciation and criticism) in 1962, *Shibundō*, and *Yoshida Seiichi Chōsakushū* (Collected works of Yoshida Seiichi), Vol.16, 1980, Ōfūsha.

⁵ *Kokugo to Kokubungaku*, Vol.40 No.6, 1963. This appears also in his work *Kaikō Kokugo Kyōiku no Hōhō* (The method of Japanese language education, rewriting edition), Yūseidō, 1963.

⁶ *Bungaku* (Literature), October 1963.

⁷ *Bungaku* (Literature), May 1964. This appeared subsequently under the title “Bungaku no gainen (The concept of literature)” in *The Works of Katō Shūichi*, Vol.1, 1979.

⁸ *Bungei Kenkyū* (The study of literature), Vol.50, June 1965.

⁹ Nishio, *Kokugo kyōiku no mondaiten* (The problems in the Japanese language education), *Kokugo Tsūshin* 37, 1961, Chikuma Shobō.

¹⁰ Katō, 1979.

¹¹ *Bungei* (Art littéraire), September 1948.

¹² *Iwanami Kōza Bungaku* (Iwanami essay series: Literature), Vol.4, 1976.

¹³ See “Nihon bungeigaku no juritsu ni tsuite (On the establishment of the study of Japanese literary arts),” *Bungaku*, October 1934, *Nihon Bungeigaku* (The study of Japanese literary arts), Iwanami Shoten, 1935, and *Nihon Bungei no Yōshiki* (The form of Japanese literary arts), Iwanami Shoten, 1939.

¹⁴ Ashida Takaaki, *Gogaku to bungaku* (The study of language and literature), *Chūgoku Bungaku Kenkyū* (Journal of the Waseda University Society of Chinese Literature), No.23, 1997, pp.95-105.

¹⁵ J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp.108-109.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.22.

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- ¹⁷ J. R. Searle, The logical status of fictional discourse, *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.62.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., p.67.
- ¹⁹ Richard Ohmann, Speech acts and the definition of literature, *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, IV, Winter 1971, pp.1-19.
- ²⁰ Stanley E. Fish, Literature in the reader: Affective stylistics, *Reader-Response Criticism from Formalism to Post-Structuralism*, John Hopkins University Press, 1980, p.70.
- ²¹ Ibid., p.99
- ²² Tokieda, *Kokugogaku Genron Zokuhen* (A sequel to “The principles of the Japanese language study”), Iwanami Shoten, 1955.
- ²³ Ishii Shōji, *Oku no hosomichi no kōbun ni tsuite* (On the structure of sentences in *Oku no Hosomichi* by Bashō), *Kokugo Kokubun*, November 1934. The paper also appears as the second chapter in Ishii Shōji, *Kokubungaku to Kokugo Kyōiku* (Japanese literature and Japanese language education), Bungakusha, 1936.
- ²⁴ Matsuo Bashō, *Oku no Hosomichi*, p.84, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei* 46, Iwanami Shoten, 1959.
- ²⁵ Tokieda, 1955, p.103.
- ²⁶ Tokieda’s view of those functions was already seen in his paper “Bungaku kenkyū ni okeru gengogakuha no tachiba to sono hōhō (The position and method of linguistics in the study of literature),” *Kokugo to Kokubungaku*, Vo.28 No.4, 1951, before his *Kokugogaku Genron Zokuhen* (A sequel to “The principles of the Japanese language study”) in 1955.
- ²⁷ Paul Grice, Meaning, *The Philosophical Review* 66, 1957, pp.377-388. Reprinted in *Semantics*, Steinberg and Jakobovits eds., 1971, pp.53-59. And also seen in *Studies in the Way of Words*, Harvard University Press, 1989.
- ²⁹ D. Sperber and D. Wilson, *Relevance, Communication and Cognition*, Harvard University Press, 1986, P156.
- ³⁰ Ibid., p.49.
- ³¹ Concerning Tokieda’s statements regarding this poem, see his *Bungaku kenkyū ni okeru gengogakuha no tachiba to sono hōhō* (The position and method of linguistics in the study of literature), 1951, where it is more detailed than *Kokugogaku Genron Zokuhen*.
- ³² Matsuo Bashō, *Oku no Hosomichi*, p.91, *Nihon Koten Bungaku Taikei* 46, Iwanami Shoten, 1959.

³³ Tokieda. 1955, pp.122-124.

³⁴ Although the figure is originally seen in Tokieda, 1955, I have taken it here from Tokieda, 1963, which is slightly different from the original.

³⁵ Saitō Yoshikado, *Kokugoka ni okeru sōzōsei no ikusei* (The education of creativity in Japanese language class), *Gengo Hyōgen no Kyōiku – Hyōgen Nōryoku o Sodateru Shidō to Jissairei* (The education of linguistic expression—guides and examples to train the ability of expression), edited by the society for the study of language education of Ochanomizu Women's University, Tokyo, 1979.

³⁶ Tokieda, 1955, pp.46-47.

³⁷ Tokieda, *Taijin kankei o kōsei suru joshi jodōshi* (Particles and auxiliary verbs that construct interpersonal relationship), *Kokugo Kokubun* (Japanese language and Japanese literature), Vol.20 No.9, December 1951.

³⁸ The story is seen in Fujiwara Tei, *Nagareru Hoshi wa Ikiteiru* (Shooting stars are living), Tokyo: Kaiseisha, 1976.

³⁹ Kindaichi Haruhiko, *Kokugo dōshi no ichibunrui* (A proposal for Japanese verb classification), *Gengo Kenkyū* (Linguistic Studies) 15, 1950, pp.48-63.

⁴⁰ Kindaichi Haruhiko, *Nihongo dōshi no tensu to asupekuto* (Tense and aspect of Japanese verbs), *Nagoya Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyū Ronshū* (Collection of research papers of Humanity Division, Nagoya University)10, 1955, pp.63-89. Both his papers are included in Kindaichi Haruhiko (ed.), *Nihongo Dōshi no Asupekuto* (Aspect of Japanese verbs), Tokyo: Mugi Shobō, 1976.

⁴¹ Suzuki Shigeyuki, *Nihongo no dōshi no sugata (asupekuto) ni tsuite* (Aspect of Japanese verbs), 1957 and *Nihongo no dōshi no toki (tensu) to sugata (asupekuto)*, (Tense and aspect of Japanese verbs), 1958. Both his papers were read at the meeting of the society for the study of linguistics, and published later in Kindaichi Haruhiko (ed.), *Nihongo Dōshi no Asupekuto* (Aspect of Japanese verbs), 1976.

⁴² Morita Yoshiyuki, *Iku kuru no yōhō* (The use of *iku* and *kuru*), *Kokugogaku* 75, 1968.

⁴³ Teramura Hideo, *Katsuyōgobi, jodōshi, hojodōshi to asupekuto 1* (Inflection, auxiliary verbs, attached verbs, and aspect vol.1), *Nihongo Nihonbunka 1* (Japanese and Japanese culture 1), 1969.

⁴⁴ Yoshikawa Taketoki, *Gendai Nihongo dōshi no asupekuto no kenkyū* (A study on aspect of the modern Japanese verbs), *Linguistic Communications* 9, Monash University, 1973. Also in Kindaichi (ed.), 1976.

⁴⁵ Concerning the history of the study of tense and aspect in Japanese, see Takahashi

Tarō, *Nihongo dōshi no asupekuto kenkyū shōshi* (The short history of the study of aspect of Japanese verbs), Kindaichi (ed.), *Nihongo Dōshi no Asupekuto* (Aspect of Japanese verbs), 1976. And also for a survey article on tense and aspect in Japanese see Teramura Hideo and Inoue Kazuko, *Tensu, asupekuto* (Tense, aspect), in Inoue (ed.), *Nihon Bunpō Shōjiten* (A mini encyclopedia of Japanese grammar), Tokyo: Taishūkan, 1989, pp.165-190.

⁴⁶ Nakamura Akira, Some aspects of temporal interpretation in Japanese, *Formal Approaches to Japanese Linguistics I, MIT Working Papers in Linguistics 24*, edited by M. Koizumi & H. Ura, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1994, pp.231-246.

⁴⁷ K. Zagana, Time as temporal argument structure, Ms., University of Washington, 1990.

⁴⁸ T. Stowell, Syntax of tense, Ms., UCLA, 1993.

⁴⁹ Ogiwara Toshiyuki, The semantics of tense and aspect in Japanese, in N. Tsujimura (ed.) *The Handbook of Japanese Linguistics*, Blackwell, 1999, pp.326-348.

⁵⁰ B. Comrie, *Aspect*, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1976.

⁵¹ L. Takeuchi, *The Structure and History of Japanese: From Yamatokotoba to Nihongo*, London and New York: Longman, 1999, p.188-189.

⁵² Takeuchi, 1999, p.189.

⁵³ K. Burke. *A Grammar of Motives*, University of California Press, 1945, p.447.

⁵⁴ K. Burke. *The Philosophy of Form: Studies in Symbolic Actions*, University of California Press, 1941, the third edition, 1973.

⁵⁵ Tokieda, Gengo ni taisuru futatsu no tachiba – Shutaiteki tachiba to kansatsushateki tachiba (The two positions towards language – The position of the user and the position of its study), *Kotoba* (Language), Vol.2 No.7, September 1940.

⁵⁶ Later, Tokieda changed this sentence, and said that the latter is possible only when it premises the former. The phrase of “*kansatsushateki tachiba*” was also changed to “*kansatsuteki tachiba*.” See Tokieda, 1941, p.29.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

In examining Tokieda's Language Process Theory (*Gengo Kateisetsu*), there were three points that attracted our close attention. The first was Suzuki Akira's linguistic theory of 1824, presented in his *Gengyo Shishuron* (The four categories of words), and of great influence upon the development of Tokieda's own linguistic thought. Tokieda found Suzuki to have shown a useful categorization of words on the basis of not only their functional but also more importantly their practical, which is to say, their pragmatic distinctions. This led Tokieda to establish his theory of *shi* (objective expressions) and *ji* (subjective expressions). Tokieda further revived Suzuki's notion of a three-dimensional analysis, where *ji* wrapped or encapsulated *shi* and thereby synthesized the structure of phrases, clauses, and ultimately sentences. This conceptualization of language presages that of the founder of Pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, who established his semiotics on the relation between any two entities, persons, ideas, or natural forces, but asserted that their relationship cannot be properly understood in simple dyadic terms, but always requires a third element, the framework or structure of meanings, truths, laws, assumptions, and expectations within which their relationship occurs.

Secondly, although Tokieda did not refer specifically to the philosophical works of Nishida Kitarō, it is clear that his logic of *basho* (locus) served as a philosophical basis for Tokieda's Language Process Theory. According to Nishida, the broadest and most fundamental element in logic is not the subject but the predicate; that is to say, the concepts that give meaning to the process by which events unfold, that is the basis of any fully effective interpretation. Nishida, contrary to the Aristotelian,

Thomistic, and Analytical systems of logic, sought to establish a logic that included the interrelationship between the predicate of a connotative judgment and that which served as its subject. This provided the foundation for Tokieda's idea that a Japanese sentence consists of *shi* and *ji*, where the former is regularly and significantly enwrapped by the latter. Furthermore, this supported the Japanese syntactic theory presented by Tokieda in which *ji* is structurally more relevant to meaning than *shi*, and functions in such a way as to give contextual meaning to the status of the subject.

Thirdly, the Buddhist worldview was also taken into account when we considered Tokieda's Process Theory. And again we must reiterate that Buddhism here must be taken not in its religious sense but as a philosophical system that strives to obtain an understanding of things as they are without positing a priori judgments concerning their intrinsic nature. For Tokieda, the concept of *bamen*, for example, is not a term used as a premise but as a procedural concept to designate one of the three interrelated conditions in which language functions. The other conditions are *shutai* (the subject as a practical condition) and *sozai* (the material or content), and while *bamen* is usually translated as "situation," we must pay close attention to how Tokieda uses the term. In his theory it does not signify merely the location and temporal background of the speech event, but also the subject's mood, emotion, and attitude towards that which in English would be called the situation. The concept of *bamen* is also significant in that by employing it Tokieda presents a view of the world, not unlike Peirce's, that is neither purely objective nor subjective, but an integration of the two. *Bamen* refers not only to the concepts of *kon* (the sense-organ) and *kyō* (object), but as we observed in Chapter 3 it follows Buddhist thought and makes it clear that the relation between *kon* and *kyō* is dependently correlative.

Gengo Kateisetsu is a theory in which language is taken as an expression of human experience, which manifests itself as human action. Therefore, Tokieda did not attempt to employ the methods of the natural sciences to his analysis of language. In sum, we have tried to demonstrate that the Language Process Theory offers insights that have the capacity to broaden our understanding of human communication.

On the basis of this overview of the origins, features, and potential value of Tokieda's Process Theory, we turned our attention to three important topics pertaining to its practical application. These are (1) the relevance of text analyses to the study and learning of language, (2) the value of Tokieda's theory in obtaining a fuller comprehension of *keigo*, and (3) the question of speech act theory and its application to the practice of reading, all discussed to attain a fuller understanding of the communicative function of language and the most effective way to acquire proficiency in its use.

Concerning the application of Tokieda's theory to text analysis, we discussed the problems his theory has drawn attention to related to the subjective aspects of a text and also the importance of a fuller understanding of the function of conjunctions in giving cohesion to a text. The first topic was dealt with in Section 4.1 of Chapter 4 where an attempt was made to show the potential usefulness of the Process Theory in gaining a richer understanding of the subjective aspects of a text by using the concepts *shi* and *ji* to clarify the problems created by subjective expressions and to guide us to their solutions. Through the analysis of the preface of the Late Middle Japanese work *Tsurezuregusa* and several of its English translations we saw that by applying Tokieda's perception of the difference between *shi* and *ji* to a text it

becomes possible to explicate it in a manner that is relevant to both theoretical and applied linguistics. That such an analysis, employing the concepts of *shi* and *ji*, has the capacity to expand our understanding beyond the grammar of sentences to that of whole texts and their translations is, I believe, an important contribution of this study and one that deserves greater attention. Further, it might be asked: can Tokieda's theory, which has been applied both to a full text and its translations, be applied in the foreign language classroom to place the subjective elements of language in a more readily teachable context? Certainly in the language classrooms in Japan the focus of instruction is on the phonetic, morphological, and syntactic aspects of sentences and only peripherally is attention paid to the larger contextual meanings and their comprehension.

The importance of the function of conjunctions in cohesion has been widely discussed. And for this reason, in Section 4.2 of the fourth chapter, we turned our attention to Tokieda's treatment of the issue by applying the Process Theory to another, this time more contemporary text and the way its conjunctions are employed to achieve cohesion. Through the analysis of Akutagawa's "*Kumo no Ito* (The spider's thread)," it became clear that conjunctions played a vital role in expressing the narrator's various attitudes and in leading the reader in the intended direction and therefore contributed significantly to the cohesiveness and therefore the fuller understanding of the text. Conjunctions express the narrator's feelings, judgements, and interpretation of the content, sometimes confirming, sometimes confounding the reader's assumptions. They also help to synthesise the text by indicating the narrator's judgements at a level different from the cohesiveness of the immediate content. In so doing, conjunctions function as subjective expressions and contribute

not only to the linkage between syntactic units but also communicate the more subtle features of the language that must be mastered by learners.

Through the examination of Tokieda's theory of *keigo*, in Chapter 5, we have seen that several aspects of Tokieda's theory, such as the difference between *shi* and *ji*, and the role of *bamen*, have yet to be used effectively in the study and teaching of honorific expressions. Were these concepts applied more conscientiously; we would be able to construct a blueprint of the language process that would lead to a more effective way to distinguish between respect language, humble language, and polite language. Such a model of *keigo* would be of great help to both native speakers and foreign learners of Japanese. There is perhaps no more context relevant aspect of any language than the way utterances are formed within a social setting. It is for this reason that a careful preliminary analysis of this aspect of Japanese was carried out.

By examining Tokieda's Language Process Theory from the point of view of speech acts, in Chapter 6, we found a significant difference between his theory and other speech act theories such as those of Austin and Searle. The Language Process Theory, unlike others, includes literary works as an integral part of language, and finds in them forces that function to influence readers in very much the same way as do the speech acts of daily life. Indeed, a close examination of the corpora suggests that no clear distinction can be made between the two. Tokieda's view opens up the possibility of discussing many issues concerning the relationship between language and literature, which is to say the whole of language. And needless to say, literature introduces to the dialogue the role of reading and how it is to be dealt with in the teaching of language. In this chapter it was argued that the Process Theory is a useful means by which to unite the teaching of language and literature, a topic of growing

concern in the pedagogic community.

The introduction to this thesis stated that its aim was not the presentation of Tokieda's Language Process Theory as something that is merely of historical value and the assessment of whether or not it has been evaluated properly. Its aim rather has been to present it as a theory that deserves to be more seriously discussed as a topic of contemporary linguistics, both theoretical and practical.

I believe that we can examine this position from yet another point of view. Some scholars, particularly Japanese, take the position that Tokieda's theory has been already superseded by subsequent studies, and that, therefore, there is little value to be found in further discussion. This, I would argue, is a questionable point of view. The theory has in many of its insights yet to be superseded; it has in part for political reasons been set aside as a footnote to the history of Japanese linguistics without sufficiently close attention being paid to its importance within the context of the current debate over the most useful model for linguistic analyses. Some will argue that one cannot create the future without forgetting the past. This is open to question. As Motoori Norinaga, the author of *Kojikiden* (An annotation of *Kojiki* the most ancient chronicle of Japan), tells us, the future does not exist ahead; it exists in what we learn insightfully from the past. And the past must be deeply understood if the future is to unfold meaningfully before us. It is hoped that by demonstrating the usefulness of Tokieda's Language Process Theory this thesis will lead those contemporary linguists who have for so long regarded it as an historical curiosity to reconsider its theoretical and pedagogical value, and convince those who have up until now been unaware of its existence that there is good reason to examine more closely Tokieda's thought and its usefulness in their study and teaching of language.

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